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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: syzbot+e2d6cfb305e9f3911dea@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	ebiggers3@gmail.com, james.morse@arm.com,
	keun-o.park@darkmatter.ae, labbott@redhat.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH] net: Whitelist the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 17:44:38 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180208014438.GA12186@beast> (raw)

Most callers of put_cmsg() use a "sizeof(foo)" for the length argument.
Within put_cmsg(), a copy_to_user() call is made with a dynamic size, as a
result of the cmsg header calculations. This means that hardened usercopy
will examine the copy, even though it was technically a fixed size and
should be implicitly whitelisted. All the put_cmsg() calls being built
from values in skbuff_head_cache are coming out of the protocol-defined
"cb" field, so whitelist this field entirely instead of creating per-use
bounce buffers, for which there are concerns about performance.

Original report was:

Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'skbuff_head_cache' (offset 64, size 16)!
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3663 at mm/usercopy.c:81 usercopy_warn+0xdb/0x100 mm/usercopy.c:76
...
 __check_heap_object+0x89/0xc0 mm/slab.c:4426
 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:236 [inline]
 __check_object_size+0x272/0x530 mm/usercopy.c:259
 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:112 [inline]
 check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:143 [inline]
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:154 [inline]
 put_cmsg+0x233/0x3f0 net/core/scm.c:242
 sock_recv_errqueue+0x200/0x3e0 net/core/sock.c:2913
 packet_recvmsg+0xb2e/0x17a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3296
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:803 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg+0xc9/0x110 net/socket.c:810
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x2a4/0x640 net/socket.c:2179
 __sys_recvmmsg+0x2a9/0xaf0 net/socket.c:2287
 SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2368 [inline]
 SyS_recvmmsg+0xc4/0x160 net/socket.c:2352
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0

Reported-by: syzbot+e2d6cfb305e9f3911dea@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 6d07d1cd300f ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
I tried the inlining, it was awful. Splitting put_cmsg() was awful. So,
instead, whitelist the "cb" field as the least bad option if bounce
buffers are unacceptable. Dave, do you want to take this through net, or
should I take it through the usercopy tree?
---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 6b0ff396fa9d..201b96c8f414 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -3889,10 +3889,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_gro_receive);
 
 void __init skb_init(void)
 {
-	skbuff_head_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_head_cache",
+	skbuff_head_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("skbuff_head_cache",
 					      sizeof(struct sk_buff),
 					      0,
 					      SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
+					      offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb),
+					      sizeof_field(struct sk_buff, cb),
 					      NULL);
 	skbuff_fclone_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_fclone_cache",
 						sizeof(struct sk_buff_fclones),
-- 
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: syzbot+e2d6cfb305e9f3911dea@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	ebiggers3@gmail.com, james.morse@arm.com,
	keun-o.park@darkmatter.ae, labbott@redhat.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH] net: Whitelist the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 17:44:38 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180208014438.GA12186@beast> (raw)

Most callers of put_cmsg() use a "sizeof(foo)" for the length argument.
Within put_cmsg(), a copy_to_user() call is made with a dynamic size, as a
result of the cmsg header calculations. This means that hardened usercopy
will examine the copy, even though it was technically a fixed size and
should be implicitly whitelisted. All the put_cmsg() calls being built
from values in skbuff_head_cache are coming out of the protocol-defined
"cb" field, so whitelist this field entirely instead of creating per-use
bounce buffers, for which there are concerns about performance.

Original report was:

Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'skbuff_head_cache' (offset 64, size 16)!
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3663 at mm/usercopy.c:81 usercopy_warn+0xdb/0x100 mm/usercopy.c:76
...
 __check_heap_object+0x89/0xc0 mm/slab.c:4426
 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:236 [inline]
 __check_object_size+0x272/0x530 mm/usercopy.c:259
 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:112 [inline]
 check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:143 [inline]
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:154 [inline]
 put_cmsg+0x233/0x3f0 net/core/scm.c:242
 sock_recv_errqueue+0x200/0x3e0 net/core/sock.c:2913
 packet_recvmsg+0xb2e/0x17a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3296
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:803 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg+0xc9/0x110 net/socket.c:810
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x2a4/0x640 net/socket.c:2179
 __sys_recvmmsg+0x2a9/0xaf0 net/socket.c:2287
 SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2368 [inline]
 SyS_recvmmsg+0xc4/0x160 net/socket.c:2352
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0

Reported-by: syzbot+e2d6cfb305e9f3911dea@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 6d07d1cd300f ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
I tried the inlining, it was awful. Splitting put_cmsg() was awful. So,
instead, whitelist the "cb" field as the least bad option if bounce
buffers are unacceptable. Dave, do you want to take this through net, or
should I take it through the usercopy tree?
---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 6b0ff396fa9d..201b96c8f414 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -3889,10 +3889,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_gro_receive);
 
 void __init skb_init(void)
 {
-	skbuff_head_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_head_cache",
+	skbuff_head_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("skbuff_head_cache",
 					      sizeof(struct sk_buff),
 					      0,
 					      SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
+					      offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb),
+					      sizeof_field(struct sk_buff, cb),
 					      NULL);
 	skbuff_fclone_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_fclone_cache",
 						sizeof(struct sk_buff_fclones),
-- 
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

             reply	other threads:[~2018-02-08  1:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-08  1:44 Kees Cook [this message]
2018-02-08  1:44 ` [PATCH] net: Whitelist the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field Kees Cook
2018-02-08 20:16 ` David Miller
2018-02-08 20:16   ` David Miller
2018-02-08 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-08 21:01     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-08 21:04     ` David Miller
2018-02-08 21:04       ` David Miller

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