From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: arm64/v4.16-rc1: KASAN: use-after-free Read in finish_task_switch
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 15:07:41 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180214150739.GH2992@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180214120254.qq4w4s42ecxio7lu@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>
Hi Mark,
Cheers for the report. These things tend to be a pain to debug, but I've had
a go.
On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 12:02:54PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> As a heads-up, I hit the splat below when fuzzing v4.16-rc1 on arm64.
>
> Evidently, we get to finish_task_switch() with rq->prev_mm != NULL,
> despite rq->prev_mm having been freed. KASAN spots the dereference of
> mm->membarrier_state in membarrier_mm_sync_core_before_usermode(mm), but
> AFAICT the underlying issue is independent of the membarrier code, and
> we could get a splat on the subsequent mmdrop(mm).
>
> I've seen this once in ~2500 CPU hours of fuzzing, so it looks pretty
> difficult to hit, and I have no reproducer so far.
>
> Syzkaller report below, mirrored with Syzkaller log at [1]. If I hit
> this again, I'll upload new info there.
The interesting thing here is on the exit path:
> Freed by task 10882:
> save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 [inline]
> set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline]
> __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:520
> kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:527
> slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1393 [inline]
> slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1414 [inline]
> slab_free mm/slub.c:2968 [inline]
> kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x270 mm/slub.c:2990
> __mmdrop+0x164/0x248 kernel/fork.c:604
^^ This should never run, because there's an mmgrab() about 8 lines above
the mmput() in exit_mm.
> mmdrop+0x50/0x60 kernel/fork.c:615
> __mmput kernel/fork.c:981 [inline]
> mmput+0x270/0x338 kernel/fork.c:992
> exit_mm kernel/exit.c:544 [inline]
Looking at exit_mm:
mmgrab(mm);
BUG_ON(mm != current->active_mm);
/* more a memory barrier than a real lock */
task_lock(current);
current->mm = NULL;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
task_unlock(current);
mm_update_next_owner(mm);
mmput(mm);
Then the comment already rings some alarm bells: our spin_lock (as used
by task_lock) has ACQUIRE semantics, so the mmgrab (which is unordered
due to being an atomic_inc) can be reordered with respect to the assignment
of NULL to current->mm.
If the exit()ing task had recently migrated from another CPU, then that
CPU could concurrently run context_switch() and take this path:
if (!prev->mm) {
prev->active_mm = NULL;
rq->prev_mm = oldmm;
}
which then means finish_task_switch will call mmdrop():
struct mm_struct *mm = rq->prev_mm;
[...]
if (mm) {
membarrier_mm_sync_core_before_usermode(mm);
mmdrop(mm);
}
note that KASAN will be ok at this point, but it explains how the exit_mm
path ends up freeing the mm. Then, when the exit()ing CPU calls
context_switch, *it* will explode accessing the freed mm.
Easiest way to fix this is by guaranteeing the barrier semantics in the
exit path. Patch below. I guess we'll have to wait another 2500 hours to
see if it works :)
Will
--->8
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 995453d9fb55..f91e8d56b03f 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -534,8 +534,9 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
}
mmgrab(mm);
BUG_ON(mm != current->active_mm);
- /* more a memory barrier than a real lock */
task_lock(current);
+ /* Ensure we've grabbed the mm before setting current->mm to NULL */
+ smp_mb__after_spin_lock();
current->mm = NULL;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, mingo@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Subject: Re: arm64/v4.16-rc1: KASAN: use-after-free Read in finish_task_switch
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 15:07:41 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180214150739.GH2992@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180214120254.qq4w4s42ecxio7lu@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>
Hi Mark,
Cheers for the report. These things tend to be a pain to debug, but I've had
a go.
On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 12:02:54PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> As a heads-up, I hit the splat below when fuzzing v4.16-rc1 on arm64.
>
> Evidently, we get to finish_task_switch() with rq->prev_mm != NULL,
> despite rq->prev_mm having been freed. KASAN spots the dereference of
> mm->membarrier_state in membarrier_mm_sync_core_before_usermode(mm), but
> AFAICT the underlying issue is independent of the membarrier code, and
> we could get a splat on the subsequent mmdrop(mm).
>
> I've seen this once in ~2500 CPU hours of fuzzing, so it looks pretty
> difficult to hit, and I have no reproducer so far.
>
> Syzkaller report below, mirrored with Syzkaller log at [1]. If I hit
> this again, I'll upload new info there.
The interesting thing here is on the exit path:
> Freed by task 10882:
> save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 [inline]
> set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline]
> __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:520
> kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:527
> slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1393 [inline]
> slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1414 [inline]
> slab_free mm/slub.c:2968 [inline]
> kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x270 mm/slub.c:2990
> __mmdrop+0x164/0x248 kernel/fork.c:604
^^ This should never run, because there's an mmgrab() about 8 lines above
the mmput() in exit_mm.
> mmdrop+0x50/0x60 kernel/fork.c:615
> __mmput kernel/fork.c:981 [inline]
> mmput+0x270/0x338 kernel/fork.c:992
> exit_mm kernel/exit.c:544 [inline]
Looking at exit_mm:
mmgrab(mm);
BUG_ON(mm != current->active_mm);
/* more a memory barrier than a real lock */
task_lock(current);
current->mm = NULL;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
task_unlock(current);
mm_update_next_owner(mm);
mmput(mm);
Then the comment already rings some alarm bells: our spin_lock (as used
by task_lock) has ACQUIRE semantics, so the mmgrab (which is unordered
due to being an atomic_inc) can be reordered with respect to the assignment
of NULL to current->mm.
If the exit()ing task had recently migrated from another CPU, then that
CPU could concurrently run context_switch() and take this path:
if (!prev->mm) {
prev->active_mm = NULL;
rq->prev_mm = oldmm;
}
which then means finish_task_switch will call mmdrop():
struct mm_struct *mm = rq->prev_mm;
[...]
if (mm) {
membarrier_mm_sync_core_before_usermode(mm);
mmdrop(mm);
}
note that KASAN will be ok at this point, but it explains how the exit_mm
path ends up freeing the mm. Then, when the exit()ing CPU calls
context_switch, *it* will explode accessing the freed mm.
Easiest way to fix this is by guaranteeing the barrier semantics in the
exit path. Patch below. I guess we'll have to wait another 2500 hours to
see if it works :)
Will
--->8
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 995453d9fb55..f91e8d56b03f 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -534,8 +534,9 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
}
mmgrab(mm);
BUG_ON(mm != current->active_mm);
- /* more a memory barrier than a real lock */
task_lock(current);
+ /* Ensure we've grabbed the mm before setting current->mm to NULL */
+ smp_mb__after_spin_lock();
current->mm = NULL;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-14 15:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-14 12:02 arm64/v4.16-rc1: KASAN: use-after-free Read in finish_task_switch Mark Rutland
2018-02-14 12:02 ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-14 15:07 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2018-02-14 15:07 ` Will Deacon
2018-02-14 16:51 ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-14 16:51 ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-14 18:53 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-14 18:53 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-15 11:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-02-15 11:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-02-15 13:13 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-15 13:13 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-15 14:22 ` Will Deacon
2018-02-15 14:22 ` Will Deacon
2018-02-15 15:33 ` Will Deacon
2018-02-15 15:33 ` Will Deacon
2018-02-15 16:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-02-15 16:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-02-15 18:21 ` Will Deacon
2018-02-15 18:21 ` Will Deacon
2018-02-15 22:08 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-15 22:08 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-16 0:02 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-16 0:02 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-16 8:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-02-16 8:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-02-16 16:53 ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-16 16:53 ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-16 17:17 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-16 17:17 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-02-16 18:33 ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-16 18:33 ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-19 11:26 ` Catalin Marinas
2018-02-19 11:26 ` Catalin Marinas
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