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From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 12:21:11 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180220012111.GC3728@rh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+ZNFX17Vxd37rPnkahFepFn77Fi9zEy+OL8nNd_2bjqQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 03:32:36PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 8:52 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote:
> > This patch-set introduces the possibility of protecting memory that has
> > been allocated dynamically.
> >
> > The memory is managed in pools: when a memory pool is turned into R/O,
> > all the memory that is part of it, will become R/O.
> >
> > A R/O pool can be destroyed, to recover its memory, but it cannot be
> > turned back into R/W mode.
> >
> > This is intentional. This feature is meant for data that doesn't need
> > further modifications after initialization.
> 
> This series came up in discussions with Dave Chinner (and Matthew
> Wilcox, already part of the discussion, and others) at LCA. I wonder
> if XFS would make a good initial user of this, as it could allocate
> all the function pointers and other const information about a
> superblock in pmalloc(), keeping it separate from the R/W portions?
> Could other filesystems do similar things?

I wasn't cc'd on this patchset, (please use david@fromorbit.com for
future postings) so I can't really say anything about it right
now. My interest for XFS was that we have a fair amount of static
data in XFS that we set up at mount time and it never gets modified
after that. I'm not so worried about VFS level objects (that's a
much more complex issue) but there is a lot of low hanging fruit in
the XFS structures we could convert to write-once structures.

Cheers,

Dave.
-- 
Dave Chinner
dchinner@redhat.com

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dchinner@redhat.com (Dave Chinner)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 12:21:11 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180220012111.GC3728@rh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+ZNFX17Vxd37rPnkahFepFn77Fi9zEy+OL8nNd_2bjqQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 03:32:36PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 8:52 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote:
> > This patch-set introduces the possibility of protecting memory that has
> > been allocated dynamically.
> >
> > The memory is managed in pools: when a memory pool is turned into R/O,
> > all the memory that is part of it, will become R/O.
> >
> > A R/O pool can be destroyed, to recover its memory, but it cannot be
> > turned back into R/W mode.
> >
> > This is intentional. This feature is meant for data that doesn't need
> > further modifications after initialization.
> 
> This series came up in discussions with Dave Chinner (and Matthew
> Wilcox, already part of the discussion, and others) at LCA. I wonder
> if XFS would make a good initial user of this, as it could allocate
> all the function pointers and other const information about a
> superblock in pmalloc(), keeping it separate from the R/W portions?
> Could other filesystems do similar things?

I wasn't cc'd on this patchset, (please use david at fromorbit.com for
future postings) so I can't really say anything about it right
now. My interest for XFS was that we have a fair amount of static
data in XFS that we set up at mount time and it never gets modified
after that. I'm not so worried about VFS level objects (that's a
much more complex issue) but there is a lot of low hanging fruit in
the XFS structures we could convert to write-once structures.

Cheers,

Dave.
-- 
Dave Chinner
dchinner at redhat.com
--
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More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 12:21:11 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180220012111.GC3728@rh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+ZNFX17Vxd37rPnkahFepFn77Fi9zEy+OL8nNd_2bjqQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 03:32:36PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 8:52 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote:
> > This patch-set introduces the possibility of protecting memory that has
> > been allocated dynamically.
> >
> > The memory is managed in pools: when a memory pool is turned into R/O,
> > all the memory that is part of it, will become R/O.
> >
> > A R/O pool can be destroyed, to recover its memory, but it cannot be
> > turned back into R/W mode.
> >
> > This is intentional. This feature is meant for data that doesn't need
> > further modifications after initialization.
> 
> This series came up in discussions with Dave Chinner (and Matthew
> Wilcox, already part of the discussion, and others) at LCA. I wonder
> if XFS would make a good initial user of this, as it could allocate
> all the function pointers and other const information about a
> superblock in pmalloc(), keeping it separate from the R/W portions?
> Could other filesystems do similar things?

I wasn't cc'd on this patchset, (please use david@fromorbit.com for
future postings) so I can't really say anything about it right
now. My interest for XFS was that we have a fair amount of static
data in XFS that we set up at mount time and it never gets modified
after that. I'm not so worried about VFS level objects (that's a
much more complex issue) but there is a lot of low hanging fruit in
the XFS structures we could convert to write-once structures.

Cheers,

Dave.
-- 
Dave Chinner
dchinner@redhat.com

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-20  1:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-12 16:52 [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:52   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-12 23:52     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-12 23:52     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 17:07     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 17:07       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 17:07       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:29       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-21 22:29         ` Kees Cook
2018-02-21 22:29         ` Kees Cook
2018-02-21 22:35         ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-02-21 22:35           ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-02-21 22:35           ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:50   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-12 23:50     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-12 23:50     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 16:59     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 16:59       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 16:59       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:28       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-21 22:28         ` Kees Cook
2018-02-21 22:28         ` Kees Cook
2018-02-22  9:14         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22  9:14           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22  9:14           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22 18:28           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22 18:28             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22 18:28             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:52   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53 ` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:43   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-12 23:43     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-12 23:43     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 16:40     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 16:40       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 16:40       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:24       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-21 22:24         ` Kees Cook
2018-02-21 22:24         ` Kees Cook
2018-02-22  9:01         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22  9:01           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22  9:01           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53 ` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 16:53   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:32 ` [RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Kees Cook
2018-02-12 23:32   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-12 23:32   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20  1:21   ` Dave Chinner [this message]
2018-02-20  1:21     ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-20  1:21     ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-20 18:03     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 18:03       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 18:03       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-20 21:36       ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-20 21:36         ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-20 21:36         ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-20 23:56         ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-20 23:56           ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-20 23:56           ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-21  1:36           ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-21  1:36             ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-21  1:36             ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-21  9:56             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21  9:56               ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21  9:56               ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 21:36               ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-21 21:36                 ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-21 21:36                 ` Dave Chinner
2018-02-22  8:58                 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22  8:58                   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-22  8:58                   ` Igor Stoppa

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