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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: "Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>,
	Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>,
	Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>,
	Peter Crosthwaite <crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>,
	Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>,
	Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 08/28] target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 19:49:45 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180313194944.GN3545@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180313192056.GD3417@localhost.localdomain>

* Eduardo Habkost (ehabkost@redhat.com) wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 08:04:51PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > On 13/03/2018 19:49, Eduardo Habkost wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>> Exactly, in other words these two options are part of the guest
> > >>> ABI, and QEMU promises to never make the guest ABI depend on the
> > >>> host hardware unless you're using "-cpu host".
> > >>
> > >> This is not entirely true; while MAXPHYADDR is constant downstream
> > >> unless using "-cpu host", in practice that behavior is wrong and a guest
> > >> could misbehave if passed a MAXPHYADDR that is different from the host's.
> > >>
> > >> I think this is the same, and management software will have to live with it.
> > > 
> > > I think they are very far from being equivalent.
> > 
> > Right, I only meant to say that guest ABI actually does depend on the
> > host hardware, even outside of "-cpu host".
> > 
> > > But if you tell the guest the wrong C-bit location, guests are
> > > likely to rely on it and break.  Migration between hosts with
> > > different C-bit locations won't work, will it?
> > 
> > It won't---but as long as the destination hosts fails fast when the
> > C-bit location is wrong, it's okay.  What matters is that we don't run
> > guest code with the wrong C bit, as you noted.
> 
> Are you proposing we change the default to simply use cbitpos
> from the host?

Hmm I don't like that idea; as an option that's fine, as the only
way it's not.

> I would agree with this only if we make QEMU able to prevent live
> migration to a host with mismatching cbitpos.

Yeh; especially since I suspect debugging stuff with a failed SEV
migration like that is going to be really hard.

Dave

> -- 
> Eduardo
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK

  reply	other threads:[~2018-03-13 19:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-08 12:48 [PATCH v12 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 01/28] memattrs: add debug attribute Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 02/28] exec: add ram_debug_ops support Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 03/28] exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 04/28] monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 05/28] machine: add -memory-encryption property Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 16:43   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 06/28] kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 07/28] docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 08/28] target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 16:49   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-08 22:22     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 22:44       ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-03-13  8:42         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 18:49           ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-03-13 19:04             ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 19:20               ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-03-13 19:49                 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 09/28] qmp: add query-sev command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 16:52   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 10/28] include: add psp-sev.h header file Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 16:54   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-09 12:24     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-03-12 10:32       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 11/28] sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 16:57   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 12/28] sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 13/28] kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 14/28] hmp: add 'info sev' command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 15/28] sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 16/28] sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 17/28] target/i386: encrypt bios rom Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 18/28] sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 19/28] sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 20/28] hw/i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 21/28] sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 22/28] target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 23/28] qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 17:03   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 24/28] sev/i386: add migration blocker Brijesh Singh
2018-03-13  9:33   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 11:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-03-13 11:36       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 25/28] cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:48 ` [PATCH v12 26/28] qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 17:05   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-08 22:52     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:49 ` [PATCH v12 27/28] sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities() Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 12:49 ` [PATCH v12 28/28] tests/qmp-test: blacklist sev specific qmp commands Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 17:08   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-03-08 20:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-03-08 21:45       ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-03-08 23:22         ` Daniel P. Berrange
2018-03-09 10:12         ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-03-13  9:07           ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 11:21             ` Brijesh Singh
2018-03-13 11:36               ` Paolo Bonzini

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