From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v2] Linux Patch 1/1
Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2018 12:14:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180427191431.GF75137@tassilo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.2.21.999.1804271147200.11549@i7.lan>
> That also argues that perhaps we could possible leave the store buffer
> bypass mitigation off by default, if we could just detect the "people are
> JIT'ing code" situation. Which we can't, afaik, but..
>
> Anybody?
That's what Tim's patches are doing essentially. Keep mitigation off by default
but allows processes to enable using prctl.
Originally we tried to use seccomp for detect JIT, but it turned out that
there can be other mitigations for seccomp too
(e.g. browsers doing full site process separation so they don't care about
leaks anymore). So separate prctl makes more sense.
-andi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-27 19:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-26 0:11 [MODERATED] [PATCH v2] Linux Patch 1/1 Tim Chen
2018-04-26 3:15 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
2018-04-26 17:03 ` Tim Chen
2018-04-26 3:29 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-26 12:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-26 16:48 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-26 16:18 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-27 16:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 16:47 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2018-04-27 17:13 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-27 17:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-04-27 17:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:09 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:30 ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-04-27 18:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:53 ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-04-27 19:14 ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2018-04-27 19:37 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-27 19:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-27 20:01 ` Jon Masters
2018-05-03 12:55 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-03 16:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-03 19:40 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-04 3:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-04 6:00 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-04 6:03 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-07 16:40 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2018-04-27 19:26 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-27 19:57 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-27 20:07 ` Tim Chen
2018-04-27 20:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 20:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-28 3:57 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-28 12:26 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-28 17:14 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-27 22:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:45 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 19:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 19:25 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 19:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 17:50 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 17:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 19:01 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-27 19:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
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