From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v2] Linux Patch 1/1
Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 10:03:01 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a2565707-0802-e78d-ec0d-0e727028331a@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3214c9b8-48d5-d939-5a67-df5f4f4f15a8@redhat.com>
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 893 bytes --]
On 04/25/2018 08:15 PM, speck for Jon Masters wrote:
> On 04/25/2018 08:11 PM, speck for Tim Chen wrote:
>
>> Processes that are unable to use other software mitigations and execute
>> untrusted code may want to disable speculative store bypass. This patch
>> adds a new prctl : PR_SET_RDS_MODE.
>
> Let's not use the Intel name for this. It should be neutral since it
> will be used across architectures. PR_SET_SSB_MODE could be ok.
>
> I personally favor a PR_SET_SPECULATION or similar first argument
> (seeking input from Linus here) that could be used to set flags for this
> and any future additional limitations that might need to be added. I
> can't see how this will be the first and only time. Another way around
> could be PR_SET_VULNERABILITY but "speculation" seems nicer to me.
>
How about PR_SET_SPECULATION_RESTRICTION? Linus, any suggestion?
Tim
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-26 17:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-26 0:11 [MODERATED] [PATCH v2] Linux Patch 1/1 Tim Chen
2018-04-26 3:15 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
2018-04-26 17:03 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-04-26 3:29 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-26 12:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-26 16:48 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-26 16:18 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-27 16:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 16:47 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2018-04-27 17:13 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-27 17:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-04-27 17:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:09 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:30 ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-04-27 18:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:53 ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-04-27 19:14 ` Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 19:37 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-27 19:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-27 20:01 ` Jon Masters
2018-05-03 12:55 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-03 16:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-03 19:40 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-04 3:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-04 6:00 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-04 6:03 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-07 16:40 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2018-04-27 19:26 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-27 19:57 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-27 20:07 ` Tim Chen
2018-04-27 20:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 20:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-28 3:57 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-28 12:26 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-28 17:14 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-27 22:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 18:45 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 19:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 19:25 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 19:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 17:50 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-04-27 17:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-27 19:01 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-27 19:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=a2565707-0802-e78d-ec0d-0e727028331a@linux.intel.com \
--to=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=speck@linutronix.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.