From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Sultan Alsawaf <sultanxda@gmail.com>
Cc: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@linuxtx.org>,
Jeremy Cline <jeremy@jcline.org>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Subject: Re: Linux messages full of `random: get_random_u32 called from`
Date: Tue, 1 May 2018 20:56:04 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180502005604.GJ10479@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180502004317.kxwiu2oephgbi6ok@sultan-box>
On Tue, May 01, 2018 at 05:43:17PM -0700, Sultan Alsawaf wrote:
>
> I've attached what I think is a reasonable stopgap solution until this is
> actually fixed. If you're willing to revert the CVE-2018-1108 patches
> completely, then I don't think you'll mind using this patch in the meantime.
I would put it slightly differently; reverting the CVE-2018-1108
patches is less dangerous than what you are proposing in your attached
patch.
Again, I think the right answer is to fix userspace to not require
cryptographic grade entropy during early system startup, and for
people to *think* about what they are doing. I've looked at the
systemd's use of hmac in journal-authenticate, and as near as I can
tell, there isn't any kind of explanation about why it was necessary,
or what threat it was trying to protect against.
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-02 0:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-26 4:11 Linux messages full of `random: get_random_u32 called from` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-26 5:00 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-26 5:05 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-26 7:32 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-26 15:17 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-26 19:25 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-26 20:22 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-26 20:47 ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-27 0:00 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-27 15:38 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-04-27 19:14 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-26 23:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-27 5:20 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-27 20:10 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-27 22:59 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-29 14:32 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-29 17:05 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-29 18:41 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-29 20:20 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-29 21:18 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-29 21:34 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-29 22:05 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-29 22:26 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-29 22:43 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-04-29 22:49 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-30 0:11 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-30 4:34 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-30 16:11 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-01 19:53 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-29 22:43 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-30 0:32 ` Laura Abbott
2018-04-30 21:12 ` Jeremy Cline
2018-05-01 11:52 ` Justin Forbes
2018-05-01 12:55 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-01 22:35 ` Justin Forbes
2018-05-02 0:02 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-02 12:09 ` Justin Forbes
2018-05-02 16:26 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-02 17:49 ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 22:25 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-03 6:19 ` Pavel Machek
2018-05-03 12:23 ` Justin Forbes
2018-05-02 0:43 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-05-02 0:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2018-05-02 1:11 ` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-05-20 3:37 ` [lkp-robot] [Linux messages full of `random] 125bac9e15: stress-ng.chdir.ops_per_sec 38.8% improvement kernel test robot
2018-04-29 18:30 ` Linux messages full of `random: get_random_u32 called from` Sultan Alsawaf
2018-04-29 20:08 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-18 1:27 ` Trent Piepho
2018-05-18 2:32 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-18 22:56 ` Trent Piepho
2018-05-18 23:22 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-21 18:39 ` Trent Piepho
2018-04-29 14:29 ` Pavel Machek
[not found] <1524676526.3280.40.camel@armitage.org.uk>
2018-04-25 20:28 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-04-24 11:48 Paul Menzel
2018-04-24 13:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-24 14:30 ` Paul Menzel
2018-04-24 15:49 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-24 15:56 ` Paul Menzel
2018-04-25 7:41 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-26 3:48 ` Paul Menzel
2018-04-29 14:22 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-29 23:02 ` Dave Jones
2018-04-29 23:07 ` Dave Jones
2018-04-30 0:21 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-26 5:51 ` Pavel Machek
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