From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
To: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/14] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space
Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 18:56:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180522175603.GS17671@n2100.armlinux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e52b3541-7106-a6dc-5851-01b091bec38f@arm.com>
On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 06:15:02PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 21/05/18 12:45, Russell King wrote:
> > In order to prevent aliasing attacks on the branch predictor,
> > invalidate the BTB or instruction cache on CPUs that are known to be
> > affected when taking an abort on a address that is outside of a user
> > task limit:
> >
> > Cortex A8, A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: flush BTB.
> > Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidate icache.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> > Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h | 3 +++
> > arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h | 8 ++++++
> > arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 3 +++
> > arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S | 8 +++---
> > 5 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
> > index 4c9fa72b59f5..07e27f212dc7 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
> > @@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
> > #define __write_sysreg(v, r, w, c, t) asm volatile(w " " c : : "r" ((t)(v)))
> > #define write_sysreg(v, ...) __write_sysreg(v, __VA_ARGS__)
> >
> > +#define BPIALL __ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 6)
> > +#define ICIALLU __ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 0)
> > +
> > extern unsigned long cr_alignment; /* defined in entry-armv.S */
> >
> > static inline unsigned long get_cr(void)
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
> > index 78f6db114faf..3cfe010c5734 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
> > @@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ void soft_restart(unsigned long);
> > extern void (*arm_pm_restart)(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *cmd);
> > extern void (*arm_pm_idle)(void);
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> > +extern void (*harden_branch_predictor)(void);
> > +#define harden_branch_predictor() \
> > + do { if (harden_branch_predictor) harden_branch_predictor(); } while (0)
> > +#else
> > +#define harden_branch_predictor() do { } while (0)
> > +#endif
> > +
> > #define UDBG_UNDEFINED (1 << 0)
> > #define UDBG_SYSCALL (1 << 1)
> > #define UDBG_BADABORT (1 << 2)
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> > index b75eada23d0a..3b1ba003c4f9 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> > @@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ __do_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
> > {
> > struct siginfo si;
> >
> > + if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
> > + harden_branch_predictor();
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
> > if (((user_debug & UDBG_SEGV) && (sig == SIGSEGV)) ||
> > ((user_debug & UDBG_BUS) && (sig == SIGBUS))) {
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> > index a32ce13479d9..65a9b8141f86 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> > @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
> > #include <linux/kernel.h>
> > #include <linux/smp.h>
> >
> > +#include <asm/cp15.h>
> > +#include <asm/cputype.h>
> > +#include <asm/system_misc.h>
> > +
> > +void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void);
> > +
> > static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(u32 mask, const char *msg)
> > {
> > u32 aux_cr;
> > @@ -21,9 +27,54 @@ static void check_spectre_auxcr(u32 bit)
> > void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
> > {
> > check_spectre_auxcr(BIT(6));
> > + cpu_v7_bugs_init();
> > }
> >
> > void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
> > {
> > check_spectre_auxcr(BIT(0));
> > + cpu_v7_bugs_init();
> > +}
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> > +void (*harden_branch_predictor)(void);
> > +
> > +static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
> > +{
> > + write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
> > +{
> > + write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
> > +{
> > + const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
> > +
> > + if (harden_branch_predictor)
> > + return;
>
> How does it work on a big-little systems where two CPUs have diverging
> mitigation methods? Let's say an hypothetical A15/A17 system? Or even a
> more common A15/A7 system, where the small core doesn't require the
> mitigation?
Hmm, I'd forgotten about those, because I don't have them.
We don't have the ability to mitigate this on such systems at all at
present, it would require a per-CPU cpu_switch_mm() implementation, and
the code has no structure to support that at present without considerable
rewrite of the CPU glue support.
I'm not even sure it could without checking deeper - I think there's some
situations where we call this before we're sufficiently setup.
I'll drop this series from the for-next branch, I suspect it won't be
making this merge window as a result, sorry.
--
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 8.8Mbps down 630kbps up
According to speedtest.net: 8.21Mbps down 510kbps up
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: linux@armlinux.org.uk (Russell King - ARM Linux)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space
Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 18:56:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180522175603.GS17671@n2100.armlinux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e52b3541-7106-a6dc-5851-01b091bec38f@arm.com>
On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 06:15:02PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 21/05/18 12:45, Russell King wrote:
> > In order to prevent aliasing attacks on the branch predictor,
> > invalidate the BTB or instruction cache on CPUs that are known to be
> > affected when taking an abort on a address that is outside of a user
> > task limit:
> >
> > Cortex A8, A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: flush BTB.
> > Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidate icache.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> > Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h | 3 +++
> > arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h | 8 ++++++
> > arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 3 +++
> > arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S | 8 +++---
> > 5 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
> > index 4c9fa72b59f5..07e27f212dc7 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
> > @@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
> > #define __write_sysreg(v, r, w, c, t) asm volatile(w " " c : : "r" ((t)(v)))
> > #define write_sysreg(v, ...) __write_sysreg(v, __VA_ARGS__)
> >
> > +#define BPIALL __ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 6)
> > +#define ICIALLU __ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 0)
> > +
> > extern unsigned long cr_alignment; /* defined in entry-armv.S */
> >
> > static inline unsigned long get_cr(void)
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
> > index 78f6db114faf..3cfe010c5734 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
> > @@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ void soft_restart(unsigned long);
> > extern void (*arm_pm_restart)(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *cmd);
> > extern void (*arm_pm_idle)(void);
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> > +extern void (*harden_branch_predictor)(void);
> > +#define harden_branch_predictor() \
> > + do { if (harden_branch_predictor) harden_branch_predictor(); } while (0)
> > +#else
> > +#define harden_branch_predictor() do { } while (0)
> > +#endif
> > +
> > #define UDBG_UNDEFINED (1 << 0)
> > #define UDBG_SYSCALL (1 << 1)
> > #define UDBG_BADABORT (1 << 2)
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> > index b75eada23d0a..3b1ba003c4f9 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> > @@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ __do_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
> > {
> > struct siginfo si;
> >
> > + if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
> > + harden_branch_predictor();
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
> > if (((user_debug & UDBG_SEGV) && (sig == SIGSEGV)) ||
> > ((user_debug & UDBG_BUS) && (sig == SIGBUS))) {
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> > index a32ce13479d9..65a9b8141f86 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> > @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
> > #include <linux/kernel.h>
> > #include <linux/smp.h>
> >
> > +#include <asm/cp15.h>
> > +#include <asm/cputype.h>
> > +#include <asm/system_misc.h>
> > +
> > +void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void);
> > +
> > static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(u32 mask, const char *msg)
> > {
> > u32 aux_cr;
> > @@ -21,9 +27,54 @@ static void check_spectre_auxcr(u32 bit)
> > void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
> > {
> > check_spectre_auxcr(BIT(6));
> > + cpu_v7_bugs_init();
> > }
> >
> > void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
> > {
> > check_spectre_auxcr(BIT(0));
> > + cpu_v7_bugs_init();
> > +}
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> > +void (*harden_branch_predictor)(void);
> > +
> > +static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
> > +{
> > + write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
> > +{
> > + write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
> > +{
> > + const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
> > +
> > + if (harden_branch_predictor)
> > + return;
>
> How does it work on a big-little systems where two CPUs have diverging
> mitigation methods? Let's say an hypothetical A15/A17 system? Or even a
> more common A15/A7 system, where the small core doesn't require the
> mitigation?
Hmm, I'd forgotten about those, because I don't have them.
We don't have the ability to mitigate this on such systems at all at
present, it would require a per-CPU cpu_switch_mm() implementation, and
the code has no structure to support that at present without considerable
rewrite of the CPU glue support.
I'm not even sure it could without checking deeper - I think there's some
situations where we call this before we're sufficiently setup.
I'll drop this series from the for-next branch, I suspect it won't be
making this merge window as a result, sorry.
--
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 8.8Mbps down 630kbps up
According to speedtest.net: 8.21Mbps down 510kbps up
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-22 17:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-21 11:42 [PATCH v2 00/14] ARM Spectre variant 2 fixes Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-21 11:42 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-21 11:44 ` [PATCH 01/14] ARM: add CPU part numbers for Cortex A73, A75 and Brahma B15 Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` [PATCH 02/14] ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` [PATCH 03/14] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` Russell King
2018-05-24 23:30 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-24 23:30 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-25 10:03 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-25 10:03 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-25 11:31 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-25 11:31 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-21 11:44 ` [PATCH 04/14] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` [PATCH 05/14] ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` [PATCH 06/14] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` Russell King
2018-05-22 3:21 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-22 3:21 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-22 9:55 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-22 9:55 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-22 18:27 ` Tony Lindgren
2018-05-22 18:27 ` Tony Lindgren
2018-05-21 11:44 ` [PATCH 07/14] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit Russell King
2018-05-21 11:44 ` Russell King
2018-05-22 18:28 ` Tony Lindgren
2018-05-22 18:28 ` Tony Lindgren
2018-05-21 11:45 ` [PATCH 08/14] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` Russell King
2018-05-22 17:15 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 17:15 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 17:56 ` Russell King - ARM Linux [this message]
2018-05-22 17:56 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-22 18:12 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-22 18:12 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-22 18:19 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-22 18:19 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-22 23:25 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-22 23:25 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-21 11:45 ` [PATCH 09/14] ARM: spectre-v2: add PSCI based hardening Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` Russell King
2018-05-22 17:24 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 17:24 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 17:57 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-22 17:57 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-23 7:25 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 7:25 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 19:45 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-23 19:45 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-24 12:03 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:03 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:30 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-24 12:30 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-24 12:49 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:49 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 13:04 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-24 13:04 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-21 11:45 ` [PATCH 10/14] ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17 Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` [PATCH 11/14] ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15 Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` [PATCH 12/14] ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15 Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` Russell King
2018-05-22 3:22 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-22 3:22 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-21 11:45 ` [PATCH 13/14] ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` Russell King
2018-05-23 10:50 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:50 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-21 11:45 ` [PATCH 14/14] ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 Russell King
2018-05-21 11:45 ` Russell King
2018-05-24 23:18 ` [PATCH v2 00/14] ARM Spectre variant 2 fixes Florian Fainelli
2018-05-24 23:18 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-25 10:00 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-25 10:00 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-05-16 10:59 [PATCH 0/14] " Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-05-16 11:01 ` [PATCH 08/14] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space Russell King
2018-05-16 11:01 ` Russell King
2018-05-16 16:35 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-05-16 16:35 ` Florian Fainelli
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