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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [patch V4 05/13] cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2018 22:19:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180620201932.889408354@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20180620201907.304694346@linutronix.de

Subject: [patch V4 05/13] cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Provide a command line and a sysfs knob to control SMT.

The command line options are:

 'nosmt':	Enumerate secondary threads, but do not online them
 		
 'nosmt=force': Ignore secondary threads completely during enumeration
 		via MP table and ACPI/MADT.

The sysfs control file has the following states (read/write):

 'on':		SMT is enabled. Secondary threads can be freely onlined
 'off':		SMT is disabled. Secondary threads, even if enumerated
 		cannot be onlined
 'forceoff':	SMT is permanentely disabled. Writes to the control
 		file are rejected.

The command line option 'nosmt' sets the sysfs control to 'off'. This
can be changed to 'on' to reenable SMT during runtime.

The command line option 'nosmt=force' sets the sysfs control to
'forceoff'. This cannot be changed during runtime.

When SMT is 'on' and the control file is changed to 'off' then all online
secondary threads are offlined and attempts to online a secondary thread
later on are rejected.

When SMT is 'off' and the control file is changed to 'on' then secondary
threads can be onlined again. The 'off' -> 'on' transition does not
automatically online the secondary threads.

When the control file is set to 'forceoff', the behaviour is the same as
setting it to 'off', but the operation is irreversible and later writes to
the control file are rejected.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
---
V3: Changelog grammar update, Minor tweaks as requested by Borislav
V2: Rewrote changelog. Make the enum named and use it for the state string
    array. Rename the evaluation function to cpu_smt_allowed().

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |   16 ++
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt    |    8 +
 arch/Kconfig                                       |    3 
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                   |    1 
 include/linux/cpu.h                                |   12 +
 kernel/cpu.c                                       |  155 +++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 195 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -487,3 +487,19 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulne
 		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
+
+What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+Date:		June 2018
+Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:	Control Symetric Multi Threading (SMT)
+
+		active:  Tells whether SMT is active (enabled and siblings online)
+
+		control: Read/write interface to control SMT. Possible
+			 values:
+
+			 "on"		SMT is enabled
+			 "off"		SMT is disabled
+			 "forceoff"	SMT is force disabled. Cannot be changed.
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2687,6 +2687,14 @@
 	nosmt		[KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
 			Equivalent to smt=1.
 
+			[KNL,x86] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
+			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, similar to disabling
+				     it in the BIOS except that some of the
+				     resource partitioning effects which are
+				     caused by having SMT enabled in the BIOS
+				     cannot be undone. Depending on the CPU
+				     type this might have a performance impact.
+
 	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
 			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ config KEXEC_CORE
 config HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
 	bool
 
+config HOTPLUG_SMT
+	bool
+
 config OPROFILE
 	tristate "OProfile system profiling"
 	depends on PROFILING
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
+	select HOTPLUG_SMT			if SMP
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
 	select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
 	select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -168,4 +168,16 @@ void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void);
 static inline void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void) { }
 #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
 
+enum cpuhp_smt_control {
+	CPU_SMT_ENABLED,
+	CPU_SMT_DISABLED,
+	CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED,
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT)
+extern enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control;
+#else
+# define cpu_smt_control		(CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -933,6 +933,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_down);
 #define takedown_cpu		NULL
 #endif /*CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU*/
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
+enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+
+static int __init smt_cmdline_disable(char *str)
+{
+	cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_DISABLED;
+	if (str && !strcmp(str, "force")) {
+		pr_info("SMT: Force disabled\n");
+		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nosmt", smt_cmdline_disable);
+
+static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	return cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ||
+		topology_is_primary_thread(cpu);
+}
+#else
+static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu) { return true; }
+#endif
+
 /**
  * notify_cpu_starting(cpu) - Invoke the callbacks on the starting CPU
  * @cpu: cpu that just started
@@ -1056,6 +1079,10 @@ static int do_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, e
 		err = -EBUSY;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (!cpu_smt_allowed(cpu)) {
+		err = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	err = _cpu_up(cpu, 0, target);
 out:
@@ -1904,10 +1931,138 @@ static const struct attribute_group cpuh
 	NULL
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
+
+static const char *smt_states[] = {
+	[CPU_SMT_ENABLED]		= "on",
+	[CPU_SMT_DISABLED]		= "off",
+	[CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED]	= "forceoff",
+};
+
+static ssize_t
+show_smt_control(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 2, "%s\n", smt_states[cpu_smt_control]);
+}
+
+static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
+{
+	int cpu, ret = 0;
+
+	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+		struct device *dev;
+
+		if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu))
+			continue;
+		ret = cpu_down_maps_locked(cpu, CPUHP_OFFLINE);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * As this needs to hold the cpu maps lock it's impossible
+		 * to call device_offline(), so nothing would update
+		 * device:offline state. That would leave the sysfs entry
+		 * stale and prevent onlining after smt control has been
+		 * changed to 'off' again. This is called under the sysfs
+		 * hotplug lock, so it is properly serialized.
+		 *
+		 * Temporary workaround until Greg has a smarter idea to do
+		 * that.
+		 */
+		dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+		dev->offline = true;
+	}
+	if (!ret)
+		cpu_smt_control = ctrlval;
+	cpu_maps_update_done();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
+{
+	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+	cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+	cpu_maps_update_done();
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+store_smt_control(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+		  const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	int ctrlval, ret;
+
+	if (sysfs_streq(buf, "on"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(buf, "off"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_DISABLED;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(buf, "forceoff"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ret = lock_device_hotplug_sysfs();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ctrlval != cpu_smt_control) {
+		switch (ctrlval) {
+		case CPU_SMT_ENABLED:
+			cpuhp_smt_enable();
+			break;
+		case CPU_SMT_DISABLED:
+		case CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED:
+			ret = cpuhp_smt_disable(ctrlval);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	unlock_device_hotplug();
+	return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(control, 0644, show_smt_control, store_smt_control);
+
+static ssize_t
+show_smt_active(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	bool active = topology_max_smt_threads() > 1;
+
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 2, "%d\n", active);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(active, 0444, show_smt_active, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *cpuhp_smt_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_control.attr,
+	&dev_attr_active.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group cpuhp_smt_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = cpuhp_smt_attrs,
+	.name = "smt",
+	NULL
+};
+
+static int __init cpu_smt_state_init(void)
+{
+	return sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
+				  &cpuhp_smt_attr_group);
+}
+
+#else
+static inline int cpu_smt_state_init(void) { return 0; }
+#endif
+
 static int __init cpuhp_sysfs_init(void)
 {
 	int cpu, ret;
 
+	ret = cpu_smt_state_init();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	ret = sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
 				 &cpuhp_cpu_root_attr_group);
 	if (ret)

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-06-20 20:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-20 20:19 [patch V4 00/13] SMT control knobs Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 01/13] sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 02/13] x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread() Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-27 13:56   ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-27 15:54     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-27 16:20       ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-06-27 16:52         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 03/13] cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 04/13] cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down() Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-06-20 23:05   ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V4 05/13] cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT Greg KH
2018-06-21  6:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 06/13] x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 07/13] x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 08/13] x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early() Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 09/13] x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early() Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 10/13] x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 11/13] x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 12/13] x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 20:19 ` [patch V4 13/13] x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-20 21:44   ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-06-28 22:13   ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-28 22:19     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-06-28 22:23     ` Luck, Tony
2018-06-28 22:29       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-06-29  8:26     ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2018-06-29 17:01       ` Luck, Tony
2018-06-29 17:08         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-06-29 18:36           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-29  8:50     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-29 16:48       ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2018-06-20 20:53 ` [patch V4 00/13] SMT control knobs Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-21 11:52 ` [MODERATED] " Ingo Molnar

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