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* [v6,11/13] x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve, free}_memtype() for "decoy" addresses
  2018-07-14  4:50 ` Dan Williams
  (?)
@ 2018-07-24  7:36 ` Ingo Molnar
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 58+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2018-07-24  7:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dan Williams
  Cc: linux-nvdimm, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
	Tony Luck, Borislav Petkov, linux-edac, x86, hch, linux-fsdevel,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel

* Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:

> In preparation for using set_memory_uc() instead set_memory_np() for
> isolating poison from speculation, teach the memtype code to sanitize
> physical addresses vs __PHYSICAL_MASK.
> 
> The motivation for using set_memory_uc() for this case is to allow
> ongoing access to persistent memory pages via the pmem-driver +
> memcpy_mcsafe() until the poison is repaired.
> 
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/mm/pat.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
> index 1555bd7d3449..6788ffa990f8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
> @@ -512,6 +512,17 @@ static int free_ram_pages_type(u64 start, u64 end)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static u64 sanitize_phys(u64 address)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * When changing the memtype for pages containing poison allow
> +	 * for a "decoy" virtual address (bit 63 clear) passed to
> +	 * set_memory_X(). __pa() on a "decoy" address results in a
> +	 * physical address with it 63 set.
> +	 */
> +	return address & __PHYSICAL_MASK;

s/it/bit

Thanks,

	Ingo
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 58+ messages in thread
* [v6,11/13] x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve, free}_memtype() for "decoy" addresses
  2018-07-24  7:36 ` Ingo Molnar
  (?)
@ 2018-07-24 15:46 ` Dave Jiang
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 58+ messages in thread
From: Dave Jiang @ 2018-07-24 15:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ingo Molnar, Dan Williams
  Cc: Tony Luck, linux-nvdimm, x86, linux-kernel, linux-mm, Ingo Molnar,
	Borislav Petkov, H. Peter Anvin, linux-fsdevel, Thomas Gleixner,
	hch, linux-edac

On 07/24/2018 12:36 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> 
>> In preparation for using set_memory_uc() instead set_memory_np() for
>> isolating poison from speculation, teach the memtype code to sanitize
>> physical addresses vs __PHYSICAL_MASK.
>>
>> The motivation for using set_memory_uc() for this case is to allow
>> ongoing access to persistent memory pages via the pmem-driver +
>> memcpy_mcsafe() until the poison is repaired.
>>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
>> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
>> Cc: <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
>> Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/mm/pat.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
>> index 1555bd7d3449..6788ffa990f8 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
>> @@ -512,6 +512,17 @@ static int free_ram_pages_type(u64 start, u64 end)
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>  
>> +static u64 sanitize_phys(u64 address)
>> +{
>> +	/*
>> +	 * When changing the memtype for pages containing poison allow
>> +	 * for a "decoy" virtual address (bit 63 clear) passed to
>> +	 * set_memory_X(). __pa() on a "decoy" address results in a
>> +	 * physical address with it 63 set.
>> +	 */
>> +	return address & __PHYSICAL_MASK;
> 
> s/it/bit

Thanks Ingo! I'll update when I pull in the patch.

> 
> Thanks,
> 
> 	Ingo
> _______________________________________________
> Linux-nvdimm mailing list
> Linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
> https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-nvdimm
>
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 58+ messages in thread
* [v6,12/13] x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()
  2018-07-14  4:49 ` Dan Williams
  (?)
@ 2018-07-14  4:50 ` Dan Williams
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 58+ messages in thread
From: Dan Williams @ 2018-07-14  4:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-nvdimm
  Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, Borislav Petkov,
	linux-edac, x86, Tony Luck, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm,
	linux-kernel

Currently memory_failure() returns zero if the error was handled. On
that result mce_unmap_kpfn() is called to zap the page out of the kernel
linear mapping to prevent speculative fetches of potentially poisoned
memory. However, in the case of dax mapped devmap pages the page may be
in active permanent use by the device driver, so it cannot be unmapped
from the kernel.

Instead of marking the page not present, marking the page UC should
be sufficient for preventing poison from being pre-fetched into the
cache. Convert mce_unmap_pfn() to set_mce_nospec() remapping the page as
UC, to hide it from speculative accesses.

Given that that persistent memory errors can be cleared by the driver,
include a facility to restore the page to cacheable operation,
clear_mce_nospec().

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h         |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h |   15 ----------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c          |   38 ++------------------------
 include/linux/set_memory.h                |   14 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)


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diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index bd090367236c..cf5e9124b45e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -88,4 +88,46 @@ extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
 void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+	unsigned long decoy_addr;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark the linear address as UC to make sure we don't log more
+	 * errors because of speculative access to the page.
+	 * We would like to just call:
+	 *      set_memory_uc((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+	 * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
+	 * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
+	 * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
+	 * around in registers.
+	 * Instead we get tricky.  We create a non-canonical address
+	 * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
+	 * This relies on set_memory_uc() properly sanitizing any __pa()
+	 * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
+	 */
+	decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
+
+	rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
+	if (rc)
+		pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
+	return rc;
+}
+#define set_mce_nospec set_mce_nospec
+
+/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */
+static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+	return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+}
+#define clear_mce_nospec clear_mce_nospec
+#else
+/*
+ * Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports
+ * recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit.
+ */
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h
index 374d1aa66952..ceb67cd5918f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h
@@ -113,21 +113,6 @@ static inline void mce_register_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb)	{ }
 static inline void mce_unregister_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb)	{ }
 #endif
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
-/*
- * On 32-bit systems it would be difficult to safely unmap a poison page
- * from the kernel 1:1 map because there are no non-canonical addresses that
- * we can use to refer to the address without risking a speculative access.
- * However, this isn't much of an issue because:
- * 1) Few unmappable pages are in the 1:1 map. Most are in HIGHMEM which
- *    are only mapped into the kernel as needed
- * 2) Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports
- *    recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit.
- */
-static inline void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) {}
-#define mce_unmap_kpfn mce_unmap_kpfn
-#endif
-
 struct mca_config {
 	bool dont_log_ce;
 	bool cmci_disabled;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index c102ad51025e..42a061ce1f5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
 
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -50,7 +51,6 @@
 #include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/reboot.h>
-#include <asm/set_memory.h>
 
 #include "mce-internal.h"
 
@@ -108,10 +108,6 @@ static struct irq_work mce_irq_work;
 
 static void (*quirk_no_way_out)(int bank, struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs);
 
-#ifndef mce_unmap_kpfn
-static void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn);
-#endif
-
 /*
  * CPU/chipset specific EDAC code can register a notifier call here to print
  * MCE errors in a human-readable form.
@@ -602,7 +598,7 @@ static int srao_decode_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
 	if (mce_usable_address(mce) && (mce->severity == MCE_AO_SEVERITY)) {
 		pfn = mce->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 		if (!memory_failure(pfn, 0))
-			mce_unmap_kpfn(pfn);
+			set_mce_nospec(pfn);
 	}
 
 	return NOTIFY_OK;
@@ -1072,38 +1068,10 @@ static int do_memory_failure(struct mce *m)
 	if (ret)
 		pr_err("Memory error not recovered");
 	else
-		mce_unmap_kpfn(m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+		set_mce_nospec(m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#ifndef mce_unmap_kpfn
-static void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn)
-{
-	unsigned long decoy_addr;
-
-	/*
-	 * Unmap this page from the kernel 1:1 mappings to make sure
-	 * we don't log more errors because of speculative access to
-	 * the page.
-	 * We would like to just call:
-	 *	set_memory_np((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
-	 * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
-	 * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
-	 * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
-	 * around in registers.
-	 * Instead we get tricky.  We create a non-canonical address
-	 * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
-	 * This relies on set_memory_np() not checking whether we passed
-	 * a legal address.
-	 */
-
-	decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
-
-	if (set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1))
-		pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * The actual machine check handler. This only handles real
  * exceptions when something got corrupted coming in through int 18.
diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h
index da5178216da5..2a986d282a97 100644
--- a/include/linux/set_memory.h
+++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h
@@ -17,6 +17,20 @@ static inline int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr,  int numpages) { return 0; }
 static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef set_mce_nospec
+static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef clear_mce_nospec
+static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
 static inline int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 {

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 58+ messages in thread
* [v6,11/13] x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve, free}_memtype() for "decoy" addresses
  2018-07-14  4:49 ` Dan Williams
  (?)
@ 2018-07-14  4:50 ` Dan Williams
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 58+ messages in thread
From: Dan Williams @ 2018-07-14  4:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-nvdimm
  Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, Tony Luck,
	Borislav Petkov, linux-edac, x86, hch, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm,
	linux-kernel

In preparation for using set_memory_uc() instead set_memory_np() for
isolating poison from speculation, teach the memtype code to sanitize
physical addresses vs __PHYSICAL_MASK.

The motivation for using set_memory_uc() for this case is to allow
ongoing access to persistent memory pages via the pmem-driver +
memcpy_mcsafe() until the poison is repaired.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pat.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)


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diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
index 1555bd7d3449..6788ffa990f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
@@ -512,6 +512,17 @@ static int free_ram_pages_type(u64 start, u64 end)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u64 sanitize_phys(u64 address)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When changing the memtype for pages containing poison allow
+	 * for a "decoy" virtual address (bit 63 clear) passed to
+	 * set_memory_X(). __pa() on a "decoy" address results in a
+	 * physical address with it 63 set.
+	 */
+	return address & __PHYSICAL_MASK;
+}
+
 /*
  * req_type typically has one of the:
  * - _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WB
@@ -533,6 +544,8 @@ int reserve_memtype(u64 start, u64 end, enum page_cache_mode req_type,
 	int is_range_ram;
 	int err = 0;
 
+	start = sanitize_phys(start);
+	end = sanitize_phys(end);
 	BUG_ON(start >= end); /* end is exclusive */
 
 	if (!pat_enabled()) {
@@ -609,6 +622,9 @@ int free_memtype(u64 start, u64 end)
 	if (!pat_enabled())
 		return 0;
 
+	start = sanitize_phys(start);
+	end = sanitize_phys(end);
+
 	/* Low ISA region is always mapped WB. No need to track */
 	if (x86_platform.is_untracked_pat_range(start, end))
 		return 0;

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 58+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 00/13] mm: Teach memory_failure() about ZONE_DEVICE pages
@ 2018-07-14  4:49 ` Dan Williams
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 58+ messages in thread
From: Dan Williams @ 2018-07-14  4:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-nvdimm
  Cc: Tony Luck, Jan Kara, Naoya Horiguchi, linux-kernel, x86,
	Michal Hocko, Andrew Morton, stable, Souptick Joarder, linux-mm,
	Jérôme Glisse, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
	Matthew Wilcox, H. Peter Anvin, linux-fsdevel, Thomas Gleixner,
	Christoph Hellwig, linux-edac

Changes since v5 [1]:
* Move put_page() before memory_failure() in madvise_inject_error()
  (Naoya)
* The previous change uncovered a latent bug / broken assumption in
  __put_devmap_managed_page(). We need to preserve page->mapping for
  dax pages when they go idle.
* Rename mapping_size() to dev_pagemap_mapping_size() (Naoya)
* Catch and fail attempts to soft-offline dax pages (Naoya)
* Collect Naoya's ack on "mm, memory_failure: Collect mapping size in
  collect_procs()"

[1]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2018-July/016682.html

---

As it stands, memory_failure() gets thoroughly confused by dev_pagemap
backed mappings. The recovery code has specific enabling for several
possible page states and needs new enabling to handle poison in dax
mappings.

In order to support reliable reverse mapping of user space addresses:

1/ Add new locking in the memory_failure() rmap path to prevent races
that would typically be handled by the page lock.

2/ Since dev_pagemap pages are hidden from the page allocator and the
"compound page" accounting machinery, add a mechanism to determine the
size of the mapping that encompasses a given poisoned pfn.

3/ Given pmem errors can be repaired, change the speculatively accessed
poison protection, mce_unmap_kpfn(), to be reversible and otherwise
allow ongoing access from the kernel.

A side effect of this enabling is that MADV_HWPOISON becomes usable for
dax mappings, however the primary motivation is to allow the system to
survive userspace consumption of hardware-poison via dax. Specifically
the current behavior is:

    mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200
    {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action
    mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged
    {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected
    Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users
    [..]
    Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed
    mce: Memory error not recovered
    <reboot>

...and with these changes:

    Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x20cb00 at process virtual address 0x7f763dd00000
    Memory failure: 0x20cb00: Killing dax-pmd:5421 due to hardware memory corruption
    Memory failure: 0x20cb00: recovery action for dax page: Recovered

Given all the cross dependencies I propose taking this through
nvdimm.git with acks from Naoya, x86/core, x86/RAS, and of course dax
folks.

---

Dan Williams (13):
      device-dax: Convert to vmf_insert_mixed and vm_fault_t
      device-dax: Enable page_mapping()
      device-dax: Set page->index
      filesystem-dax: Set page->index
      mm, madvise_inject_error: Disable MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE for ZONE_DEVICE pages
      mm, dev_pagemap: Do not clear ->mapping on final put
      mm, madvise_inject_error: Let memory_failure() optionally take a page reference
      mm, memory_failure: Collect mapping size in collect_procs()
      filesystem-dax: Introduce dax_lock_mapping_entry()
      mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages
      x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve,free}_memtype() for "decoy" addresses
      x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set,clear}_mce_nospec()
      libnvdimm, pmem: Restore page attributes when clearing errors


 arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h         |   42 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h |   15 --
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c          |   38 -----
 arch/x86/mm/pat.c                         |   16 ++
 drivers/dax/device.c                      |   75 +++++++---
 drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c                     |   26 ++++
 drivers/nvdimm/pmem.h                     |   13 ++
 fs/dax.c                                  |  125 ++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/dax.h                       |   13 ++
 include/linux/huge_mm.h                   |    5 -
 include/linux/mm.h                        |    1 
 include/linux/set_memory.h                |   14 ++
 kernel/memremap.c                         |    1 
 mm/hmm.c                                  |    2 
 mm/huge_memory.c                          |    4 -
 mm/madvise.c                              |   16 ++
 mm/memory-failure.c                       |  210 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
 17 files changed, 481 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list
Linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-nvdimm

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 58+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-08-06  9:28 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-07-24  7:36 [v6,11/13] x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve, free}_memtype() for "decoy" addresses Ingo Molnar
2018-07-24  7:36 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] " Ingo Molnar
2018-07-24  7:36 ` Ingo Molnar
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-07-24 15:46 [v6,11/13] " Dave Jiang
2018-07-24 15:46 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] " Dave Jiang
2018-07-24 15:46 ` Dave Jiang
2018-07-14  4:50 [v6,12/13] x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec() Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] " Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50 ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50 [v6,11/13] x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve, free}_memtype() for "decoy" addresses Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] " Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50 ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49 [PATCH v6 00/13] mm: Teach memory_failure() about ZONE_DEVICE pages Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49 ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] device-dax: Convert to vmf_insert_mixed and vm_fault_t Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] device-dax: Enable page_mapping() Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] device-dax: Set page->index Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] filesystem-dax: " Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] mm, madvise_inject_error: Disable MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE for ZONE_DEVICE pages Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:49   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-17  6:47   ` Naoya Horiguchi
2018-07-17  6:47     ` Naoya Horiguchi
2018-07-14  4:50 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] mm, dev_pagemap: Do not clear ->mapping on final put Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-23 16:12   ` Dave Jiang
2018-07-23 16:12     ` Dave Jiang
2018-07-23 16:12     ` Dave Jiang
2018-07-23 16:23     ` Jerome Glisse
2018-07-23 16:23       ` Jerome Glisse
2018-07-23 16:23       ` Jerome Glisse
2018-07-23 16:23       ` Jerome Glisse
2018-07-14  4:50 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] mm, madvise_inject_error: Let memory_failure() optionally take a page reference Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-17  6:52   ` Naoya Horiguchi
2018-07-14  4:50 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] mm, memory_failure: Collect mapping size in collect_procs() Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] filesystem-dax: Introduce dax_lock_mapping_entry() Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50   ` Dan Williams
2018-08-06  9:21   ` Jan Kara
2018-08-06  9:21     ` Jan Kara
2018-07-14  4:50 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50   ` Dan Williams
2018-08-06  9:27   ` Jan Kara
2018-08-06  9:27     ` Jan Kara
2018-08-06  9:27     ` Jan Kara
2018-08-06  9:27     ` Jan Kara
2018-07-14  4:50 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] libnvdimm, pmem: Restore page attributes when clearing errors Dan Williams
2018-07-14  4:50   ` Dan Williams
2018-07-19 17:57 ` [PATCH v6 00/13] mm: Teach memory_failure() about ZONE_DEVICE pages Dave Jiang
2018-07-19 17:57   ` Dave Jiang
2018-07-24  7:39   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-24  7:39     ` Ingo Molnar

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