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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 12/43] fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 19:17:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180814171517.896244329@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180814171517.014285600@linuxfoundation.org>

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

commit 119e1ef80ecfe0d1deb6378d4ab41f5b71519de1 upstream.

__legitimize_mnt() has two problems - one is that in case of success
the check of mount_lock is not ordered wrt preceding increment of
refcount, making it possible to have successful __legitimize_mnt()
on one CPU just before the otherwise final mntpu() on another,
with __legitimize_mnt() not seeing mntput() taking the lock and
mntput() not seeing the increment done by __legitimize_mnt().
Solved by a pair of barriers.

Another is that failure of __legitimize_mnt() on the second
read_seqretry() leaves us with reference that'll need to be
dropped by caller; however, if that races with final mntput()
we can end up with caller dropping rcu_read_lock() and doing
mntput() to release that reference - with the first mntput()
having freed the damn thing just as rcu_read_lock() had been
dropped.  Solution: in "do mntput() yourself" failure case
grab mount_lock, check if MNT_DOOMED has been set by racing
final mntput() that has missed our increment and if it has -
undo the increment and treat that as "failure, caller doesn't
need to drop anything" case.

It's not easy to hit - the final mntput() has to come right
after the first read_seqretry() in __legitimize_mnt() *and*
manage to miss the increment done by __legitimize_mnt() before
the second read_seqretry() in there.  The things that are almost
impossible to hit on bare hardware are not impossible on SMP
KVM, though...

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Fixes: 48a066e72d97 ("RCU'd vsfmounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/namespace.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -603,12 +603,21 @@ int __legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *ba
 		return 0;
 	mnt = real_mount(bastard);
 	mnt_add_count(mnt, 1);
+	smp_mb();			// see mntput_no_expire()
 	if (likely(!read_seqretry(&mount_lock, seq)))
 		return 0;
 	if (bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT) {
 		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
 		return 1;
 	}
+	lock_mount_hash();
+	if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_DOOMED)) {
+		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
+		unlock_mount_hash();
+		return 1;
+	}
+	unlock_mount_hash();
+	/* caller will mntput() */
 	return -1;
 }
 
@@ -1139,6 +1148,11 @@ static void mntput_no_expire(struct moun
 		return;
 	}
 	lock_mount_hash();
+	/*
+	 * make sure that if __legitimize_mnt() has not seen us grab
+	 * mount_lock, we'll see their refcount increment here.
+	 */
+	smp_mb();
 	mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
 	if (mnt_get_count(mnt)) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();



  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-14 17:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-14 17:17 [PATCH 4.4 00/43] 4.4.148-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/43] ext4: fix check to prevent initializing reserved inodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/43] tpm: fix race condition in tpm_common_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/43] ipv4+ipv6: Make INET*_ESP select CRYPTO_ECHAINIV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/43] fork: unconditionally clear stack on fork Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/43] parisc: Enable CONFIG_MLONGCALLS by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/43] xen/netfront: dont cache skb_shinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/43] ACPI / LPSS: Add missing prv_offset setting for byt/cht PWM devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/43] scsi: sr: Avoid that opening a CD-ROM hangs with runtime power management enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/43] root dentries need RCU-delayed freeing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/43] fix mntput/mntput race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/43] IB/core: Make testing MR flags for writability a static inline function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/43] IB/mlx4: Mark user MR as writable if actual virtual memory is writable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/43] IB/ocrdma: fix out of bounds access to local buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/43] ARM: dts: imx6sx: fix irq for pcie bridge Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/43] x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/43] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/43] kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/43] x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 21/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 22/43] x86/mm: Move swap offset/type up in PTE to work around erratum Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.4 23/43] x86/mm: Fix swap entry comment and macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 24/43] mm: x86: move _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY from bit 7 to bit 1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 25/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 26/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 27/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 28/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 29/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 30/43] mm: Add vm_insert_pfn_prot() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 31/43] mm: fix cache mode tracking in vm_insert_mixed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-09-07 17:05   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-09-07 20:03     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-09-07 20:03       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 32/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 33/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 34/43] x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 35/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 36/43] x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 37/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 38/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 39/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 40/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 41/43] x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-09-09 16:46   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-09-09 17:06     ` Guenter Roeck
2018-09-10  7:16       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-09-10  7:16         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 42/43] x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 43/43] x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up CPU feature flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15  6:15 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/43] 4.4.148-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 13:10 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 20:52 ` Dan Rue

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