From: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk (Alan Cox)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Leaking path for set_task_comm
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 23:39:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180926233903.38fb598a@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180926031645.GB3321@thunk.org>
> Trying to depend on task name for anything security sensitive is at
> _really_ bad idea, so it seems unlikely that a LSM would want to
> protect the process name. (And if they did, the first thing I would
> ask is "Why? What are you trying to do? Do you realize how many
> *other* ways the process name can be spoofed or otherwise controlled
> by a potentially malicious user?")
Two processes that should not be able to otherwise communicate can keep
changing their name to a chunk of data, waiting for an ack flag name
change back.
Alan
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: TongZhang <ztong@vt.edu>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
adobriyan@gmail.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: Leaking path for set_task_comm
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 23:39:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180926233903.38fb598a@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180926031645.GB3321@thunk.org>
> Trying to depend on task name for anything security sensitive is at
> _really_ bad idea, so it seems unlikely that a LSM would want to
> protect the process name. (And if they did, the first thing I would
> ask is "Why? What are you trying to do? Do you realize how many
> *other* ways the process name can be spoofed or otherwise controlled
> by a potentially malicious user?")
Two processes that should not be able to otherwise communicate can keep
changing their name to a chunk of data, waiting for an ack flag name
change back.
Alan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-26 22:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-25 17:27 Leaking path for set_task_comm Tong Zhang
2018-09-25 17:27 ` Tong Zhang
2018-09-25 18:39 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-09-25 18:39 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-09-26 0:44 ` TongZhang
2018-09-26 0:44 ` TongZhang
2018-09-26 3:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-09-26 3:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-09-26 22:39 ` Alan Cox [this message]
2018-09-26 22:39 ` Alan Cox
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