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From: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com, ghook@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
	kasong@redhat.com, bhe@redhat.com, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 20:38:45 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180927123845.32052-1-kasong@redhat.com> (raw)

Commit 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running
with SEV active") is causing kexec becomes sometimes unstable even if
SEV is not active. kexec reboot won't start a second kernel bypassing
BIOS boot process, instead, the system got reset.

That's because, in get_sev_encryption_bit function, we are using
32-bit RIP-relative addressing to read the value of enc_bit, but
kexec may alloc the early boot up code to a higher location, which
is beyond 32-bit addressing limit. Some garbage will be read and
get_sev_encryption_bit will return the wrong value, which leads to
wrong memory page flag.

This patch removes the use of enc_bit, as currently, enc_bit's only
purpose is to avoid duplicated encryption bit reading, but the overhead
of reading encryption bit is so tiny, so no need to cache that.

Fixes: 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active")
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 19 -------------------
 1 file changed, 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
index eaa843a52907..a480356e0ed8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -25,20 +25,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 	push	%ebx
 	push	%ecx
 	push	%edx
-	push	%edi
-
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
 
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
@@ -69,15 +55,12 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 	jmp	.Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
-	pop	%edi
 	pop	%edx
 	pop	%ecx
 	pop	%ebx
@@ -113,8 +96,6 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 ENDPROC(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	.data
-enc_bit:
-	.int	0xffffffff
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	.balign	8
-- 
2.17.1


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	x86@kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
	bp@suse.de, kasong@redhat.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	dyoung@redhat.com, bhe@redhat.com, ghook@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 20:38:45 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180927123845.32052-1-kasong@redhat.com> (raw)

Commit 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running
with SEV active") is causing kexec becomes sometimes unstable even if
SEV is not active. kexec reboot won't start a second kernel bypassing
BIOS boot process, instead, the system got reset.

That's because, in get_sev_encryption_bit function, we are using
32-bit RIP-relative addressing to read the value of enc_bit, but
kexec may alloc the early boot up code to a higher location, which
is beyond 32-bit addressing limit. Some garbage will be read and
get_sev_encryption_bit will return the wrong value, which leads to
wrong memory page flag.

This patch removes the use of enc_bit, as currently, enc_bit's only
purpose is to avoid duplicated encryption bit reading, but the overhead
of reading encryption bit is so tiny, so no need to cache that.

Fixes: 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active")
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 19 -------------------
 1 file changed, 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
index eaa843a52907..a480356e0ed8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -25,20 +25,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 	push	%ebx
 	push	%ecx
 	push	%edx
-	push	%edi
-
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
 
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
@@ -69,15 +55,12 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 	jmp	.Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
-	pop	%edi
 	pop	%edx
 	pop	%ecx
 	pop	%ebx
@@ -113,8 +96,6 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 ENDPROC(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	.data
-enc_bit:
-	.int	0xffffffff
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	.balign	8
-- 
2.17.1


             reply	other threads:[~2018-09-27 12:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-27 12:38 Kairui Song [this message]
2018-09-27 12:38 ` [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support Kairui Song
2018-09-27 13:16 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-27 13:16   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-27 19:06 ` [tip:x86/urgent] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure in the SEV bit detection code tip-bot for Kairui Song
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-09-25 11:10 [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support Kairui Song
2018-09-25 11:10 ` Kairui Song
2018-09-25 14:33 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-25 14:33   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-25 17:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-25 17:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-26  7:32     ` Baoquan He
2018-09-26  7:32       ` Baoquan He
2018-09-26 10:52       ` Kairui Song
2018-09-26 10:52         ` Kairui Song
2018-09-26 11:22       ` Baoquan He
2018-09-26 11:22         ` Baoquan He
2018-09-26 13:01         ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-26 13:01           ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-26 13:18           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-26 13:18             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-26 13:21           ` Baoquan He
2018-09-26 13:21             ` Baoquan He

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