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From: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
To: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Cc: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>,
	mreitz@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, ppandit@redhat.com,
	qemu-block@nongnu.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] nvme: fix oob access issue(CVE-2018-16847)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2018 09:00:04 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181102150004.GD24372@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181102105421.GC7521@dhcp-200-186.str.redhat.com>

On Fri, Nov 02, 2018 at 11:54:21AM +0100, Kevin Wolf wrote:
> Am 02.11.2018 um 02:22 hat Li Qiang geschrieben:
> > Currently, the nvme_cmb_ops mr doesn't check the addr and size.
> > This can lead an oob access issue. This is triggerable in the guest.
> > Add check to avoid this issue.
> > 
> > Fixes CVE-2018-16847.
> > 
> > Reported-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
> > ---
> >  hw/block/nvme.c | 7 +++++++
> >  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/hw/block/nvme.c b/hw/block/nvme.c
> > index fc7dacb..d097add 100644
> > --- a/hw/block/nvme.c
> > +++ b/hw/block/nvme.c
> > @@ -1175,6 +1175,10 @@ static void nvme_cmb_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t data,
> >      unsigned size)
> >  {
> >      NvmeCtrl *n = (NvmeCtrl *)opaque;
> > +
> > +    if (addr + size > NVME_CMBSZ_GETSIZE(n->bar.cmbsz)) {
> 
> What prevents a guest from moving the device to the end of the address
> space and causing an integer overflow in addr + size?
> 
> If this happens, we still have .max_access_size = 8. The next question is
> then, is NVME_CMBSZ_GETSIZE guaranteed to be at least 8? I suppose yes,
> but do we want to rely on this for security?
> 
> Kevin

The nvme spec at least doesn't allow a way to express a CMB that isn't
at a minimum 4k aligned and sized, so 8 byte access should always be
within the boundary.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-02 15:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-02  1:22 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] nvme: fix oob access issue(CVE-2018-16847) Li Qiang
2018-11-02  7:51 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2018-11-02 10:54 ` Kevin Wolf
2018-11-02 15:00   ` Keith Busch [this message]
2018-11-02 15:22   ` Li Qiang
2018-11-02 15:42     ` Kevin Wolf
2018-11-05  1:49       ` Li Qiang
2018-11-02 15:40 ` Keith Busch
2018-11-05  1:56   ` Li Qiang
2018-11-13 18:26   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-11-13  1:45 ` Li Qiang
2018-11-13 10:17   ` Kevin Wolf
2018-11-13 10:24     ` Li Qiang
2018-11-13 18:27     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-11-14  1:38       ` Li Qiang
2018-11-14 15:44         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-11-15  3:14           ` Li Qiang
2018-11-15 18:10             ` Paolo Bonzini

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