[PATCH] ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

[PATCH] ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

[Gustavo A. R. Silva]

ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)
sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
 sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c
index 6ebe817801ea..1f25e6d029d8 100644
--- a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c
+++ b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <sound/core.h>
 #include <sound/tlv.h>
@@ -1026,6 +1027,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke(struct snd_emu10k1 *emu,
 
 	if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream,
+					     EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT);
 	if (ipcm->channels > 32)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream];
@@ -1072,6 +1075,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek(struct snd_emu10k1 *emu,
 
 	if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream,
+					     EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT);
 	pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream];
 	mutex_lock(&emu->fx8010.lock);
 	spin_lock_irq(&emu->reg_lock);
-- 
2.19.2

Re: [PATCH] ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

[Sasha Levin]

Hi,

[This is an automated email]

This commit has been processed because it contains a -stable tag.
The stable tag indicates that it's relevant for the following trees: all

The bot has tested the following trees: v4.19.10, v4.14.89, v4.9.146, v4.4.168, v3.18.130, 

v4.19.10: Build OK!
v4.14.89: Build OK!
v4.9.146: Build OK!
v4.4.168: Build OK!
v3.18.130: Build failed! Errors:
    sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:39:10: fatal error: linux/nospec.h: No such file or directory


How should we proceed with this patch?

--
Thanks,
Sasha

Re: [PATCH] ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

[Takashi Iwai]

On Tue, 18 Dec 2018 18:52:16 +0100,
 Gustavo A. R. Silva  wrote:
> 
> ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> 
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> 
> sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)
> sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)
> 
> Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm
> 
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> 
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

Applied, thanks.


Takashi

Re: [PATCH] ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

[Takashi Iwai]

On Tue, 18 Dec 2018 18:52:16 +0100,
 Gustavo A. R. Silva  wrote:
> 
> ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> 
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> 
> sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)
> sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap)
> 
> Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm
> 
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> 
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

Applied, thanks.


Takashi