From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent
Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 12:50:53 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190111205053.GV2509588@devbig004.ftw2.facebook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190109091028.24485-1-omosnace@redhat.com>
Hello,
On Wed, Jan 09, 2019 at 10:10:25AM +0100, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> The main motivation for this change is that the userspace users of cgroupfs
> (which is built on kernfs) expect the usual security context inheritance
> to work under SELinux (see [1] and [2]). This functionality is required for
> better confinement of containers under SELinux.
Can you please go into details on what the expected use cases are like
for cgroupfs? It shows up as a filesystem but isn't a real one and
has its own permission scheme for delegation and stuff. If sysfs
hasn't needed selinux support, I'm having a bit of difficulty seeing
why cgroupfs would.
Thanks.
--
tejun
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-11 20:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-09 9:10 [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 1/3] LSM: Add new hook for generic node initialization Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 14:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-09 16:06 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 2/3] selinux: Implement the object_init_security hook Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 14:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-11 1:58 ` Paul Moore
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 3/3] kernfs: Initialize security of newly created nodes Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 15:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-11 2:08 ` Paul Moore
2019-01-11 20:50 ` Tejun Heo [this message]
2019-01-14 9:14 ` [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-14 9:29 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
[not found] ` <64977013-e2a5-809d-7a3f-bffbda9276aa@redhat.com>
2019-01-17 16:15 ` Tejun Heo
2019-01-17 16:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-17 20:30 ` Daniel Walsh
2019-01-17 20:35 ` Daniel Walsh
2019-01-14 15:50 ` Tejun Heo
2019-01-15 14:36 ` Stephen Smalley
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