From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
To: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Linux Security Module list
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2019 08:15:21 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190117161521.GA50184@devbig004.ftw2.facebook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <64977013-e2a5-809d-7a3f-bffbda9276aa@redhat.com>
Hello,
On Thu, Jan 17, 2019 at 10:01:23AM -0500, Daniel Walsh wrote:
> The above comment is correct. We want to be able to run a container
> where we hand it control over a limited subdir of the cgroups hierachy.
> We can currently do this and label the content correctly, but when
> subdirs of the directory get created by processes inside the container
> they do not get the correct label. For example we add a label like
> system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 to a directory but when the
> process inside of the container creates a fd within this directory the
> kernel says the label is the default label for cgroups
> system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0. This forces us to write looser policy
> that from an SELinux point of view allows a process within the container
> to write anywhere on the cgroup file system, rather then just the
> designated directories.
Can you please go into a bit more details on why the existing
cgroup delegation model isn't enough?
Thanks.
--
tejun
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-17 16:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-09 9:10 [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 1/3] LSM: Add new hook for generic node initialization Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 14:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-09 16:06 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 2/3] selinux: Implement the object_init_security hook Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 14:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-11 1:58 ` Paul Moore
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 3/3] kernfs: Initialize security of newly created nodes Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 15:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-11 2:08 ` Paul Moore
2019-01-11 20:50 ` [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Tejun Heo
2019-01-14 9:14 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-14 9:29 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
[not found] ` <64977013-e2a5-809d-7a3f-bffbda9276aa@redhat.com>
2019-01-17 16:15 ` Tejun Heo [this message]
2019-01-17 16:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-17 20:30 ` Daniel Walsh
2019-01-17 20:35 ` Daniel Walsh
2019-01-14 15:50 ` Tejun Heo
2019-01-15 14:36 ` Stephen Smalley
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