From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [patch V4 01/11] x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 23:24:19 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190222224149.174010244@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20190222222418.405369026@linutronix.de
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Greg pointed out that speculation related bit defines are using (1 << N)
format instead of BIT(N). Aside of that (1 << N) is wrong as it should use
1UL at least.
Clean it up.
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
#define _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+
/*
* CPU model specific register (MSR) numbers.
*
@@ -40,14 +42,14 @@
/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT 1 /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
-#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e
#define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f
@@ -69,20 +71,20 @@
#define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
-#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH (1 << 3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO (1 << 4) /*
- * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
- * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
- * control required.
- */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
+#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /*
+ * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
+ * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+ * control required.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
-#define L1D_FLUSH (1 << 0) /*
- * Writeback and invalidate the
- * L1 data cache.
- */
+#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
+ * Writeback and invalidate the
+ * L1 data cache.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-23 0:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-22 22:24 [patch V4 00/11] MDS basics Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 02/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23 1:28 ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2019-02-23 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-27 13:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 03/11] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 04/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffer() Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 16:06 ` [MODERATED] " Frederic Weisbecker
2019-02-26 14:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-01 20:58 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-01 22:14 ` Jon Masters
2019-02-26 15:00 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V4 04/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffer() David Woodhouse
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 05/11] x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 21:04 ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-26 15:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-02-26 20:26 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 06/11] x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 21:09 ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-26 15:31 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-02-26 20:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 07/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 20:17 ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2019-02-26 15:50 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-02-26 20:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 08/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting " Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 09/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23 9:52 ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-25 20:31 ` mark gross
2019-02-26 0:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-02-26 18:51 ` mark gross
2019-02-26 19:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 10/11] Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23 8:41 ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 11/11] Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23 9:58 ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-26 20:11 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 18:02 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2019-02-26 20:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23 0:53 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V4 00/11] MDS basics Andrew Cooper
2019-02-23 14:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-25 16:38 ` mark gross
2019-02-26 19:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-26 16:28 ` [MODERATED] " Tyler Hicks
2019-02-26 19:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-26 18:58 ` [MODERATED] " Kanth Ghatraju
2019-02-26 19:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
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