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From: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [patch V4 04/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffer()
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 17:06:18 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190225160617.GA6051@lenoir> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190222224149.440041789@linutronix.de>

On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:24:22PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> The Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) vulernabilities are mitigated by
> clearing the affected CPU buffers. The mechanism for clearing the buffers
> uses the unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a
> microcode update which triggers a CPU buffer clear when VERW is executed.
> 
> Provide a inline function with the assembly magic. The argument of the VERW
> instruction must be a memory operand as documented:
> 
>   "MD_CLEAR enumerates that the memory-operand variant of VERW (for
>    example, VERW m16) has been extended to also overwrite buffers affected
>    by MDS. This buffer overwriting functionality is not guaranteed for the
>    register operand variant of VERW."
> 
> Documentation also recommends to use a writable data segment selector:
> 
>   "The buffer overwriting occurs regardless of the result of the VERW
>    permission check, as well as when the selector is null or causes a
>    descriptor load segment violation. However, for lowest latency we
>    recommend using a selector that indicates a valid writable data
>    segment."
> 
> Add x86 specific documentation about MDS and the internal workings of the
> mitigation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-25 16:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-22 22:24 [patch V4 00/11] MDS basics Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 01/11] x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 02/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23  1:28   ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2019-02-23  7:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-27 13:04       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 03/11] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 04/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffer() Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 16:06   ` Frederic Weisbecker [this message]
2019-02-26 14:19   ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-01 20:58     ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-01 22:14       ` Jon Masters
2019-02-26 15:00   ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V4 04/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffer() David Woodhouse
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 05/11] x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 21:04   ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-26 15:20   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-02-26 20:26     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 06/11] x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 21:09   ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-26 15:31   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-02-26 20:20     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 07/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 20:17   ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2019-02-26 15:50   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-02-26 20:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 08/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting " Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 09/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23  9:52   ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-25 20:31   ` mark gross
2019-02-26  0:34     ` Andrew Cooper
2019-02-26 18:51       ` mark gross
2019-02-26 19:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 10/11] Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23  8:41   ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-22 22:24 ` [patch V4 11/11] Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23  9:58   ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-02-26 20:11     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-25 18:02   ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2019-02-26 20:10     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-23  0:53 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V4 00/11] MDS basics Andrew Cooper
2019-02-23 14:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-25 16:38 ` mark gross
2019-02-26 19:58   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-26 16:28 ` [MODERATED] " Tyler Hicks
2019-02-26 19:58   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-02-26 18:58 ` [MODERATED] " Kanth Ghatraju
2019-02-26 19:59   ` Thomas Gleixner

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