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From: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>Peter Zijlstra
	<peterz@infradead.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from cred pointer
Date: Fri,  7 Feb 2020 23:35:05 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200207180504.4200-3-frextrite@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200207180504.4200-1-frextrite@gmail.com>

task_struct::cred is only used task-synchronously and does
not require any RCU locks, hence, rcu_dereference_check is
not required to read from it.

Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 15 +++++----------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4effe01ebbe2..d3510513cdd1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -430,24 +430,19 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise.
- *
- * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
- * filtering a task rule at task creation time.  This and tsk == current are
- * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
  */
 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			      struct audit_krule *rule,
 			      struct audit_context *ctx,
 			      struct audit_names *name,
-			      enum audit_state *state,
-			      bool task_creation)
+			      enum audit_state *state)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
-	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
+	cred = tsk->cred;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
@@ -745,7 +740,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
 		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
-				       &state, true)) {
+				       &state)) {
 			if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
 				*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -791,7 +786,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
 		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
 		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
-				       &state, false)) {
+				       &state)) {
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			ctx->current_state = state;
 			return state;
@@ -815,7 +810,7 @@ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
 		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
-		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
+		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
 			ctx->current_state = state;
 			return 1;
 		}
-- 
2.24.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from cred pointer
Date: Fri,  7 Feb 2020 23:35:05 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200207180504.4200-3-frextrite@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200207180504.4200-1-frextrite@gmail.com>

task_struct::cred is only used task-synchronously and does
not require any RCU locks, hence, rcu_dereference_check is
not required to read from it.

Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 15 +++++----------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4effe01ebbe2..d3510513cdd1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -430,24 +430,19 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise.
- *
- * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
- * filtering a task rule at task creation time.  This and tsk == current are
- * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
  */
 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			      struct audit_krule *rule,
 			      struct audit_context *ctx,
 			      struct audit_names *name,
-			      enum audit_state *state,
-			      bool task_creation)
+			      enum audit_state *state)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
-	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
+	cred = tsk->cred;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
@@ -745,7 +740,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
 		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
-				       &state, true)) {
+				       &state)) {
 			if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
 				*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -791,7 +786,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
 		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
 		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
-				       &state, false)) {
+				       &state)) {
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			ctx->current_state = state;
 			return state;
@@ -815,7 +810,7 @@ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
 		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
-		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
+		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
 			ctx->current_state = state;
 			return 1;
 		}
-- 
2.24.1

_______________________________________________
Linux-kernel-mentees mailing list
Linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-kernel-mentees

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from cred pointer
Date: Fri,  7 Feb 2020 23:35:05 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200207180504.4200-3-frextrite@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200207180504.4200-1-frextrite@gmail.com>

task_struct::cred is only used task-synchronously and does
not require any RCU locks, hence, rcu_dereference_check is
not required to read from it.

Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 15 +++++----------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4effe01ebbe2..d3510513cdd1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -430,24 +430,19 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise.
- *
- * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
- * filtering a task rule at task creation time.  This and tsk == current are
- * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
  */
 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			      struct audit_krule *rule,
 			      struct audit_context *ctx,
 			      struct audit_names *name,
-			      enum audit_state *state,
-			      bool task_creation)
+			      enum audit_state *state)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
-	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
+	cred = tsk->cred;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
@@ -745,7 +740,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
 		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
-				       &state, true)) {
+				       &state)) {
 			if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
 				*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -791,7 +786,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
 		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
 		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
-				       &state, false)) {
+				       &state)) {
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			ctx->current_state = state;
 			return state;
@@ -815,7 +810,7 @@ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
 		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
-		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
+		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
 			ctx->current_state = state;
 			return 1;
 		}
-- 
2.24.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-02-07 18:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-07 18:05 [PATCH 1/3] sched: Remove __rcu annotation from cred pointer Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [Linux-kernel-mentees] " Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` [PATCH 2/3] cred: Do not use RCU primitives to access " Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05   ` Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05   ` [Linux-kernel-mentees] " Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05 ` Amol Grover [this message]
2020-02-07 18:05   ` [PATCH 3/3] auditsc: Do not use RCU primitive to read from " Amol Grover
2020-02-07 18:05   ` [Linux-kernel-mentees] " Amol Grover
2020-02-11 15:19   ` Paul Moore
2020-02-11 15:19     ` Paul Moore
2020-02-11 15:19     ` [Linux-kernel-mentees] " Paul Moore
2020-02-13  8:11     ` Amol Grover
2020-02-13  8:11       ` Amol Grover
2020-02-13  8:11       ` [Linux-kernel-mentees] " Amol Grover

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