From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
x86-patch-review@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 13:07:44 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202002251306.2011C9374@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205181935.3712-18-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 10:19:25AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> This patch adds basic Shadow Stack (SHSTK) enabling/disabling routines.
> A task's SHSTK is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK flag and read-only
> protection. It has a fixed size of RLIMIT_STACK.
>
> v9:
> - Change cpu_feature_enabled() to static_cpu_has().
> - Merge cet_disable_shstk to cet_disable_free_shstk.
> - Remove the empty slot at the top of the SHSTK, as it is not needed.
> - Move do_mmap_locked() to alloc_shstk(), which is a static function.
>
> v6:
> - Create a function do_mmap_locked() for SHSTK allocation.
>
> v2:
> - Change noshstk to no_cet_shstk.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 31 +++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +
> arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 25 ++++
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 +
> .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
> 8 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c44c991ca91f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct task_struct;
> +/*
> + * Per-thread CET status
> + */
> +struct cet_status {
> + unsigned long shstk_base;
> + unsigned long shstk_size;
> + unsigned int shstk_enabled:1;
> +};
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> +int cet_setup_shstk(void);
> +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
> +#else
> +static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
> +#endif
> +
> +#define cpu_x86_cet_enabled() \
> + (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || \
> + static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> +
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index 8e1d0bb46361..e1454509ad83 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -62,6 +62,12 @@
> # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
> +#else
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
> */
> @@ -81,7 +87,7 @@
> #define DISABLED_MASK13 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK14 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK15 0
> -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
> +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
> #define DISABLED_MASK17 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK18 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 0340aad3f2fc..793d210e64da 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct vm86;
> #include <asm/special_insns.h>
> #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> #include <linux/personality.h>
> #include <linux/cache.h>
> @@ -539,6 +540,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
> unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
> unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> + struct cet_status cet;
> +#endif
> +
> /* Floating point and extended processor state */
> struct fpu fpu;
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index 6175e370ee4a..b8c1ea4ab7eb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
>
> +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o
> +
> ###
> # 64 bit specific files
> ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b4c7d88e9a8f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * cet.c - Control-flow Enforcement (CET)
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation.
> + * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> +#include <linux/compat.h>
> +#include <asm/msr.h>
> +#include <asm/user.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> +
> +static void start_update_msrs(void)
> +{
> + fpregs_lock();
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> + __fpregs_load_activate();
> +}
> +
> +static void end_update_msrs(void)
> +{
> + fpregs_unlock();
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long cet_get_shstk_addr(void)
> +{
> + struct fpu *fpu = ¤t->thread.fpu;
> + unsigned long ssp = 0;
> +
> + fpregs_lock();
> +
> + if (fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> + } else {
> + struct cet_user_state *p;
> +
> + p = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
> + if (p)
> + ssp = p->user_ssp;
> + }
> +
> + fpregs_unlock();
> + return ssp;
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
> +{
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + unsigned long addr, populate;
> +
> + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE,
> + VM_SHSTK, 0, &populate, NULL);
> + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> +
> + if (populate)
> + mm_populate(addr, populate);
> +
> + return addr;
> +}
> +
> +int cet_setup_shstk(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr, size;
> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
> +
> + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
> + addr = alloc_shstk(size);
> +
> + if (IS_ERR((void *)addr))
> + return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
> +
> + cet->shstk_base = addr;
> + cet->shstk_size = size;
> + cet->shstk_enabled = 1;
> +
> + start_update_msrs();
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + end_update_msrs();
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
> +
> + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> + !cet->shstk_enabled || !cet->shstk_base)
> + return;
> +
> + if (!tsk->mm || (tsk->mm != current->mm))
> + return;
> +
> + if (tsk == current) {
> + u64 msr_val;
> +
> + start_update_msrs();
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + end_update_msrs();
> + }
> +
> + vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
> + cet->shstk_base = 0;
> + cet->shstk_size = 0;
> + cet->shstk_enabled = 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index 2e4d90294fe6..40498ec72fda 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
> #include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
> #include <asm/intel-family.h>
> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
>
> #include "cpu.h"
> @@ -486,6 +487,29 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
> __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
> #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
>
> +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> + if (cpu_x86_cet_enabled())
> + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
> +{
> + /* require an exact match without trailing characters */
> + if (s[0] != '\0')
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return 1;
> +
> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> + pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_shstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n");
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk);
> +#endif
I wonder if this should be "cet_shstk=..." instead? Will it always be a
giant knob like this? Will we want to disable it for userspace but keep
it for kernel space, etc?
> +
> /*
> * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
> * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
> @@ -1510,6 +1534,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> x86_init_rdrand(c);
> x86_init_cache_qos(c);
> setup_pku(c);
> + setup_cet(c);
>
> /*
> * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 8d0b9442202e..e102e63de641 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
> #include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
> #include <asm/proto.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> #include "process.h"
>
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index 8e1d0bb46361..e1454509ad83 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -62,6 +62,12 @@
> # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
> +#else
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
> */
> @@ -81,7 +87,7 @@
> #define DISABLED_MASK13 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK14 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK15 0
> -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
> +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
> #define DISABLED_MASK17 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK18 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
> --
> 2.21.0
>
>
Otherwise, looks good to me. :)
--
Kees Cook
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Pavel
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 13:07:44 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202002251306.2011C9374@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205181935.3712-18-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 10:19:25AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> This patch adds basic Shadow Stack (SHSTK) enabling/disabling routines.
> A task's SHSTK is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK flag and read-only
> protection. It has a fixed size of RLIMIT_STACK.
>
> v9:
> - Change cpu_feature_enabled() to static_cpu_has().
> - Merge cet_disable_shstk to cet_disable_free_shstk.
> - Remove the empty slot at the top of the SHSTK, as it is not needed.
> - Move do_mmap_locked() to alloc_shstk(), which is a static function.
>
> v6:
> - Create a function do_mmap_locked() for SHSTK allocation.
>
> v2:
> - Change noshstk to no_cet_shstk.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 31 +++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +
> arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 25 ++++
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 +
> .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
> 8 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c44c991ca91f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct task_struct;
> +/*
> + * Per-thread CET status
> + */
> +struct cet_status {
> + unsigned long shstk_base;
> + unsigned long shstk_size;
> + unsigned int shstk_enabled:1;
> +};
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> +int cet_setup_shstk(void);
> +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
> +#else
> +static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
> +#endif
> +
> +#define cpu_x86_cet_enabled() \
> + (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || \
> + static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> +
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index 8e1d0bb46361..e1454509ad83 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -62,6 +62,12 @@
> # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
> +#else
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
> */
> @@ -81,7 +87,7 @@
> #define DISABLED_MASK13 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK14 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK15 0
> -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
> +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
> #define DISABLED_MASK17 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK18 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 0340aad3f2fc..793d210e64da 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct vm86;
> #include <asm/special_insns.h>
> #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> #include <linux/personality.h>
> #include <linux/cache.h>
> @@ -539,6 +540,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
> unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
> unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> + struct cet_status cet;
> +#endif
> +
> /* Floating point and extended processor state */
> struct fpu fpu;
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index 6175e370ee4a..b8c1ea4ab7eb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
>
> +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o
> +
> ###
> # 64 bit specific files
> ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b4c7d88e9a8f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * cet.c - Control-flow Enforcement (CET)
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation.
> + * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> +#include <linux/compat.h>
> +#include <asm/msr.h>
> +#include <asm/user.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> +
> +static void start_update_msrs(void)
> +{
> + fpregs_lock();
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> + __fpregs_load_activate();
> +}
> +
> +static void end_update_msrs(void)
> +{
> + fpregs_unlock();
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long cet_get_shstk_addr(void)
> +{
> + struct fpu *fpu = ¤t->thread.fpu;
> + unsigned long ssp = 0;
> +
> + fpregs_lock();
> +
> + if (fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> + } else {
> + struct cet_user_state *p;
> +
> + p = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
> + if (p)
> + ssp = p->user_ssp;
> + }
> +
> + fpregs_unlock();
> + return ssp;
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
> +{
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + unsigned long addr, populate;
> +
> + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE,
> + VM_SHSTK, 0, &populate, NULL);
> + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> +
> + if (populate)
> + mm_populate(addr, populate);
> +
> + return addr;
> +}
> +
> +int cet_setup_shstk(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr, size;
> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
> +
> + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
> + addr = alloc_shstk(size);
> +
> + if (IS_ERR((void *)addr))
> + return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
> +
> + cet->shstk_base = addr;
> + cet->shstk_size = size;
> + cet->shstk_enabled = 1;
> +
> + start_update_msrs();
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + end_update_msrs();
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
> +
> + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> + !cet->shstk_enabled || !cet->shstk_base)
> + return;
> +
> + if (!tsk->mm || (tsk->mm != current->mm))
> + return;
> +
> + if (tsk == current) {
> + u64 msr_val;
> +
> + start_update_msrs();
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + end_update_msrs();
> + }
> +
> + vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
> + cet->shstk_base = 0;
> + cet->shstk_size = 0;
> + cet->shstk_enabled = 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index 2e4d90294fe6..40498ec72fda 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
> #include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
> #include <asm/intel-family.h>
> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
>
> #include "cpu.h"
> @@ -486,6 +487,29 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
> __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
> #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
>
> +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> + if (cpu_x86_cet_enabled())
> + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
> +{
> + /* require an exact match without trailing characters */
> + if (s[0] != '\0')
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return 1;
> +
> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> + pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_shstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n");
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk);
> +#endif
I wonder if this should be "cet_shstk=..." instead? Will it always be a
giant knob like this? Will we want to disable it for userspace but keep
it for kernel space, etc?
> +
> /*
> * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
> * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
> @@ -1510,6 +1534,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> x86_init_rdrand(c);
> x86_init_cache_qos(c);
> setup_pku(c);
> + setup_cet(c);
>
> /*
> * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 8d0b9442202e..e102e63de641 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
> #include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
> #include <asm/proto.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> #include "process.h"
>
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index 8e1d0bb46361..e1454509ad83 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -62,6 +62,12 @@
> # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
> +#else
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
> */
> @@ -81,7 +87,7 @@
> #define DISABLED_MASK13 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK14 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK15 0
> -#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
> +#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
> #define DISABLED_MASK17 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK18 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
> --
> 2.21.0
>
>
Otherwise, looks good to me. :)
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-25 21:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 238+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-05 18:19 [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 0:16 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06 0:16 ` Randy Dunlap
[not found] ` <af5ee976-3b57-4afe-6304-fcab8de45c77-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-06 20:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 20:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-28 15:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:57 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:27 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 19:50 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:54 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 20:59 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 21:12 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 22:19 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:51 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 23:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10 0:08 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 0:08 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10 2:13 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 2:13 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:44 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:07 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:13 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-03 15:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:47 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27 0:08 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 0:08 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 18:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 22:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-08 18:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-13 22:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27 0:34 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 0:34 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-02-25 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27 0:55 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 0:55 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:10 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:22 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-25 21:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
[not found] ` <20200205181935.3712-1-yu-cheng.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57 ` Pavel Machek
2020-02-26 19:57 ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 1:02 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 1:02 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 1:16 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 1:16 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 2:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 2:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 18:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 19:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 21:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 21:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 21:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:22 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:31 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=202002251306.2011C9374@keescook \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=esyr@redhat.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
--cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com \
--cc=x86-patch-review@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.