* [PATCH v16 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v16: Rebase to 5.6
Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul
- Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding
- Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002)
- Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002)
- Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002)
- Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003)
- Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms
structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is
currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is
likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle
management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005)
- Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding
with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less
obscure. (patch 0006)
- Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as
this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006)
- Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018)
- Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020)
- Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021)
- Enhanced documentation (patch 0022)
- Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr()
(patch 0021)
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting
all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
"display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 0001 moves management of the sock security blob
from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with
a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the
security modules to be held and reused later. At this
point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
for each of the security modules compiled into the
kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when
a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number
to pass the correct secid to or from the security module
hooks.
It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
where it is used would have performance and/or locking
issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to
identify which security module's hooks should be used
when displaying or converting a security context string.
A new interface /proc/self/attr/display contains the name
of the security module to show. Reading from this file
will present the name of the module, while writing to
it will set the value. Only names of active security
modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated
to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which
is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
allow the transition. The "display" of other processess
can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases
for reading the display of a different process have race
conditions.
Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security
context is represented. Since it is possible for a
security context to have been generated by more than one
security module it is now necessary to note which module
created a security context so that the correct "release"
hook can be called. There are several places where the
module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
which contains the context string, its length and the
"slot" number of the security module that created it.
The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
pointer.
Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from
(string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
The slot number identifying the creating module is
added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
instead of secids in Patch 0018.
Patch 0019 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display".
Patches 0020-0021 add addition audit records
to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules.
Patch 0022 adds a new interfaces for getting the
compound security contexts.
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks
removed, Patch 0023 removes the exclusive bit from
AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of
this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking
for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change
within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results
are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with
better performance being as common as worse. The
benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.6-v16
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--
10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 20d8cf194fb7..c2b1af29a8f0 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2095,6 +2095,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 2431c011800d..5b6f52c62058 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b621ad74f54a..61b24f4eb355 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -766,33 +766,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -801,8 +783,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
@@ -853,7 +835,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1038,7 +1020,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1051,7 +1033,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1135,7 +1117,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1145,7 +1127,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1162,6 +1144,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1198,7 +1181,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1749,7 +1731,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 565bc9b67276..4ee63826c116 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -336,6 +338,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
/*
@@ -654,6 +657,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
* @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2098,12 +2123,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1659b59fb5d7..011b76c5f6e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4461,7 +4461,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4518,7 +4518,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4534,8 +4534,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4550,7 +4550,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4685,7 +4685,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4864,9 +4864,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4898,8 +4898,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4941,7 +4941,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4974,7 +4974,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -5042,13 +5042,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -5108,34 +5110,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -5149,7 +5144,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5159,7 +5154,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5174,7 +5169,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5325,8 +5320,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5343,7 +5338,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5364,7 +5359,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5381,7 +5376,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5465,7 +5460,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5609,7 +5604,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5648,7 +5643,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5740,7 +5735,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5769,7 +5764,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -5832,7 +5827,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
int err = 0;
u32 perm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -6805,6 +6800,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 330b7b6d44e0..9ca41988281f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -189,4 +189,9 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
return tsec->sid;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index abaab7683840..6a94b31b5472 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -370,8 +371,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 62529f382942..2836540f9577 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 8c61d175e195..f6c2ec5b60b7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1832,7 +1832,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2239,11 +2239,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2257,11 +2253,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2270,7 +2265,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2283,9 +2277,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2403,7 +2396,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -2448,7 +2441,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
int rc;
int sk_lbl;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2524,7 +2517,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2612,7 +2605,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2706,7 +2699,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2754,7 +2747,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2779,8 +2772,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2845,7 +2838,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
if (rsp != NULL) {
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
@@ -3577,9 +3570,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3625,8 +3618,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3663,7 +3656,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3836,7 +3829,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3957,7 +3950,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -4007,7 +4000,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -4020,7 +4013,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -4058,7 +4051,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4078,7 +4071,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
@@ -4177,7 +4170,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4581,6 +4574,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4690,7 +4684,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index fc7399b45373..635e2339579e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--
10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 20d8cf194fb7..c2b1af29a8f0 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2095,6 +2095,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 2431c011800d..5b6f52c62058 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b621ad74f54a..61b24f4eb355 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -766,33 +766,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -801,8 +783,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
@@ -853,7 +835,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1038,7 +1020,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1051,7 +1033,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1135,7 +1117,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1145,7 +1127,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1162,6 +1144,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1198,7 +1181,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1749,7 +1731,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 565bc9b67276..4ee63826c116 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -336,6 +338,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
/*
@@ -654,6 +657,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
* @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2098,12 +2123,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1659b59fb5d7..011b76c5f6e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4461,7 +4461,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4518,7 +4518,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4534,8 +4534,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4550,7 +4550,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4685,7 +4685,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4864,9 +4864,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4898,8 +4898,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4941,7 +4941,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4974,7 +4974,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -5042,13 +5042,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -5108,34 +5110,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -5149,7 +5144,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5159,7 +5154,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5174,7 +5169,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5325,8 +5320,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5343,7 +5338,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5364,7 +5359,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5381,7 +5376,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5465,7 +5460,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5609,7 +5604,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5648,7 +5643,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5740,7 +5735,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5769,7 +5764,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -5832,7 +5827,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
int err = 0;
u32 perm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -6805,6 +6800,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 330b7b6d44e0..9ca41988281f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -189,4 +189,9 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
return tsec->sid;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index abaab7683840..6a94b31b5472 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -370,8 +371,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 62529f382942..2836540f9577 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 8c61d175e195..f6c2ec5b60b7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1832,7 +1832,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2239,11 +2239,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2257,11 +2253,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2270,7 +2265,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2283,9 +2277,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2403,7 +2396,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -2448,7 +2441,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
int rc;
int sk_lbl;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2524,7 +2517,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2612,7 +2605,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2706,7 +2699,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2754,7 +2747,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2779,8 +2772,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2845,7 +2838,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
if (rsp != NULL) {
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
@@ -3577,9 +3570,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3625,8 +3618,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3663,7 +3656,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3836,7 +3829,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3957,7 +3950,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -4007,7 +4000,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -4020,7 +4013,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -4058,7 +4051,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4078,7 +4071,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
@@ -4177,7 +4170,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4581,6 +4574,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4690,7 +4684,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index fc7399b45373..635e2339579e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
security module data rather than a single instance.
Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is
affected as well.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 4 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 24 +++++-----
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++++++++++-----
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/security.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
16 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index f9ceae57ca8d..8e1c759fd1ff 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
@@ -64,8 +65,9 @@ struct audit_field {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
struct {
+ bool lsm_isset;
char *lsm_str;
- void *lsm_rule;
+ void *lsm_rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
};
};
u32 op;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index c2b1af29a8f0..7eb808cde051 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2077,6 +2077,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
#endif
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */
+struct lsm_id {
+ const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
+ int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
+};
+
/*
* Security module hook list structure.
* For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -2085,7 +2093,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct hlist_node list;
struct hlist_head *head;
union security_list_options hook;
- char *lsm;
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
@@ -2114,7 +2122,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
extern char *lsm_names;
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm);
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 64b19f050343..8c2751763c52 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -130,6 +130,64 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+ u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ struct lsmblob empty = {};
+
+ return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+ return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1781,8 +1839,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule);
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1798,12 +1856,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 026e34da4ace..978051c498d5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rules);
}
}
@@ -519,9 +519,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
goto exit_free;
}
entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
+ f->lsm_isset = true;
f->lsm_str = str;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -774,7 +775,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -788,9 +789,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
return -ENOMEM;
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
- (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+ df->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -842,7 +843,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1360,10 +1361,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1390,7 +1392,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
return ret;
}
-static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
+static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
{
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1422,7 +1424,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1437,7 +1439,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
if (!err)
err = res;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4effe01ebbe2..0c239c29a9d5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -638,14 +638,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
if (need_sid) {
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -655,21 +655,21 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
n->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule)) {
+ f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule))
+ f->lsm_rules))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 61b24f4eb355..146d75e5e021 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1147,6 +1147,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
+static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "apparmor",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1847,7 +1852,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
- "apparmor");
+ &apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f4ee0ae106b2..9dcfd2a0e891 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1339,6 +1339,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "capability",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1363,7 +1368,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
- "capability");
+ &capability_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 453427048999..006447d6c366 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
int pcr;
struct {
- void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
+ void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
void *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
@@ -84,6 +84,22 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
+/**
+ * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
+ * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check.
+ *
+ * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
+ */
+static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (rules[i])
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
@@ -258,9 +274,11 @@ __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
int i;
+ int r;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- kfree(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ for (r = 0; r < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; r++)
+ kfree(entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
kfree(entry);
@@ -295,8 +313,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
- if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
+ nentry->lsm[i].rules);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(nentry->lsm[i].rules))
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
@@ -465,7 +483,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
- if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
continue;
else
@@ -479,7 +497,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rules);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
@@ -487,7 +505,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rules);
default:
break;
}
@@ -872,7 +890,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
{
int result;
- if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))
return -EINVAL;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
@@ -883,8 +901,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
- if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
(char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1585,7 +1603,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[i].rules)) {
switch (i) {
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index ee5cb944f4ad..86317e78899f 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
}
+static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "loadpin",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -227,7 +232,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
parse_exclude();
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+ &loadpin_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 5a952617a0eb..924292f7bfcd 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
};
+static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "lockdown",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
#endif
security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
- "lockdown");
+ &lockdown_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 7760019ad35d..950dfb7f931e 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -149,6 +149,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
return -EACCES;
}
+static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "safesetid",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+ ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+ &safesetid_lsmid);
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4ee63826c116..8e66f27d6adb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -467,21 +468,36 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */
+static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
*/
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm)
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid)
{
int i;
+ if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+ if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+ panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
+ init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
+ lsmid->slot);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
@@ -490,7 +506,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
* and fix this up afterwards.
*/
if (slab_is_available()) {
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
@@ -1938,7 +1954,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
@@ -1951,7 +1967,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
@@ -2415,7 +2431,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2423,14 +2456,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 011b76c5f6e2..84eef6af53e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6864,6 +6864,11 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
+static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "selinux",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7171,7 +7176,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
hashtab_cache_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+ &selinux_lsmid);
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f6c2ec5b60b7..12e01d450dd4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4577,6 +4577,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
+static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "smack",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4775,7 +4780,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
smack_enabled = 1;
pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 716c92ec941a..f1968e80f06d 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
}
}
+static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "tomoyo",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+ &tomoyo_lsmid);
pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 94dc346370b1..0f0cf7136929 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
return rc;
}
+static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "yama",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
static int __init yama_init(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
yama_init_sysctl();
return 0;
}
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
security module data rather than a single instance.
Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is
affected as well.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 4 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 24 +++++-----
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++++++++++-----
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/security.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
16 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index f9ceae57ca8d..8e1c759fd1ff 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
@@ -64,8 +65,9 @@ struct audit_field {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
struct {
+ bool lsm_isset;
char *lsm_str;
- void *lsm_rule;
+ void *lsm_rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
};
};
u32 op;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index c2b1af29a8f0..7eb808cde051 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2077,6 +2077,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
#endif
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */
+struct lsm_id {
+ const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
+ int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
+};
+
/*
* Security module hook list structure.
* For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -2085,7 +2093,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct hlist_node list;
struct hlist_head *head;
union security_list_options hook;
- char *lsm;
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
@@ -2114,7 +2122,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
extern char *lsm_names;
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm);
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 64b19f050343..8c2751763c52 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -130,6 +130,64 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+ u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ struct lsmblob empty = {};
+
+ return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+ return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1781,8 +1839,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule);
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1798,12 +1856,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 026e34da4ace..978051c498d5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rules);
}
}
@@ -519,9 +519,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
goto exit_free;
}
entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
+ f->lsm_isset = true;
f->lsm_str = str;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -774,7 +775,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -788,9 +789,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
return -ENOMEM;
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
- (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+ df->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -842,7 +843,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1360,10 +1361,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1390,7 +1392,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
return ret;
}
-static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
+static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
{
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1422,7 +1424,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1437,7 +1439,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
if (!err)
err = res;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4effe01ebbe2..0c239c29a9d5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -638,14 +638,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
if (need_sid) {
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -655,21 +655,21 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
n->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule)) {
+ f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule))
+ f->lsm_rules))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 61b24f4eb355..146d75e5e021 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1147,6 +1147,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
+static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "apparmor",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1847,7 +1852,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
- "apparmor");
+ &apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f4ee0ae106b2..9dcfd2a0e891 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1339,6 +1339,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "capability",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1363,7 +1368,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
- "capability");
+ &capability_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 453427048999..006447d6c366 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
int pcr;
struct {
- void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
+ void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
void *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
@@ -84,6 +84,22 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
+/**
+ * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
+ * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check.
+ *
+ * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
+ */
+static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (rules[i])
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
@@ -258,9 +274,11 @@ __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
int i;
+ int r;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- kfree(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ for (r = 0; r < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; r++)
+ kfree(entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
kfree(entry);
@@ -295,8 +313,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
- if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
+ nentry->lsm[i].rules);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(nentry->lsm[i].rules))
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
@@ -465,7 +483,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
- if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
continue;
else
@@ -479,7 +497,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rules);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
@@ -487,7 +505,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rules);
default:
break;
}
@@ -872,7 +890,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
{
int result;
- if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))
return -EINVAL;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
@@ -883,8 +901,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
- if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
(char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1585,7 +1603,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[i].rules)) {
switch (i) {
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index ee5cb944f4ad..86317e78899f 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
}
+static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "loadpin",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -227,7 +232,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
parse_exclude();
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+ &loadpin_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 5a952617a0eb..924292f7bfcd 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
};
+static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "lockdown",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
#endif
security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
- "lockdown");
+ &lockdown_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 7760019ad35d..950dfb7f931e 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -149,6 +149,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
return -EACCES;
}
+static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "safesetid",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+ ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+ &safesetid_lsmid);
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4ee63826c116..8e66f27d6adb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -467,21 +468,36 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */
+static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
*/
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm)
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid)
{
int i;
+ if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+ if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+ panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
+ init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
+ lsmid->slot);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
@@ -490,7 +506,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
* and fix this up afterwards.
*/
if (slab_is_available()) {
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
@@ -1938,7 +1954,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
@@ -1951,7 +1967,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
@@ -2415,7 +2431,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2423,14 +2456,31 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 011b76c5f6e2..84eef6af53e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6864,6 +6864,11 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
+static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "selinux",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7171,7 +7176,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
hashtab_cache_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+ &selinux_lsmid);
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f6c2ec5b60b7..12e01d450dd4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4577,6 +4577,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
+static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "smack",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4775,7 +4780,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
smack_enabled = 1;
pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 716c92ec941a..f1968e80f06d 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
}
}
+static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "tomoyo",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+ &tomoyo_lsmid);
pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 94dc346370b1..0f0cf7136929 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
return rc;
}
+static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "yama",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
static int __init yama_init(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
yama_init_sysctl();
return 0;
}
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++--
security/security.c | 6 ++++--
6 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 8c2751763c52..9d83c6832bae 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1839,7 +1839,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void **lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1855,8 +1856,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void **lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void **lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 978051c498d5..542eee7ad882 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1333,6 +1333,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1363,8 +1364,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_isset) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0c239c29a9d5..ef2f5e7eec7b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -643,7 +644,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
}
@@ -658,15 +661,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules)) {
@@ -678,7 +683,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules))
++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 64317d95363e..f9e3ca96fa52 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 006447d6c366..55cca6a57178 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -482,6 +482,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -494,7 +495,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rules);
@@ -502,7 +504,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rules);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8e66f27d6adb..b3fab8fdbb57 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2467,7 +2467,8 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
}
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void **lsmrule)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
@@ -2475,7 +2476,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ field, op,
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++--
security/security.c | 6 ++++--
6 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 8c2751763c52..9d83c6832bae 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1839,7 +1839,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void **lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1855,8 +1856,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void **lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void **lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 978051c498d5..542eee7ad882 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1333,6 +1333,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1363,8 +1364,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_isset) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0c239c29a9d5..ef2f5e7eec7b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -643,7 +644,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
}
@@ -658,15 +661,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rules)) {
@@ -678,7 +683,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules))
++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 64317d95363e..f9e3ca96fa52 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 006447d6c366..55cca6a57178 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -482,6 +482,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -494,7 +495,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rules);
@@ -502,7 +504,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rules);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8e66f27d6adb..b3fab8fdbb57 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2467,7 +2467,8 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
}
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void **lsmrule)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
@@ -2475,7 +2476,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ field, op,
&lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however
this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid()
is undated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 18639c069263..03ae0182cba6 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9d83c6832bae..1bfaf9ece13e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -1045,7 +1045,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 809a985b1793..fae63c0a1b36 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -732,14 +732,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -755,6 +755,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -762,7 +763,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b3fab8fdbb57..914aecd89822 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1647,9 +1647,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however
this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid()
is undated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 18639c069263..03ae0182cba6 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9d83c6832bae..1bfaf9ece13e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -1045,7 +1045,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 809a985b1793..fae63c0a1b36 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -732,14 +732,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -755,6 +755,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -762,7 +763,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b3fab8fdbb57..914aecd89822 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1647,9 +1647,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
The secid field of the unix_skb_parms structure has been
replaced with a pointer to an lsmblob structure, and the
lsmblob is allocated as needed. This is similar to how the
list of passed files is managed. While an lsmblob structure
will fit in the available space today, there is no guarantee
that the addition of other data to the unix_skb_parms or
support for additional security modules wouldn't exceed what
is available.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++---
net/unix/scm.c | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
7 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1bfaf9ece13e..2ad58e2900e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1358,7 +1358,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1496,7 +1497,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 17e10fba2152..83c3b3034030 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
kgid_t gid;
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Security ID */
+ struct lsmblob *lsmdata; /* Security LSM data */
#endif
u32 consumed;
} __randomize_layout;
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+ security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
+ &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index aa3fd61818c4..6cf57d5ac899 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 seclen;
int err;
- err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
+ err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 68debcb28fa4..179876573d6d 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -138,17 +138,18 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+ UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = kmemdup(&scm->lsmblob, sizeof(scm->lsmblob),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+ scm->lsmblob = *(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/unix/scm.c b/net/unix/scm.c
index 8c40f2b32392..3094323935a4 100644
--- a/net/unix/scm.c
+++ b/net/unix/scm.c
@@ -142,6 +142,12 @@ void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ if (UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata) {
+ kfree(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
+ UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
/* Alas, it calls VFS */
/* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 914aecd89822..2fa826000889 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2140,10 +2140,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
The secid field of the unix_skb_parms structure has been
replaced with a pointer to an lsmblob structure, and the
lsmblob is allocated as needed. This is similar to how the
list of passed files is managed. While an lsmblob structure
will fit in the available space today, there is no guarantee
that the addition of other data to the unix_skb_parms or
support for additional security modules wouldn't exceed what
is available.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++---
net/unix/scm.c | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
7 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1bfaf9ece13e..2ad58e2900e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1358,7 +1358,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1496,7 +1497,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 17e10fba2152..83c3b3034030 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
kgid_t gid;
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Security ID */
+ struct lsmblob *lsmdata; /* Security LSM data */
#endif
u32 consumed;
} __randomize_layout;
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+ security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
+ &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index aa3fd61818c4..6cf57d5ac899 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 seclen;
int err;
- err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
+ err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 68debcb28fa4..179876573d6d 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -138,17 +138,18 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+ UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = kmemdup(&scm->lsmblob, sizeof(scm->lsmblob),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+ scm->lsmblob = *(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/unix/scm.c b/net/unix/scm.c
index 8c40f2b32392..3094323935a4 100644
--- a/net/unix/scm.c
+++ b/net/unix/scm.c
@@ -142,6 +142,12 @@ void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ if (UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata) {
+ kfree(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
+ UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
/* Alas, it calls VFS */
/* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 914aecd89822..2fa826000889 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2140,10 +2140,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:36 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:41PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
> secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
> security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
> lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
> that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
> code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
>
> The secid field of the unix_skb_parms structure has been
> replaced with a pointer to an lsmblob structure, and the
> lsmblob is allocated as needed. This is similar to how the
> list of passed files is managed. While an lsmblob structure
> will fit in the available space today, there is no guarantee
> that the addition of other data to the unix_skb_parms or
> support for additional security modules wouldn't exceed what
> is available.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
> include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++---
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++---
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++---
> net/unix/scm.c | 6 ++++++
> security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> 7 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 1bfaf9ece13e..2ad58e2900e7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1358,7 +1358,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
> int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
> void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
> void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
> @@ -1496,7 +1497,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> + struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> index 17e10fba2152..83c3b3034030 100644
> --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
> kgid_t gid;
> struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> - u32 secid; /* Security ID */
> + struct lsmblob *lsmdata; /* Security LSM data */
> #endif
> u32 consumed;
> } __randomize_layout;
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
> struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
> struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> - u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
> + struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Passed LSM data */
> #endif
> };
>
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> {
> - security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
> + security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
> }
> #else
> static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> + &secdata, &seclen);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index aa3fd61818c4..6cf57d5ac899 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> + struct lsmblob lb;
> char *secdata;
> - u32 seclen, secid;
> + u32 seclen;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
> + err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 68debcb28fa4..179876573d6d 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -138,17 +138,18 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
> + UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = kmemdup(&scm->lsmblob, sizeof(scm->lsmblob),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> }
>
> static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
> + scm->lsmblob = *(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
> }
>
> static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
> + return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
> }
> #else
> static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/net/unix/scm.c b/net/unix/scm.c
> index 8c40f2b32392..3094323935a4 100644
> --- a/net/unix/scm.c
> +++ b/net/unix/scm.c
> @@ -142,6 +142,12 @@ void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
> scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
> if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
> unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> + if (UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata) {
> + kfree(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
> + UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = NULL;
> + }
> +#endif
>
> /* Alas, it calls VFS */
> /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 914aecd89822..2fa826000889 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2140,10 +2140,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> optval, optlen, len);
> }
>
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - skb, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> + list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + break;
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
@ 2020-04-07 18:36 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:41PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
> secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
> security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
> lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
> that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
> code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
>
> The secid field of the unix_skb_parms structure has been
> replaced with a pointer to an lsmblob structure, and the
> lsmblob is allocated as needed. This is similar to how the
> list of passed files is managed. While an lsmblob structure
> will fit in the available space today, there is no guarantee
> that the addition of other data to the unix_skb_parms or
> support for additional security modules wouldn't exceed what
> is available.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
> include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++---
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++---
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++---
> net/unix/scm.c | 6 ++++++
> security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> 7 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 1bfaf9ece13e..2ad58e2900e7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1358,7 +1358,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
> int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
> void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
> void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
> @@ -1496,7 +1497,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> + struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> index 17e10fba2152..83c3b3034030 100644
> --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
> kgid_t gid;
> struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> - u32 secid; /* Security ID */
> + struct lsmblob *lsmdata; /* Security LSM data */
> #endif
> u32 consumed;
> } __randomize_layout;
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
> struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
> struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> - u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
> + struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Passed LSM data */
> #endif
> };
>
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> {
> - security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
> + security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
> }
> #else
> static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> + &secdata, &seclen);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index aa3fd61818c4..6cf57d5ac899 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> + struct lsmblob lb;
> char *secdata;
> - u32 seclen, secid;
> + u32 seclen;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
> + err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 68debcb28fa4..179876573d6d 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -138,17 +138,18 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
> + UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = kmemdup(&scm->lsmblob, sizeof(scm->lsmblob),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> }
>
> static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
> + scm->lsmblob = *(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
> }
>
> static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
> + return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
> }
> #else
> static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/net/unix/scm.c b/net/unix/scm.c
> index 8c40f2b32392..3094323935a4 100644
> --- a/net/unix/scm.c
> +++ b/net/unix/scm.c
> @@ -142,6 +142,12 @@ void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
> scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
> if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
> unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> + if (UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata) {
> + kfree(UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata);
> + UNIXCB(skb).lsmdata = NULL;
> + }
> +#endif
>
> /* Alas, it calls VFS */
> /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 914aecd89822..2fa826000889 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2140,10 +2140,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> optval, optlen, len);
> }
>
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - skb, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> + list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + break;
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead
of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the
string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is
appropriate. Change security_secmark_relabel_packet() to use a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. In some other cases there is
scaffolding where interfaces have yet to be converted.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 6 ++++--
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 18 +++++++++-------
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 ++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++++--------
security/security.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
8 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2ad58e2900e7..554fe4cbbf48 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -188,6 +188,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
}
+/**
+ * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
+ * it is appropriate are rare.
+ *
+ * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
+ * There should only be one.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (blob->secid[i])
+ return blob->secid[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -498,7 +519,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1304,7 +1326,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -1372,7 +1394,7 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req);
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb);
-int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid);
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security);
@@ -1545,7 +1567,7 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
{
}
-static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index e2e71c4bf9d0..c09f2dfeec88 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -97,8 +97,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
+ /* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob,
+ * so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a
+ * lsmblob directly. */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&scm->lsmblob),
&secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index fae63c0a1b36..e654a5a84408 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -756,14 +756,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsmblob blob;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 6cf57d5ac899..7207f90eba44 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point,
+ * so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&lb), &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 951b6e87ed5d..5875222aeac5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ struct nft_expr_type nft_meta_type __read_mostly = {
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
struct nft_secmark {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
char *ctx;
};
@@ -811,21 +811,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
- u32 tmp_secid = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
if (err)
return err;
- if (!tmp_secid)
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return -ENOENT;
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&blob);
if (err)
return err;
- priv->secid = tmp_secid;
+ priv->lsmdata = blob;
return 0;
}
@@ -835,7 +835,11 @@ static void nft_secmark_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, struct nft_regs *regs,
const struct nft_secmark *priv = nft_obj_data(obj);
struct sk_buff *skb = pkt->skb;
- skb->secmark = priv->secid;
+ /* It is not possible for more than one secid to be set in
+ * the lsmblob structure because it is set using
+ * security_secctx_to_secid(). Any secid that is set must therefore
+ * be the one that should go in the secmark. */
+ skb->secmark = lsmblob_value(&priv->lsmdata);
}
static int nft_secmark_obj_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 2317721f3ecb..8a004d018871 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -45,13 +45,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ &blob);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -59,13 +60,17 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
+ /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
+ * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
+ * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
+ info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
return -ENOENT;
}
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(info->secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&blob);
if (err) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n");
return err;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 77bb1bb22c3b..8948557eaebb 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -906,13 +906,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
+ * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
+ * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
+ * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
+
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -933,7 +938,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -955,13 +960,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
+ * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2fa826000889..6edbcb4c655e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2002,10 +2002,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2222,9 +2234,21 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
-int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secmark_relabel_packet(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead
of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the
string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is
appropriate. Change security_secmark_relabel_packet() to use a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. In some other cases there is
scaffolding where interfaces have yet to be converted.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 6 ++++--
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 18 +++++++++-------
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 ++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++++--------
security/security.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
8 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2ad58e2900e7..554fe4cbbf48 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -188,6 +188,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
}
+/**
+ * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
+ * it is appropriate are rare.
+ *
+ * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
+ * There should only be one.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (blob->secid[i])
+ return blob->secid[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -498,7 +519,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1304,7 +1326,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -1372,7 +1394,7 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req);
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb);
-int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid);
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security);
@@ -1545,7 +1567,7 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
{
}
-static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index e2e71c4bf9d0..c09f2dfeec88 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -97,8 +97,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
+ /* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob,
+ * so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a
+ * lsmblob directly. */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&scm->lsmblob),
&secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index fae63c0a1b36..e654a5a84408 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -756,14 +756,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsmblob blob;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 6cf57d5ac899..7207f90eba44 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point,
+ * so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&lb), &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 951b6e87ed5d..5875222aeac5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ struct nft_expr_type nft_meta_type __read_mostly = {
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
struct nft_secmark {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
char *ctx;
};
@@ -811,21 +811,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
- u32 tmp_secid = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
if (err)
return err;
- if (!tmp_secid)
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return -ENOENT;
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&blob);
if (err)
return err;
- priv->secid = tmp_secid;
+ priv->lsmdata = blob;
return 0;
}
@@ -835,7 +835,11 @@ static void nft_secmark_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, struct nft_regs *regs,
const struct nft_secmark *priv = nft_obj_data(obj);
struct sk_buff *skb = pkt->skb;
- skb->secmark = priv->secid;
+ /* It is not possible for more than one secid to be set in
+ * the lsmblob structure because it is set using
+ * security_secctx_to_secid(). Any secid that is set must therefore
+ * be the one that should go in the secmark. */
+ skb->secmark = lsmblob_value(&priv->lsmdata);
}
static int nft_secmark_obj_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 2317721f3ecb..8a004d018871 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -45,13 +45,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ &blob);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -59,13 +60,17 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
+ /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
+ * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
+ * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
+ info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
return -ENOENT;
}
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(info->secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&blob);
if (err) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n");
return err;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 77bb1bb22c3b..8948557eaebb 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -906,13 +906,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
+ * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
+ * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
+ * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
+
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -933,7 +938,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -955,13 +960,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
+ * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2fa826000889..6edbcb4c655e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2002,10 +2002,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2222,9 +2234,21 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
-int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secmark_relabel_packet(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:36 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:42PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead
> of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the
> string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is
> appropriate. Change security_secmark_relabel_packet() to use a
> lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. In some other cases there is
> scaffolding where interfaces have yet to be converted.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
> include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++--
> kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 6 ++++--
> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 18 +++++++++-------
> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 ++++++--
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++++--------
> security/security.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 8 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2ad58e2900e7..554fe4cbbf48 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -188,6 +188,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
> return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> }
>
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data
> + *
> + * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
> + * it is appropriate are rare.
> + *
> + * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
> + * There should only be one.
> + */
> +static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + if (blob->secid[i])
> + return blob->secid[i];
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -498,7 +519,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> @@ -1304,7 +1326,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
>
> static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
> u32 seclen,
> - u32 *secid)
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> @@ -1372,7 +1394,7 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
> const struct request_sock *req);
> void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
> struct sk_buff *skb);
> -int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid);
> +int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
> void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
> int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security);
> @@ -1545,7 +1567,7 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
> {
> }
>
> -static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
> +static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index e2e71c4bf9d0..c09f2dfeec88 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -97,8 +97,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> + /* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob,
> + * so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until
> + * security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a
> + * lsmblob directly. */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&scm->lsmblob),
> &secdata, &seclen);
>
> if (!err) {
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index fae63c0a1b36..e654a5a84408 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -756,14 +756,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
> int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
> {
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - u32 secid;
> int ret;
>
> - ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
> + ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> return set_security_override(new, &blob);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 6cf57d5ac899..7207f90eba44 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point,
> + * so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until
> + * security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&lb), &secdata, &seclen);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> index 951b6e87ed5d..5875222aeac5 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ struct nft_expr_type nft_meta_type __read_mostly = {
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
> struct nft_secmark {
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob lsmdata;
> char *ctx;
> };
>
> @@ -811,21 +811,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
> {
> - u32 tmp_secid = 0;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - if (!tmp_secid)
> + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return -ENOENT;
>
> - err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&blob);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - priv->secid = tmp_secid;
> + priv->lsmdata = blob;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -835,7 +835,11 @@ static void nft_secmark_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, struct nft_regs *regs,
> const struct nft_secmark *priv = nft_obj_data(obj);
> struct sk_buff *skb = pkt->skb;
>
> - skb->secmark = priv->secid;
> + /* It is not possible for more than one secid to be set in
> + * the lsmblob structure because it is set using
> + * security_secctx_to_secid(). Any secid that is set must therefore
> + * be the one that should go in the secmark. */
> + skb->secmark = lsmblob_value(&priv->lsmdata);
> }
>
> static int nft_secmark_obj_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> index 2317721f3ecb..8a004d018871 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> @@ -45,13 +45,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
>
> static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
> {
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
> info->secid = 0;
>
> err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
> - &info->secid);
> + &blob);
> if (err) {
> if (err == -EINVAL)
> pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
> @@ -59,13 +60,17 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
> return err;
> }
>
> + /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
> + * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
> + * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
> + info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
> if (!info->secid) {
> pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
> info->secctx);
> return -ENOENT;
> }
>
> - err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(info->secid);
> + err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&blob);
> if (err) {
> pr_info_ratelimited("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n");
> return err;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 77bb1bb22c3b..8948557eaebb 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -906,13 +906,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
> + * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
> + * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
> + * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
> +
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> - &audit_info);
> + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
> + lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -933,7 +938,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -955,13 +960,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
> + * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> - &audit_info);
> + NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
> + lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 2fa826000889..6edbcb4c655e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2002,10 +2002,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> - return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>
> @@ -2222,9 +2234,21 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
>
> -int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
> +int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet,
> + list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.secmark_relabel_packet(
> + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + break;
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
@ 2020-04-07 18:36 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:42PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead
> of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the
> string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is
> appropriate. Change security_secmark_relabel_packet() to use a
> lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. In some other cases there is
> scaffolding where interfaces have yet to be converted.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
> include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++--
> kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 6 ++++--
> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 18 +++++++++-------
> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 ++++++--
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++++--------
> security/security.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 8 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2ad58e2900e7..554fe4cbbf48 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -188,6 +188,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
> return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> }
>
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data
> + *
> + * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
> + * it is appropriate are rare.
> + *
> + * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
> + * There should only be one.
> + */
> +static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + if (blob->secid[i])
> + return blob->secid[i];
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -498,7 +519,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> @@ -1304,7 +1326,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
>
> static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
> u32 seclen,
> - u32 *secid)
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> @@ -1372,7 +1394,7 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
> const struct request_sock *req);
> void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
> struct sk_buff *skb);
> -int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid);
> +int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
> void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
> int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security);
> @@ -1545,7 +1567,7 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
> {
> }
>
> -static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
> +static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index e2e71c4bf9d0..c09f2dfeec88 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -97,8 +97,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> + /* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob,
> + * so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until
> + * security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a
> + * lsmblob directly. */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&scm->lsmblob),
> &secdata, &seclen);
>
> if (!err) {
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index fae63c0a1b36..e654a5a84408 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -756,14 +756,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
> int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
> {
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - u32 secid;
> int ret;
>
> - ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
> + ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> return set_security_override(new, &blob);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 6cf57d5ac899..7207f90eba44 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point,
> + * so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until
> + * security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&lb), &secdata, &seclen);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> index 951b6e87ed5d..5875222aeac5 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ struct nft_expr_type nft_meta_type __read_mostly = {
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
> struct nft_secmark {
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob lsmdata;
> char *ctx;
> };
>
> @@ -811,21 +811,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
> {
> - u32 tmp_secid = 0;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - if (!tmp_secid)
> + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return -ENOENT;
>
> - err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&blob);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - priv->secid = tmp_secid;
> + priv->lsmdata = blob;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -835,7 +835,11 @@ static void nft_secmark_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, struct nft_regs *regs,
> const struct nft_secmark *priv = nft_obj_data(obj);
> struct sk_buff *skb = pkt->skb;
>
> - skb->secmark = priv->secid;
> + /* It is not possible for more than one secid to be set in
> + * the lsmblob structure because it is set using
> + * security_secctx_to_secid(). Any secid that is set must therefore
> + * be the one that should go in the secmark. */
> + skb->secmark = lsmblob_value(&priv->lsmdata);
> }
>
> static int nft_secmark_obj_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> index 2317721f3ecb..8a004d018871 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> @@ -45,13 +45,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
>
> static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
> {
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
> info->secid = 0;
>
> err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
> - &info->secid);
> + &blob);
> if (err) {
> if (err == -EINVAL)
> pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
> @@ -59,13 +60,17 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
> return err;
> }
>
> + /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
> + * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
> + * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
> + info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
> if (!info->secid) {
> pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
> info->secctx);
> return -ENOENT;
> }
>
> - err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(info->secid);
> + err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(&blob);
> if (err) {
> pr_info_ratelimited("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n");
> return err;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 77bb1bb22c3b..8948557eaebb 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -906,13 +906,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
> + * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
> + * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
> + * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
> +
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> - &audit_info);
> + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
> + lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -933,7 +938,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -955,13 +960,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
> + * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> - &audit_info);
> + NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
> + lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 2fa826000889..6edbcb4c655e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2002,10 +2002,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> - return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>
> @@ -2222,9 +2234,21 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
>
> -int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
> +int security_secmark_relabel_packet(struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet,
> + list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.secmark_relabel_packet(
> + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + break;
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
possibility that more than one module may be called upon
to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
audit code.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
include/net/scm.h | 8 ++-----
kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 +----
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++---
security/security.c | 16 ++++++++++---
12 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index e47c8a4c83db..2783fd9c7ad6 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3107,10 +3107,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ /*
+ * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+ * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * which means that the one expected by
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 554fe4cbbf48..97921325b2e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1319,7 +1319,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index c09f2dfeec88..31ae605fcc0a 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -97,12 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- /* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob,
- * so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until
- * security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a
- * lsmblob directly. */
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&scm->lsmblob),
- &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
+ &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 9ddfe2aa6671..11da27db9b90 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1420,7 +1420,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
+ * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
+ * happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2063,12 +2072,19 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+ * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+ * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ef2f5e7eec7b..56cbb113975a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -644,6 +644,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to sid. This is temporary until
+ * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+ * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type,
@@ -661,6 +668,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
+ * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
+ * until name->osid is converted to a
+ * lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
@@ -966,6 +980,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -975,7 +990,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1218,7 +1234,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1368,9 +1387,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 7207f90eba44..1ca97d0cb4a9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -139,10 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- /* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point,
- * so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until
- * security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&lb), &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 6a1c8f1f6171..0ee04cd61772 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -331,8 +331,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -643,8 +648,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 4912069627b6..af8568d1fc6a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 76535fd9278c..863eb2d34137 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,13 +305,20 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in
+ * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
+ * module to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 8948557eaebb..2ebe29ddf05e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -438,7 +439,11 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -475,6 +480,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -494,8 +500,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -537,6 +548,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -555,8 +567,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1082,6 +1099,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1136,7 +1154,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 3ed4fea2a2de..893301ae0131 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6edbcb4c655e..85751ebe8842 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1995,10 +1995,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
- seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
possibility that more than one module may be called upon
to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
audit code.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
include/net/scm.h | 8 ++-----
kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 +----
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++---
security/security.c | 16 ++++++++++---
12 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index e47c8a4c83db..2783fd9c7ad6 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3107,10 +3107,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ /*
+ * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+ * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * which means that the one expected by
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 554fe4cbbf48..97921325b2e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1319,7 +1319,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index c09f2dfeec88..31ae605fcc0a 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -97,12 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- /* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob,
- * so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until
- * security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a
- * lsmblob directly. */
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&scm->lsmblob),
- &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
+ &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 9ddfe2aa6671..11da27db9b90 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1420,7 +1420,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
+ * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
+ * happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2063,12 +2072,19 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+ * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+ * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ef2f5e7eec7b..56cbb113975a 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -644,6 +644,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to sid. This is temporary until
+ * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+ * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type,
@@ -661,6 +668,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
+ * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
+ * until name->osid is converted to a
+ * lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
@@ -966,6 +980,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -975,7 +990,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1218,7 +1234,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1368,9 +1387,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 7207f90eba44..1ca97d0cb4a9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -139,10 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- /* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point,
- * so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until
- * security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob_value(&lb), &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 6a1c8f1f6171..0ee04cd61772 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -331,8 +331,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -643,8 +648,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 4912069627b6..af8568d1fc6a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 76535fd9278c..863eb2d34137 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,13 +305,20 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in
+ * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
+ * module to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 8948557eaebb..2ebe29ddf05e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -438,7 +439,11 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -475,6 +480,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -494,8 +500,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -537,6 +548,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -555,8 +567,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1082,6 +1099,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1136,7 +1154,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 3ed4fea2a2de..893301ae0131 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6edbcb4c655e..85751ebe8842 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1995,10 +1995,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
- seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 97921325b2e9..10c607a40057 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1197,9 +1197,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 56cbb113975a..c5aa1f10e7cc 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2299,11 +2299,16 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+ /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
+ * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
+ * labels associated with the ipc object. */
+ context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 85751ebe8842..776f62291b9f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1815,10 +1815,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 97921325b2e9..10c607a40057 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1197,9 +1197,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 56cbb113975a..c5aa1f10e7cc 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2299,11 +2299,16 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+ /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
+ * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
+ * labels associated with the ipc object. */
+ context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 85751ebe8842..776f62291b9f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1815,10 +1815,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +-------
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++--
kernel/audit.c | 16 ++++------
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +--
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++++--------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 ++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 42 +++++++++++++++------------
security/security.c | 12 ++++++--
10 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 2783fd9c7ad6..b6f22979a1db 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3106,20 +3106,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
- security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- /*
- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
- * which means that the one expected by
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 10c607a40057..cbc02e13e4b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1124,9 +1124,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 11da27db9b90..1a7646854813 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2071,19 +2071,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
@@ -2291,6 +2284,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2301,7 +2295,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+ audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 542eee7ad882..eb1dc5dfe408 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1332,7 +1332,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
switch (f->type) {
@@ -1363,8 +1362,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_isset) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c5aa1f10e7cc..e64f73cd5bc4 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -641,17 +640,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->lsm_isset) {
if (need_sid) {
- security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to sid. This is temporary until
- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type,
f->op,
@@ -2398,12 +2389,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+ context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2419,6 +2413,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2430,7 +2425,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2451,7 +2448,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 2ebe29ddf05e..f4a6204f4205 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1557,11 +1557,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
+ audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 3c67afce64f1..438b5db6c714 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+ audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a9649b04b9f1..3dfb573c7171 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -48,14 +48,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
- IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func,
+ mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9fe949c6a530..1f50f68a6f5b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -384,12 +384,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -412,10 +413,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -436,10 +439,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -597,7 +601,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -619,9 +623,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
+ size, MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -703,7 +708,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
} hash = {};
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_policy_flag)
return;
@@ -716,9 +721,10 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
- &pcr, &template, keyring);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0,
+ func, &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 776f62291b9f..58c8866d2871 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1732,10 +1732,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +-------
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++--
kernel/audit.c | 16 ++++------
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +--
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++++--------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 ++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 42 +++++++++++++++------------
security/security.c | 12 ++++++--
10 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 2783fd9c7ad6..b6f22979a1db 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3106,20 +3106,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
- security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- /*
- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
- * which means that the one expected by
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 10c607a40057..cbc02e13e4b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1124,9 +1124,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 11da27db9b90..1a7646854813 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2071,19 +2071,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
@@ -2291,6 +2284,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2301,7 +2295,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+ audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 542eee7ad882..eb1dc5dfe408 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1332,7 +1332,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
switch (f->type) {
@@ -1363,8 +1362,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_isset) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c5aa1f10e7cc..e64f73cd5bc4 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -641,17 +640,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->lsm_isset) {
if (need_sid) {
- security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to sid. This is temporary until
- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type,
f->op,
@@ -2398,12 +2389,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+ context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2419,6 +2413,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2430,7 +2425,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2451,7 +2448,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 2ebe29ddf05e..f4a6204f4205 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1557,11 +1557,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
+ audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 3c67afce64f1..438b5db6c714 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+ audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a9649b04b9f1..3dfb573c7171 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -48,14 +48,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
- IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func,
+ mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9fe949c6a530..1f50f68a6f5b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -384,12 +384,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -412,10 +413,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -436,10 +439,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -597,7 +601,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -619,9 +623,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
+ size, MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -703,7 +708,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
} hash = {};
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_policy_flag)
return;
@@ -716,9 +721,10 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
- &pcr, &template, keyring);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0,
+ func, &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 776f62291b9f..58c8866d2871 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1732,10 +1732,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +---
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cbc02e13e4b4..3f07ba240ec5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -947,9 +947,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e64f73cd5bc4..5d4ce44bff91 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1938,13 +1938,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
+ name->osid = blob.secid[0];
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 55cca6a57178..594cf716a16b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -481,7 +481,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
@@ -494,8 +493,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 58c8866d2871..8cced3fc9ad3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1418,9 +1418,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +---
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cbc02e13e4b4..3f07ba240ec5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -947,9 +947,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e64f73cd5bc4..5d4ce44bff91 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1938,13 +1938,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
+ name->osid = blob.secid[0];
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 55cca6a57178..594cf716a16b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -481,7 +481,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
@@ -494,8 +493,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 58c8866d2871..8cced3fc9ad3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1418,9 +1418,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++----------------
kernel/audit.h | 5 +++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++--------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++----
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---
6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3f07ba240ec5..9b4705d4ec2c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 1a7646854813..a7430f09afd9 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-u32 audit_sig_sid = 0;
+struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1419,29 +1419,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
- * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
- * happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
@@ -2284,7 +2276,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2295,9 +2286,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
- audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 6fb7160412d4..f65f516913c6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
-extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5d4ce44bff91..97da8bf2eda9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -964,14 +964,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -980,9 +980,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1553,7 +1552,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1562,7 +1561,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1740,7 +1739,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->aux = NULL;
context->aux_pids = NULL;
context->target_pid = 0;
- context->target_sid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(&context->target_lsm, 0);
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -2393,15 +2392,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
- context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2417,7 +2413,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2429,9 +2424,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2452,9 +2445,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1f50f68a6f5b..8ad399ea7883 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -412,7 +412,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
@@ -422,9 +421,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8cced3fc9ad3..bf71066ea19b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1647,10 +1647,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++----------------
kernel/audit.h | 5 +++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++--------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++----
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---
6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3f07ba240ec5..9b4705d4ec2c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 1a7646854813..a7430f09afd9 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-u32 audit_sig_sid = 0;
+struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1419,29 +1419,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
- * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
- * happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
@@ -2284,7 +2276,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2295,9 +2286,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
- audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 6fb7160412d4..f65f516913c6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
-extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5d4ce44bff91..97da8bf2eda9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -964,14 +964,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -980,9 +980,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1553,7 +1552,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1562,7 +1561,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1740,7 +1739,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->aux = NULL;
context->aux_pids = NULL;
context->target_pid = 0;
- context->target_sid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(&context->target_lsm, 0);
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -2393,15 +2392,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
- context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2417,7 +2413,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2429,9 +2424,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2452,9 +2445,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1f50f68a6f5b..8ad399ea7883 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -412,7 +412,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
@@ -422,9 +421,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8cced3fc9ad3..bf71066ea19b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1647,10 +1647,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 ++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 +++++++++++----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 ++++++------
5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f9e3ca96fa52..a85aa57d28c5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -230,9 +230,9 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -258,8 +258,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring);
void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index f6bc00914aa5..b481bbc2e55f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -182,16 +182,16 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr,
template_desc, keyring);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3dfb573c7171..bf66e3e6f398 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -54,10 +54,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
return 0;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func,
- mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL,
- NULL);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8ad399ea7883..a6348dca299c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr,
&template_desc, NULL);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
@@ -388,8 +388,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -415,16 +414,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
@@ -442,8 +439,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -624,9 +620,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
- size, MAY_READ, func);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
+ MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -722,9 +717,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
*/
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding */
- action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0,
- func, &pcr, &template, keyring);
+ action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), &blob, 0, func,
+ &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 594cf716a16b..ccb570257f9c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
const char *keyring)
{
@@ -502,7 +502,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
@@ -546,7 +545,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -561,8 +560,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring)
{
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask,
keyring))
continue;
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 ++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 +++++++++++----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 ++++++------
5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f9e3ca96fa52..a85aa57d28c5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -230,9 +230,9 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -258,8 +258,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring);
void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index f6bc00914aa5..b481bbc2e55f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -182,16 +182,16 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
- struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr,
template_desc, keyring);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3dfb573c7171..bf66e3e6f398 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -54,10 +54,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
return 0;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func,
- mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL,
- NULL);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8ad399ea7883..a6348dca299c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr,
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr,
&template_desc, NULL);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
@@ -388,8 +388,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -415,16 +414,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
@@ -442,8 +439,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -624,9 +620,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
- size, MAY_READ, func);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
+ MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -722,9 +717,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
*/
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding */
- action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0,
- func, &pcr, &template, keyring);
+ action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), &blob, 0, func,
+ &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 594cf716a16b..ccb570257f9c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
const char *keyring)
{
@@ -502,7 +502,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
@@ -546,7 +545,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -561,8 +560,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *keyring)
{
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask,
keyring))
continue;
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Create a new entry "display" in the procfs attr directory for
controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
human readable data may be written to "display" to set the
value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
"display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is
provided to get the display slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using
setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 +++++
security/security.c | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++
8 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index c7c64272b0fa..505331ab7a14 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2743,6 +2743,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7eb808cde051..2bf82e1cf347 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2186,4 +2186,19 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+/**
+ * lsm_task_display - the "display" LSM for this task
+ * @task: The task to report on
+ *
+ * Returns the task's display LSM slot.
+ */
+static inline int lsm_task_display(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int *display = task->security;
+
+ if (display)
+ return *display;
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
#define AA_CLASS_NET 14
#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
+#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 146d75e5e021..16b992235c11 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -612,6 +612,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
}
+
+static int profile_display_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
+ if (state) {
+ aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
@@ -623,6 +642,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of display if allowed */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ aad(&sa)->info = "set display lsm";
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_display_lsm(profile, &sa));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return error;
+ }
+
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bf71066ea19b..0208652ad53a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -75,7 +75,14 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * The task blob includes the "display" slot used for
+ * chosing which module presents contexts.
+ */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(int),
+};
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
@@ -470,8 +477,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
/*
* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -491,6 +500,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
lsmid->slot);
@@ -620,6 +630,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
*/
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
+ int *display;
+
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
task->security = NULL;
return 0;
@@ -628,6 +640,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
if (task->security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
+ * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
+ * default first registered LSM be displayed.
+ */
+ display = task->security;
+ *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1583,14 +1604,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
+ int *odisplay = current->security;
+ int *ndisplay;
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
+
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
- if (unlikely(rc))
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
security_task_free(task);
- return rc;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (odisplay) {
+ ndisplay = task->security;
+ if (ndisplay)
+ *ndisplay = *odisplay;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -1987,23 +2020,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+ /*
+ * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+ */
+ if (lsm_slot == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow getting the current process' display.
+ * There are too few reasons to get another process'
+ * display and too many LSM policy issues.
+ */
+ if (current != p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ display = lsm_task_display(p);
+ if (display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = display;
+ *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*value)
+ return strlen(*value);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ display != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
+/**
+ * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
+ * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value to set the attribute to
+ * @size: size of the value
+ *
+ * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
+ * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
+ * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
+ * The /proc code has already done this check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
+ */
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *termed;
+ char *copy;
+ int *display = current->security;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+ /*
+ * Change the "display" value only if all the security
+ * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
+ * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
+ * cooperative.
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ termed = strsep(©, " \n");
+
+ for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
+ if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
+ *display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
+ rc = size;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(termed);
+ return rc;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2023,15 +2143,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2041,16 +2161,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
- &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2058,7 +2177,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ return;
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2183,8 +2309,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list)
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
+ optlen, len);
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 84eef6af53e7..dc5e3bd2b770 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6299,6 +6299,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
+
+ /*
+ * For setting display, we only perform a permission check;
+ * the actual update to the display value is handled by the
+ * LSM framework.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display"))
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
+ PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY, NULL);
+
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 986f3ac14282..ba36a55b5ea4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
{ "process2",
- { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 12e01d450dd4..00a304861657 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3510,6 +3510,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "display"
+ * to be reset at will.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "display") == 0)
+ return 0;
+
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
return -EPERM;
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Create a new entry "display" in the procfs attr directory for
controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
human readable data may be written to "display" to set the
value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
"display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is
provided to get the display slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using
setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 +++++
security/security.c | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++
8 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index c7c64272b0fa..505331ab7a14 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2743,6 +2743,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7eb808cde051..2bf82e1cf347 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2186,4 +2186,19 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+/**
+ * lsm_task_display - the "display" LSM for this task
+ * @task: The task to report on
+ *
+ * Returns the task's display LSM slot.
+ */
+static inline int lsm_task_display(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int *display = task->security;
+
+ if (display)
+ return *display;
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
#define AA_CLASS_NET 14
#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
+#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 146d75e5e021..16b992235c11 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -612,6 +612,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
}
+
+static int profile_display_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
+ if (state) {
+ aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
@@ -623,6 +642,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of display if allowed */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ aad(&sa)->info = "set display lsm";
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_display_lsm(profile, &sa));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return error;
+ }
+
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bf71066ea19b..0208652ad53a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -75,7 +75,14 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * The task blob includes the "display" slot used for
+ * chosing which module presents contexts.
+ */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(int),
+};
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
@@ -470,8 +477,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
/*
* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -491,6 +500,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
lsmid->slot);
@@ -620,6 +630,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
*/
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
+ int *display;
+
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
task->security = NULL;
return 0;
@@ -628,6 +640,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
if (task->security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
+ * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
+ * default first registered LSM be displayed.
+ */
+ display = task->security;
+ *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1583,14 +1604,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
+ int *odisplay = current->security;
+ int *ndisplay;
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
+
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
- if (unlikely(rc))
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
security_task_free(task);
- return rc;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (odisplay) {
+ ndisplay = task->security;
+ if (ndisplay)
+ *ndisplay = *odisplay;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -1987,23 +2020,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+ /*
+ * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+ */
+ if (lsm_slot == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow getting the current process' display.
+ * There are too few reasons to get another process'
+ * display and too many LSM policy issues.
+ */
+ if (current != p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ display = lsm_task_display(p);
+ if (display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = display;
+ *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*value)
+ return strlen(*value);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ display != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
+/**
+ * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
+ * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value to set the attribute to
+ * @size: size of the value
+ *
+ * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
+ * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
+ * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
+ * The /proc code has already done this check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
+ */
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *termed;
+ char *copy;
+ int *display = current->security;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+ /*
+ * Change the "display" value only if all the security
+ * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
+ * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
+ * cooperative.
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ termed = strsep(©, " \n");
+
+ for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
+ if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
+ *display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
+ rc = size;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(termed);
+ return rc;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2023,15 +2143,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2041,16 +2161,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
- &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2058,7 +2177,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ return;
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2183,8 +2309,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ int display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list)
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
+ optlen, len);
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 84eef6af53e7..dc5e3bd2b770 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6299,6 +6299,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
+
+ /*
+ * For setting display, we only perform a permission check;
+ * the actual update to the display value is handled by the
+ * LSM framework.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display"))
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
+ PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY, NULL);
+
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 986f3ac14282..ba36a55b5ea4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
{ "process2",
- { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 12e01d450dd4..00a304861657 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3510,6 +3510,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "display"
+ * to be reset at will.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "display") == 0)
+ return 0;
+
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
return -EPERM;
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:40 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:49PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new entry "display" in the procfs attr directory for
> controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
> process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
>
> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
> human readable data may be written to "display" to set the
> value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
> "display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
> of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is
> provided to get the display slot for a task_struct.
>
> Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using
> setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
> responsible for defining its policy.
>
> AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++
> security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 +++++
> security/security.c | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++
> 8 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index c7c64272b0fa..505331ab7a14 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2743,6 +2743,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
> + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> DIR("smack", 0555,
> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 7eb808cde051..2bf82e1cf347 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2186,4 +2186,19 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
>
> extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
>
> +/**
> + * lsm_task_display - the "display" LSM for this task
> + * @task: The task to report on
> + *
> + * Returns the task's display LSM slot.
> + */
> +static inline int lsm_task_display(struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> + int *display = task->security;
> +
> + if (display)
> + return *display;
> + return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
> index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
> @@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
> #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
> #define AA_CLASS_NET 14
> #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
> +#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
>
> -#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
> +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
>
> /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
> extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 146d75e5e021..16b992235c11 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -612,6 +612,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> return error;
> }
>
> +
> +static int profile_display_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
> + struct common_audit_data *sa)
> +{
> + struct aa_perms perms = { };
> + unsigned int state;
> +
> + state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
> + if (state) {
> + aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
> + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
> + aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
> +
> + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size)
> {
> @@ -623,6 +642,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
> if (size == 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of display if allowed */
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> + struct aa_profile *profile;
> + struct aa_label *label;
> +
> + aad(&sa)->info = "set display lsm";
> + label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
> + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
> + profile_display_lsm(profile, &sa));
> + end_current_label_crit_section(label);
> + return error;
> + }
> +
> /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
> if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
> /* null terminate */
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index bf71066ea19b..0208652ad53a 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -75,7 +75,14 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
> static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>
> char *lsm_names;
> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> +/*
> + * The task blob includes the "display" slot used for
> + * chosing which module presents contexts.
> + */
> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lbs_task = sizeof(int),
> +};
>
> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> @@ -470,8 +477,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>
> /*
> * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
> */
> static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -491,6 +500,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
> lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> lsmid->slot);
> @@ -620,6 +630,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
> */
> static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> + int *display;
> +
> if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
> task->security = NULL;
> return 0;
> @@ -628,6 +640,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (task->security == NULL)
> return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /*
> + * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
> + * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
> + * default first registered LSM be displayed.
> + */
> + display = task->security;
> + *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1583,14 +1604,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
>
> int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
> {
> + int *odisplay = current->security;
> + int *ndisplay;
> int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
>
> - if (rc)
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> return rc;
> +
> rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
> - if (unlikely(rc))
> + if (unlikely(rc)) {
> security_task_free(task);
> - return rc;
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + if (odisplay) {
> + ndisplay = task->security;
> + if (ndisplay)
> + *ndisplay = *odisplay;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> }
>
> void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> @@ -1987,23 +2020,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> char **value)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
> + int slot = 0;
> +
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> + /*
> + * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> + */
> + if (lsm_slot == 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /*
> + * Only allow getting the current process' display.
> + * There are too few reasons to get another process'
> + * display and too many LSM policy issues.
> + */
> + if (current != p)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + display = lsm_task_display(p);
> + if (display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + slot = display;
> + *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (*value)
> + return strlen(*value);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> + if (lsm == NULL && display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> + display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> + continue;
> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> }
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
> + * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
> + * @name: name of the attribute
> + * @value: value to set the attribute to
> + * @size: size of the value
> + *
> + * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
> + * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
> + * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
> + * The /proc code has already done this check.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
> + */
> int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + char *termed;
> + char *copy;
> + int *display = current->security;
> + int rc = -EINVAL;
> + int slot = 0;
> +
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> + /*
> + * Change the "display" value only if all the security
> + * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
> + * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
> + * cooperative.
> + */
> + if (size == 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
> + list) {
> + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> +
> + copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (copy == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + termed = strsep(©, " \n");
> +
> + for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
> + if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
> + *display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
> + rc = size;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + kfree(termed);
> + return rc;
> + }
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> + *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> + continue;
> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> }
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -2023,15 +2143,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
> int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int rc;
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
> - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> - secdata, seclen);
> - if (rc != 0)
> - return rc;
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> + return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
> + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> + secdata, seclen);
> }
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -2041,16 +2161,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int rc;
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>
> lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
> - rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> - &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> - if (rc != 0)
> - return rc;
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> + return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> }
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -2058,7 +2177,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> {
> - call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> + hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> + return;
> + }
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>
> @@ -2183,8 +2309,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - optval, optlen, len);
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
> + list)
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> + return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
> + optlen, len);
> + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
>
> int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 84eef6af53e7..dc5e3bd2b770 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6299,6 +6299,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
> /*
> * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
> */
> +
> + /*
> + * For setting display, we only perform a permission check;
> + * the actual update to the display value is handled by the
> + * LSM framework.
> + */
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display"))
> + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> + mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
> + PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY, NULL);
> +
> if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
> error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 986f3ac14282..ba36a55b5ea4 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
> "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
> "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
> { "process2",
> - { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
> + { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } },
> { "system",
> { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
> "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 12e01d450dd4..00a304861657 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3510,6 +3510,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
> struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
> int rc;
>
> + /*
> + * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "display"
> + * to be reset at will.
> + */
> + if (strcmp(name, "display") == 0)
> + return 0;
> +
> if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
> return -EPERM;
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
@ 2020-04-07 18:40 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:49PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new entry "display" in the procfs attr directory for
> controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
> process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
>
> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
> human readable data may be written to "display" to set the
> value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
> "display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
> of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is
> provided to get the display slot for a task_struct.
>
> Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using
> setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
> responsible for defining its policy.
>
> AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++
> security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 +++++
> security/security.c | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++
> 8 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index c7c64272b0fa..505331ab7a14 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2743,6 +2743,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
> + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> DIR("smack", 0555,
> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 7eb808cde051..2bf82e1cf347 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2186,4 +2186,19 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
>
> extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
>
> +/**
> + * lsm_task_display - the "display" LSM for this task
> + * @task: The task to report on
> + *
> + * Returns the task's display LSM slot.
> + */
> +static inline int lsm_task_display(struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> + int *display = task->security;
> +
> + if (display)
> + return *display;
> + return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
> index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
> @@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
> #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
> #define AA_CLASS_NET 14
> #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
> +#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
>
> -#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
> +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
>
> /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
> extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 146d75e5e021..16b992235c11 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -612,6 +612,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> return error;
> }
>
> +
> +static int profile_display_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
> + struct common_audit_data *sa)
> +{
> + struct aa_perms perms = { };
> + unsigned int state;
> +
> + state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
> + if (state) {
> + aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
> + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
> + aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
> +
> + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size)
> {
> @@ -623,6 +642,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
> if (size == 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of display if allowed */
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> + struct aa_profile *profile;
> + struct aa_label *label;
> +
> + aad(&sa)->info = "set display lsm";
> + label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
> + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
> + profile_display_lsm(profile, &sa));
> + end_current_label_crit_section(label);
> + return error;
> + }
> +
> /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
> if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
> /* null terminate */
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index bf71066ea19b..0208652ad53a 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -75,7 +75,14 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
> static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>
> char *lsm_names;
> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> +/*
> + * The task blob includes the "display" slot used for
> + * chosing which module presents contexts.
> + */
> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lbs_task = sizeof(int),
> +};
>
> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> @@ -470,8 +477,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>
> /*
> * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
> */
> static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -491,6 +500,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
> lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> lsmid->slot);
> @@ -620,6 +630,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
> */
> static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> + int *display;
> +
> if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
> task->security = NULL;
> return 0;
> @@ -628,6 +640,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (task->security == NULL)
> return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /*
> + * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number.
> + * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
> + * default first registered LSM be displayed.
> + */
> + display = task->security;
> + *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1583,14 +1604,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
>
> int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
> {
> + int *odisplay = current->security;
> + int *ndisplay;
> int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
>
> - if (rc)
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> return rc;
> +
> rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
> - if (unlikely(rc))
> + if (unlikely(rc)) {
> security_task_free(task);
> - return rc;
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + if (odisplay) {
> + ndisplay = task->security;
> + if (ndisplay)
> + *ndisplay = *odisplay;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> }
>
> void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> @@ -1987,23 +2020,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> char **value)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
> + int slot = 0;
> +
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> + /*
> + * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
> + */
> + if (lsm_slot == 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /*
> + * Only allow getting the current process' display.
> + * There are too few reasons to get another process'
> + * display and too many LSM policy issues.
> + */
> + if (current != p)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + display = lsm_task_display(p);
> + if (display != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + slot = display;
> + *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (*value)
> + return strlen(*value);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> + if (lsm == NULL && display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> + display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> + continue;
> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> }
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
> + * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
> + * @name: name of the attribute
> + * @value: value to set the attribute to
> + * @size: size of the value
> + *
> + * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
> + * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
> + * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
> + * The /proc code has already done this check.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
> + */
> int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + char *termed;
> + char *copy;
> + int *display = current->security;
> + int rc = -EINVAL;
> + int slot = 0;
> +
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
> + /*
> + * Change the "display" value only if all the security
> + * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
> + * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
> + * cooperative.
> + */
> + if (size == 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
> + list) {
> + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> +
> + copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (copy == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + termed = strsep(©, " \n");
> +
> + for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
> + if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
> + *display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
> + rc = size;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + kfree(termed);
> + return rc;
> + }
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
> + *display != hp->lsmid->slot)
> + continue;
> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> }
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -2023,15 +2143,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
> int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int rc;
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
> - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> - secdata, seclen);
> - if (rc != 0)
> - return rc;
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> + return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
> + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> + secdata, seclen);
> }
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -2041,16 +2161,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int rc;
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>
> lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
> - rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> - &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> - if (rc != 0)
> - return rc;
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> + return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> }
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -2058,7 +2177,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> {
> - call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> + hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
> + return;
> + }
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>
> @@ -2183,8 +2309,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - optval, optlen, len);
> + int display = lsm_task_display(current);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
> + list)
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> + return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
> + optlen, len);
> + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
>
> int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 84eef6af53e7..dc5e3bd2b770 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6299,6 +6299,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
> /*
> * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
> */
> +
> + /*
> + * For setting display, we only perform a permission check;
> + * the actual update to the display value is handled by the
> + * LSM framework.
> + */
> + if (!strcmp(name, "display"))
> + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> + mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
> + PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY, NULL);
> +
> if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
> error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 986f3ac14282..ba36a55b5ea4 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
> "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
> "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
> { "process2",
> - { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
> + { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } },
> { "system",
> { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
> "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 12e01d450dd4..00a304861657 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3510,6 +3510,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
> struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
> int rc;
>
> + /*
> + * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "display"
> + * to be reset at will.
> + */
> + if (strcmp(name, "display") == 0)
> + return 0;
> +
> if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
> return -EPERM;
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Add a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information
about a "security context", including the string, its size and
which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is
necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the
lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys
them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry
in a list that never goes away.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++---
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++--
include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 5 +++-
kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++-
security/security.c | 11 ++++----
15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index b6f22979a1db..30e59b386ce2 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2863,6 +2863,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3159,7 +3160,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
secctx = NULL;
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3492,8 +3494,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx)
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (secctx) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index 7b8a070a782d..9bf41894e3e1 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -1272,12 +1272,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->acl);
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->default_acl);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
- security_release_secctx(as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
#endif
if (as_ctx->pagelist)
ceph_pagelist_release(as_ctx->pagelist);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 69b7ab7a5815..4f2e9c7aaec4 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -130,8 +130,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 9761512674a0..df308b1b37fa 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2496,6 +2496,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
void *context = NULL;
int contextlen;
#endif
@@ -2998,8 +2999,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (context) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9b4705d4ec2c..2e83c5bf37b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -130,6 +130,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * A "security context" is the text representation of
+ * the information used by LSMs.
+ * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
+ * it is useful for.
+ */
+struct lsmcontext {
+ char *context; /* Provided by the module */
+ u32 len;
+ int slot; /* Identifies the module */
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
+ * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
+ * @context: Initial context, or NULL
+ * @size: Size of context, or 0
+ * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
+ *
+ * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
+ * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
+ * lsmcontext integration is complete.
+ */
+static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
+ u32 size, int slot)
+{
+ cp->slot = slot;
+ cp->context = context;
+ cp->len = size;
+}
+
/*
* Data exported by the security modules
*
@@ -521,7 +552,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1335,7 +1366,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 31ae605fcc0a..30ba801c91bd 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
@@ -102,7 +103,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ /*scaffolding*/
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index a7430f09afd9..128875679101 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1180,6 +1180,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1427,15 +1428,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2064,6 +2068,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
@@ -2077,7 +2082,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 97da8bf2eda9..94aeedfa3ce4 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -969,6 +969,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -986,7 +987,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
rc = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1199,6 +1201,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1232,7 +1235,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1378,6 +1382,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1386,7 +1391,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 1ca97d0cb4a9..96d56a30ecca 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 0ee04cd61772..131df0661bfa 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
@@ -352,7 +353,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index af8568d1fc6a..f4de2c734557 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
u32 len;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 863eb2d34137..f3bb11828d73 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
char *secdata = NULL;
u32 seclen = 0;
@@ -628,8 +629,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -637,8 +640,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index f4a6204f4205..5785e6dcf54b 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -447,7 +448,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -478,6 +481,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -509,7 +513,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -546,6 +552,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -576,7 +583,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1095,6 +1103,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
@@ -1165,7 +1174,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
secctx_len,
secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 893301ae0131..ef139d8ae7cd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0208652ad53a..dcf7eae1f31c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2175,16 +2175,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int display = lsm_task_display(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
- if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
- hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
- return;
+ if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
+ break;
}
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Add a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information
about a "security context", including the string, its size and
which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is
necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the
lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys
them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry
in a list that never goes away.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++---
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++--
include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 5 +++-
kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++-
security/security.c | 11 ++++----
15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index b6f22979a1db..30e59b386ce2 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2863,6 +2863,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3159,7 +3160,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
secctx = NULL;
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3492,8 +3494,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx)
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (secctx) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index 7b8a070a782d..9bf41894e3e1 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -1272,12 +1272,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->acl);
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->default_acl);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
- security_release_secctx(as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
#endif
if (as_ctx->pagelist)
ceph_pagelist_release(as_ctx->pagelist);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 69b7ab7a5815..4f2e9c7aaec4 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -130,8 +130,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 9761512674a0..df308b1b37fa 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2496,6 +2496,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
void *context = NULL;
int contextlen;
#endif
@@ -2998,8 +2999,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (context) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9b4705d4ec2c..2e83c5bf37b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -130,6 +130,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * A "security context" is the text representation of
+ * the information used by LSMs.
+ * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
+ * it is useful for.
+ */
+struct lsmcontext {
+ char *context; /* Provided by the module */
+ u32 len;
+ int slot; /* Identifies the module */
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
+ * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
+ * @context: Initial context, or NULL
+ * @size: Size of context, or 0
+ * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
+ *
+ * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
+ * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
+ * lsmcontext integration is complete.
+ */
+static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
+ u32 size, int slot)
+{
+ cp->slot = slot;
+ cp->context = context;
+ cp->len = size;
+}
+
/*
* Data exported by the security modules
*
@@ -521,7 +552,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1335,7 +1366,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 31ae605fcc0a..30ba801c91bd 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
@@ -102,7 +103,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ /*scaffolding*/
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index a7430f09afd9..128875679101 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1180,6 +1180,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1427,15 +1428,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2064,6 +2068,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
@@ -2077,7 +2082,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 97da8bf2eda9..94aeedfa3ce4 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -969,6 +969,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -986,7 +987,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
rc = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1199,6 +1201,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1232,7 +1235,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1378,6 +1382,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1386,7 +1391,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 1ca97d0cb4a9..96d56a30ecca 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 0ee04cd61772..131df0661bfa 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
@@ -352,7 +353,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index af8568d1fc6a..f4de2c734557 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
u32 len;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 863eb2d34137..f3bb11828d73 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
char *secdata = NULL;
u32 seclen = 0;
@@ -628,8 +629,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -637,8 +640,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index f4a6204f4205..5785e6dcf54b 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -447,7 +448,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -478,6 +481,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -509,7 +513,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -546,6 +552,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -576,7 +583,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1095,6 +1103,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
@@ -1165,7 +1174,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
secctx_len,
secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 893301ae0131..ef139d8ae7cd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0208652ad53a..dcf7eae1f31c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2175,16 +2175,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int display = lsm_task_display(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
- if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
- hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
- return;
+ if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
+ break;
}
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++---------
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 10 ++-----
kernel/audit.c | 35 ++++++++--------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 +++++------
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++-----------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
security/security.c | 10 +++++--
12 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 30e59b386ce2..c76fc2abd091 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2861,9 +2861,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_sz = 0;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3111,14 +3109,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_get_secctx_failed;
}
- added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
extra_buffers_size += added_size;
if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3145,24 +3143,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer = NULL;
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
- if (secctx) {
+ if (lsmctx.context) {
int err;
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
if (err) {
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- secctx = NULL;
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3218,7 +3214,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
off_min = 0;
for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3494,10 +3490,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmctx.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2e83c5bf37b0..ec64ccd2e168 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 30ba801c91bd..4a6ad8caf423 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -93,18 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
- &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- /*scaffolding*/
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
+ context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 128875679101..013a90dd2bd5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1178,9 +1178,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1419,30 +1417,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &context);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
- sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
+ sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len);
kfree(sig_data);
break;
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
@@ -2064,26 +2058,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 94aeedfa3ce4..b7275860ba5f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -969,9 +969,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -982,13 +980,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1201,7 +1198,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1225,17 +1221,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
@@ -1379,20 +1373,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 96d56a30ecca..27af7a6b8780 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 131df0661bfa..2fa1e5bd781d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -329,8 +329,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -338,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -347,13 +346,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
@@ -651,15 +649,15 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
- /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
+ len = context.len;
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index f4de2c734557..383a4f44be63 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index f3bb11828d73..880da01ef4d3 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ *secdata = context.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ seclen = context.len;
#endif
return seclen;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 5785e6dcf54b..cf4c56beb3ec 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
@@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -510,11 +503,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -553,8 +544,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -580,10 +569,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -1106,8 +1094,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1167,15 +1153,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dcf7eae1f31c..356c5cd94c48 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2140,18 +2140,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
+ }
}
return 0;
}
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++---------
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 10 ++-----
kernel/audit.c | 35 ++++++++--------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 +++++------
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++-----------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
security/security.c | 10 +++++--
12 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 30e59b386ce2..c76fc2abd091 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2861,9 +2861,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_sz = 0;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3111,14 +3109,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_get_secctx_failed;
}
- added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
extra_buffers_size += added_size;
if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3145,24 +3143,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer = NULL;
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
- if (secctx) {
+ if (lsmctx.context) {
int err;
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
if (err) {
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- secctx = NULL;
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3218,7 +3214,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
off_min = 0;
for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3494,10 +3490,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmctx.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2e83c5bf37b0..ec64ccd2e168 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 30ba801c91bd..4a6ad8caf423 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -93,18 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
- &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- /*scaffolding*/
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
+ context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 128875679101..013a90dd2bd5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1178,9 +1178,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1419,30 +1417,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &context);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
- sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
+ sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len);
kfree(sig_data);
break;
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
@@ -2064,26 +2058,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 94aeedfa3ce4..b7275860ba5f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -969,9 +969,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -982,13 +980,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1201,7 +1198,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1225,17 +1221,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
@@ -1379,20 +1373,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 96d56a30ecca..27af7a6b8780 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 131df0661bfa..2fa1e5bd781d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -329,8 +329,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -338,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -347,13 +346,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
@@ -651,15 +649,15 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
- /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
+ len = context.len;
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index f4de2c734557..383a4f44be63 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index f3bb11828d73..880da01ef4d3 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ *secdata = context.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ seclen = context.len;
#endif
return seclen;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 5785e6dcf54b..cf4c56beb3ec 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
@@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -510,11 +503,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -553,8 +544,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -580,10 +569,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -1106,8 +1094,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1167,15 +1153,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dcf7eae1f31c..356c5cd94c48 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2140,18 +2140,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
+ }
}
return 0;
}
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:41 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:51PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
> along with the context and context length. This allows
> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
> returned data from the new structure.
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++---------
> include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
> include/net/scm.h | 10 ++-----
> kernel/audit.c | 35 ++++++++--------------
> kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++---
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 +++++------
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++-----------------
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
> security/security.c | 10 +++++--
> 12 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 30e59b386ce2..c76fc2abd091 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2861,9 +2861,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
> struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
> int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
> - char *secctx = NULL;
> - u32 secctx_sz = 0;
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> + struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
>
> e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
> e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
> @@ -3111,14 +3109,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> size_t added_size;
>
> security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> return_error_line = __LINE__;
> goto err_get_secctx_failed;
> }
> - added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> + added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
> extra_buffers_size += added_size;
> if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
> /* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
> @@ -3145,24 +3143,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> t->buffer = NULL;
> goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
> }
> - if (secctx) {
> + if (lsmctx.context) {
> int err;
> size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
> ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
> ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
> - ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> + ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>
> t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
> err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
> t->buffer, buf_offset,
> - secctx, secctx_sz);
> + lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
> if (err) {
> t->security_ctx = 0;
> WARN_ON(1);
> }
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - secctx = NULL;
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> }
> t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
> t->buffer->transaction = t;
> @@ -3218,7 +3214,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
> sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
> sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
> - ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> + ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
> off_min = 0;
> for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
> buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
> @@ -3494,10 +3490,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
> err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
> err_bad_extra_size:
> - if (secctx) {
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - }
> + if (lsmctx.context)
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> err_get_secctx_failed:
> kfree(tcomplete);
> binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2e83c5bf37b0..ec64ccd2e168 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size);
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
>
> static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> - char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> + struct lsmcontext *cp)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 30ba801c91bd..4a6ad8caf423 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -93,18 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> {
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secdata;
> - u32 seclen;
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
> - &seclen);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
>
> if (!err) {
> - put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> - /*scaffolding*/
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
> + put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
> + context.len, context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 128875679101..013a90dd2bd5 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1178,9 +1178,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
> struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - u32 len;
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> + struct lsmcontext context = { };
>
> err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
> if (err)
> @@ -1419,30 +1417,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> break;
> }
> case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
> - len = 0;
> if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
> - &len);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> + &context);
> if (err)
> return err;
> }
> - sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!sig_data) {
> - if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - }
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
> sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
> sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
> if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> - memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> + memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
> - sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> + sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len);
> kfree(sig_data);
> break;
> case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
> @@ -2064,26 +2058,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
>
> int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - unsigned len;
> int error;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> + struct lsmcontext context;
>
> security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (error) {
> if (error != -EINVAL)
> goto error_path;
> return 0;
> }
>
> - audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> return 0;
>
> error_path:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 94aeedfa3ce4..b7275860ba5f 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -969,9 +969,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - u32 len;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> int rc = 0;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> @@ -982,13 +980,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> rc = 1;
> } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> }
> }
> audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> @@ -1201,7 +1198,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>
> static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> {
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> int i;
>
> @@ -1225,17 +1221,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
> context->ipc.mode);
> if (osid) {
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - u32 len;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> *call_panic = 1;
> } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> }
> }
> @@ -1379,20 +1373,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> if (n->osid != 0) {
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - u32 len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> }
> }
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 96d56a30ecca..27af7a6b8780 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> struct lsmcontext context;
> struct lsmblob lb;
> - char *secdata;
> - u32 seclen;
> int err;
>
> err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
> + put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 131df0661bfa..2fa1e5bd781d 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -329,8 +329,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> {
> struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
> - int len, ret;
> - char *secctx;
> + int ret;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> @@ -338,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -347,13 +346,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> if (!nest_secctx)
> goto nla_put_failure;
>
> - if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
> + if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
> goto nla_put_failure;
> nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
>
> ret = 0;
> nla_put_failure:
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> return ret;
> }
> @@ -651,15 +649,15 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
> #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
> int len, ret;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> + struct lsmcontext context;
>
> - /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
> - * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> - * to use to create the secctx. */
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> + len = context.len;
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> +
> return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
> + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
> #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index f4de2c734557..383a4f44be63 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
> static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> {
> int ret;
> - u32 len;
> - char *secctx;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (ret)
> return;
>
> - seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
> + seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
>
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index f3bb11828d73..880da01ef4d3 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> u32 seclen = 0;
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
> struct lsmblob blob;
> + struct lsmcontext context = { };
>
> if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
> return 0;
> @@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
> * module to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + *secdata = context.context;
> }
>
> read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> + seclen = context.len;
> #endif
> return seclen;
> }
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 5785e6dcf54b..cf4c56beb3ec 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secctx = NULL;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
> @@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> - &secctx,
> - &secctx_len) == 0) {
> - audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> - /* scaffolding */
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> + context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> struct net_device *dev;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secctx;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -510,11 +503,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> if (entry != NULL)
> lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> - &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> - audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> - /* scaffolding */
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> + context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -553,8 +544,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> struct net_device *dev;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secctx;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -580,10 +569,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> if (entry != NULL)
> lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> - &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> - audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> + context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -1106,8 +1094,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> struct lsmcontext context;
> void *data;
> u32 secid;
> - char *secctx;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
> @@ -1167,15 +1153,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> - ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> + ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
> - secctx_len,
> - secctx);
> - /* scaffolding */
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> + context.len,
> + context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
> {
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secctx;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
> @@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
> if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> - audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index dcf7eae1f31c..356c5cd94c48 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2140,18 +2140,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>
> + memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
> +
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
> - if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
> blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> - secdata, seclen);
> + &cp->context, &cp->len);
> + }
> }
> return 0;
> }
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
@ 2020-04-07 18:41 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:51PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
> lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
> along with the context and context length. This allows
> security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
> context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
> returned data from the new structure.
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++---------
> include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
> include/net/scm.h | 10 ++-----
> kernel/audit.c | 35 ++++++++--------------
> kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++---
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 +++++------
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++-----------------
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
> security/security.c | 10 +++++--
> 12 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 30e59b386ce2..c76fc2abd091 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2861,9 +2861,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
> struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
> int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
> - char *secctx = NULL;
> - u32 secctx_sz = 0;
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> + struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
>
> e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
> e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
> @@ -3111,14 +3109,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> size_t added_size;
>
> security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> return_error_line = __LINE__;
> goto err_get_secctx_failed;
> }
> - added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> + added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
> extra_buffers_size += added_size;
> if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
> /* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
> @@ -3145,24 +3143,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> t->buffer = NULL;
> goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
> }
> - if (secctx) {
> + if (lsmctx.context) {
> int err;
> size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
> ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
> ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
> - ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> + ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
>
> t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
> err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
> t->buffer, buf_offset,
> - secctx, secctx_sz);
> + lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
> if (err) {
> t->security_ctx = 0;
> WARN_ON(1);
> }
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - secctx = NULL;
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> }
> t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
> t->buffer->transaction = t;
> @@ -3218,7 +3214,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
> sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
> sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
> - ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
> + ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
> off_min = 0;
> for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
> buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
> @@ -3494,10 +3490,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
> err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
> err_bad_extra_size:
> - if (secctx) {
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - }
> + if (lsmctx.context)
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> err_get_secctx_failed:
> kfree(tcomplete);
> binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2e83c5bf37b0..ec64ccd2e168 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size);
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
>
> static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> - char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> + struct lsmcontext *cp)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 30ba801c91bd..4a6ad8caf423 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -93,18 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> {
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secdata;
> - u32 seclen;
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
> - &seclen);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
>
> if (!err) {
> - put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> - /*scaffolding*/
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
> + put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
> + context.len, context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 128875679101..013a90dd2bd5 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1178,9 +1178,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
> struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - u32 len;
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> + struct lsmcontext context = { };
>
> err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
> if (err)
> @@ -1419,30 +1417,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> break;
> }
> case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
> - len = 0;
> if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
> - &len);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> + &context);
> if (err)
> return err;
> }
> - sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!sig_data) {
> - if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - }
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
> sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
> sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
> if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> - memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> + memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
> - sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> + sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + context.len);
> kfree(sig_data);
> break;
> case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
> @@ -2064,26 +2058,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
>
> int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - unsigned len;
> int error;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> + struct lsmcontext context;
>
> security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (error) {
> if (error != -EINVAL)
> goto error_path;
> return 0;
> }
>
> - audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> return 0;
>
> error_path:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 94aeedfa3ce4..b7275860ba5f 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -969,9 +969,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - u32 len;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> int rc = 0;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> @@ -982,13 +980,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> rc = 1;
> } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> }
> }
> audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> @@ -1201,7 +1198,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>
> static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> {
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> int i;
>
> @@ -1225,17 +1221,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
> context->ipc.mode);
> if (osid) {
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - u32 len;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> *call_panic = 1;
> } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> }
> }
> @@ -1379,20 +1373,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> if (n->osid != 0) {
> - char *ctx = NULL;
> - u32 len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> }
> }
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 96d56a30ecca..27af7a6b8780 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> struct lsmcontext context;
> struct lsmblob lb;
> - char *secdata;
> - u32 seclen;
> int err;
>
> err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
> + put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 131df0661bfa..2fa1e5bd781d 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -329,8 +329,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> {
> struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
> - int len, ret;
> - char *secctx;
> + int ret;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> @@ -338,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -347,13 +346,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> if (!nest_secctx)
> goto nla_put_failure;
>
> - if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
> + if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
> goto nla_put_failure;
> nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
>
> ret = 0;
> nla_put_failure:
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> return ret;
> }
> @@ -651,15 +649,15 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
> #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
> int len, ret;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> + struct lsmcontext context;
>
> - /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
> - * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> - * to use to create the secctx. */
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> + len = context.len;
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> +
> return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
> + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
> #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index f4de2c734557..383a4f44be63 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
> static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> {
> int ret;
> - u32 len;
> - char *secctx;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (ret)
> return;
>
> - seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
> + seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
>
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> #else
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index f3bb11828d73..880da01ef4d3 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> u32 seclen = 0;
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
> struct lsmblob blob;
> + struct lsmcontext context = { };
>
> if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
> return 0;
> @@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
> * module to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + *secdata = context.context;
> }
>
> read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> + seclen = context.len;
> #endif
> return seclen;
> }
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 5785e6dcf54b..cf4c56beb3ec 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secctx = NULL;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
> @@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> - &secctx,
> - &secctx_len) == 0) {
> - audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> - /* scaffolding */
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> + context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> struct net_device *dev;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secctx;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -510,11 +503,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> if (entry != NULL)
> lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> - &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> - audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> - /* scaffolding */
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> + context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -553,8 +544,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> struct net_device *dev;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secctx;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> @@ -580,10 +569,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> if (entry != NULL)
> lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> - &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> - audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> + context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
> @@ -1106,8 +1094,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> struct lsmcontext context;
> void *data;
> u32 secid;
> - char *secctx;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
> @@ -1167,15 +1153,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> - ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> + ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
> - secctx_len,
> - secctx);
> - /* scaffolding */
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
> + context.len,
> + context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
> {
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> - char *secctx;
> - u32 secctx_len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
> @@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
> if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> - audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
> - lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index dcf7eae1f31c..356c5cd94c48 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2140,18 +2140,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>
> + memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
> +
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
> - if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot)
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) {
> + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
> blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> - secdata, seclen);
> + &cp->context, &cp->len);
> + }
> }
> return 0;
> }
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
This provides the information about which LSM created the
context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
correct hook.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index df308b1b37fa..ac8eb77d0053 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2379,11 +2379,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{
__be32 *p;
- p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2393,13 +2393,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
*/
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
- p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
return 0;
}
#else
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{ return 0; }
#endif
@@ -2496,9 +2496,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
#endif
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2556,7 +2554,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ &context);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -2986,8 +2984,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -2999,10 +2996,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ec64ccd2e168..fac5547dd89e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1382,7 +1382,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 356c5cd94c48..84f33bd4990a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2211,9 +2211,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+ return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
This provides the information about which LSM created the
context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
correct hook.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index df308b1b37fa..ac8eb77d0053 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2379,11 +2379,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{
__be32 *p;
- p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2393,13 +2393,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
*/
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
- p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
return 0;
}
#else
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{ return 0; }
#endif
@@ -2496,9 +2496,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
#endif
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2556,7 +2554,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ &context);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -2986,8 +2984,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -2999,10 +2996,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ec64ccd2e168..fac5547dd89e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1382,7 +1382,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 356c5cd94c48..84f33bd4990a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2211,9 +2211,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+ return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:41 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:52PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
> a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
> This provides the information about which LSM created the
> context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
> correct hook.
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
> security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
> 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> index df308b1b37fa..ac8eb77d0053 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> @@ -2379,11 +2379,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
> #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> static inline __be32
> nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> - void *context, int len)
> + struct lsmcontext *context)
> {
> __be32 *p;
>
> - p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
> + p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
> if (!p)
> return nfserr_resource;
>
> @@ -2393,13 +2393,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> */
> *p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
> *p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
> - p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
> + p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
> return 0;
> }
> #else
> static inline __be32
> nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> - void *context, int len)
> + struct lsmcontext *context)
> { return 0; }
> #endif
>
> @@ -2496,9 +2496,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
> int err;
> struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
> #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> - void *context = NULL;
> - int contextlen;
> + struct lsmcontext context = { };
> #endif
> bool contextsupport = false;
> struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
> @@ -2556,7 +2554,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
> bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
> if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
> err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
> - &context, &contextlen);
> + &context);
> else
> err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> contextsupport = (err == 0);
> @@ -2986,8 +2984,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
> - status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
> - contextlen);
> + status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
> if (status)
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -2999,10 +2996,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>
> out:
> #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> - if (context) {
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - }
> + if (context.context)
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
> kfree(acl);
> if (tempfh) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ec64ccd2e168..fac5547dd89e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> -int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
> int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
> #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>
> @@ -1382,7 +1382,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> -static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
> + struct lsmcontext *cp)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 356c5cd94c48..84f33bd4990a 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2211,9 +2211,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
>
> -int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
> + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> + return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
> + &cp->len);
> + }
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
@ 2020-04-07 18:41 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:52PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
> a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
> This provides the information about which LSM created the
> context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
> correct hook.
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
> security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
> 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> index df308b1b37fa..ac8eb77d0053 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> @@ -2379,11 +2379,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
> #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> static inline __be32
> nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> - void *context, int len)
> + struct lsmcontext *context)
> {
> __be32 *p;
>
> - p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
> + p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
> if (!p)
> return nfserr_resource;
>
> @@ -2393,13 +2393,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> */
> *p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
> *p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
> - p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
> + p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
> return 0;
> }
> #else
> static inline __be32
> nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> - void *context, int len)
> + struct lsmcontext *context)
> { return 0; }
> #endif
>
> @@ -2496,9 +2496,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
> int err;
> struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
> #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> - struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
> - void *context = NULL;
> - int contextlen;
> + struct lsmcontext context = { };
> #endif
> bool contextsupport = false;
> struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
> @@ -2556,7 +2554,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
> bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
> if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
> err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
> - &context, &contextlen);
> + &context);
> else
> err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> contextsupport = (err == 0);
> @@ -2986,8 +2984,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
> - status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
> - contextlen);
> + status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
> if (status)
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -2999,10 +2996,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
>
> out:
> #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
> - if (context) {
> - lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
> - security_release_secctx(&scaff);
> - }
> + if (context.context)
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
> kfree(acl);
> if (tempfh) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ec64ccd2e168..fac5547dd89e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> -int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
> int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
> #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>
> @@ -1382,7 +1382,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> -static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
> + struct lsmcontext *cp)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 356c5cd94c48..84f33bd4990a 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2211,9 +2211,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
>
> -int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
> + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
> + return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
> + &cp->len);
> + }
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 31 ++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 880da01ef4d3..d07900c317fd 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -301,12 +301,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
return -1;
}
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -318,14 +316,14 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- *secdata = context.context;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- seclen = context.len;
+ return context->len;
+#else
+ return 0;
#endif
- return seclen;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -401,8 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- char *secdata = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
u32 seclen = 0;
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
@@ -469,7 +466,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
+ seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
if (seclen)
size += nla_total_size(seclen);
}
@@ -604,7 +601,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -632,10 +629,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (seclen)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -643,10 +638,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (seclen)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return NULL;
}
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 31 ++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 880da01ef4d3..d07900c317fd 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -301,12 +301,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
return -1;
}
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -318,14 +316,14 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- *secdata = context.context;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- seclen = context.len;
+ return context->len;
+#else
+ return 0;
#endif
- return seclen;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -401,8 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- char *secdata = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
u32 seclen = 0;
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
@@ -469,7 +466,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
+ seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
if (seclen)
size += nla_total_size(seclen);
}
@@ -604,7 +601,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -632,10 +629,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (seclen)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -643,10 +638,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (seclen)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return NULL;
}
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
the internal storage is used to pass information between
these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the
modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +--
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 27 ++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++--------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++--
12 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 43ae50337685..73fc25b4042b 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
} attr;
};
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 0bd10a1f477f..90e81cd268e9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag).
* Tag definition (may change between kernel versions)
*
- * 0 8 16 24 32
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
- * +----------+----------+
- *
+ * 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob)
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data |
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ *
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
+ * The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which
+ * Linux security modules are built in the kernel.
+ * The data is opaque.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1467,7 +1469,12 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ /* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header
+ * for the LSM data. This should never become an issue.
+ * The check is made from an abundance of caution. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN > CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX);
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.lsmblob,
+ sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1487,7 +1494,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 409a3ae47ce2..f2ebd43a7992 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @family: address family
- * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ lsmblob, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index cf4c56beb3ec..c14a485ff045 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -408,7 +407,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -438,11 +437,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -477,7 +472,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -497,13 +491,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -544,7 +533,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -563,13 +551,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -923,14 +906,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
- * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
- * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
- * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
-
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ &blob, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -977,11 +954,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
- * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
+ &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1093,8 +1067,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmblob *lsmb;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1132,7 +1105,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1146,14 +1119,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1505,7 +1474,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -1518,7 +1487,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 058e3a285d56..168920780994 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dc5e3bd2b770..75af88abb346 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6875,7 +6875,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
-static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "selinux",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index a39f9565d80b..8300e565ddf3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
/* Policy capabilities */
enum {
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 6a94b31b5472..d8d7603ab14e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 216ce602a2b5..8972269a8e3e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3673,7 +3673,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3746,7 +3746,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 2836540f9577..6e76b6b33063 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_enabled;
+extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 00a304861657..5bee05bd7a42 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3767,7 +3767,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
/*
* Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
*/
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(
+ sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
/*
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
* for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -4584,7 +4585,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
-static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "smack",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index e3e05c04dbd1..d10e9c96717e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1122,6 +1122,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1253,10 +1254,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
+ lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
+ &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
the internal storage is used to pass information between
these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the
modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +--
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 27 ++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++--------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++--
12 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 43ae50337685..73fc25b4042b 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
} attr;
};
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 0bd10a1f477f..90e81cd268e9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag).
* Tag definition (may change between kernel versions)
*
- * 0 8 16 24 32
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
- * +----------+----------+
- *
+ * 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob)
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data |
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ *
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
+ * The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which
+ * Linux security modules are built in the kernel.
+ * The data is opaque.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1467,7 +1469,12 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ /* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header
+ * for the LSM data. This should never become an issue.
+ * The check is made from an abundance of caution. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN > CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX);
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.lsmblob,
+ sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1487,7 +1494,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 409a3ae47ce2..f2ebd43a7992 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @family: address family
- * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ lsmblob, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index cf4c56beb3ec..c14a485ff045 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -408,7 +407,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -438,11 +437,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -477,7 +472,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -497,13 +491,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -544,7 +533,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -563,13 +551,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -923,14 +906,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
- * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
- * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
- * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
-
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ &blob, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -977,11 +954,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
- * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
+ &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1093,8 +1067,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmblob *lsmb;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1132,7 +1105,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1146,14 +1119,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1505,7 +1474,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -1518,7 +1487,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 058e3a285d56..168920780994 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dc5e3bd2b770..75af88abb346 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6875,7 +6875,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
-static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "selinux",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index a39f9565d80b..8300e565ddf3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
/* Policy capabilities */
enum {
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 6a94b31b5472..d8d7603ab14e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 216ce602a2b5..8972269a8e3e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3673,7 +3673,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3746,7 +3746,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 2836540f9577..6e76b6b33063 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_enabled;
+extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 00a304861657..5bee05bd7a42 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3767,7 +3767,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
/*
* Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
*/
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(
+ sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
/*
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
* for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -4584,7 +4585,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
};
-static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "smack",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index e3e05c04dbd1..d10e9c96717e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1122,6 +1122,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1253,10 +1254,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
+ lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
+ &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction
use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion
of security "contexts".
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 84f33bd4990a..b7c2ed1eee42 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -769,9 +769,38 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
}
+/**
+ * security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check
+ * @from: source of the transaction
+ * @to: destination of the transaction
+ *
+ * Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then
+ * call the security module hooks.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the
+ * result of the security module checks.
+ */
int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to)
{
+ int from_display = lsm_task_display(from);
+ int to_display = lsm_task_display(to);
+
+ /*
+ * If the display is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has
+ * an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot.
+ *
+ * This is currently only required if the server has requested
+ * peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of
+ * the binder driver detail here.
+ */
+ if (from_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ from_display = 0;
+ if (to_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ to_display = 0;
+ if (from_display != to_display)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
}
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction
use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion
of security "contexts".
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 84f33bd4990a..b7c2ed1eee42 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -769,9 +769,38 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
}
+/**
+ * security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check
+ * @from: source of the transaction
+ * @to: destination of the transaction
+ *
+ * Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then
+ * call the security module hooks.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the
+ * result of the security module checks.
+ */
int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to)
{
+ int from_display = lsm_task_display(from);
+ int to_display = lsm_task_display(to);
+
+ /*
+ * If the display is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has
+ * an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot.
+ *
+ * This is currently only required if the server has requested
+ * peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of
+ * the binder driver detail here.
+ */
+ if (from_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ from_display = 0;
+ if (to_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ to_display = 0;
+ if (from_display != to_display)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
}
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:42 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:55PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction
> use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion
> of security "contexts".
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 84f33bd4990a..b7c2ed1eee42 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -769,9 +769,38 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
> return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check
> + * @from: source of the transaction
> + * @to: destination of the transaction
> + *
> + * Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then
> + * call the security module hooks.
> + *
> + * Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the
> + * result of the security module checks.
> + */
> int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
> struct task_struct *to)
> {
> + int from_display = lsm_task_display(from);
> + int to_display = lsm_task_display(to);
> +
> + /*
> + * If the display is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has
> + * an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot.
> + *
> + * This is currently only required if the server has requested
> + * peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of
> + * the binder driver detail here.
> + */
> + if (from_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + from_display = 0;
> + if (to_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + to_display = 0;
> + if (from_display != to_display)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
> }
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
@ 2020-04-07 18:42 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:55PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction
> use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion
> of security "contexts".
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 84f33bd4990a..b7c2ed1eee42 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -769,9 +769,38 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
> return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check
> + * @from: source of the transaction
> + * @to: destination of the transaction
> + *
> + * Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then
> + * call the security module hooks.
> + *
> + * Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the
> + * result of the security module checks.
> + */
> int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
> struct task_struct *to)
> {
> + int from_display = lsm_task_display(from);
> + int to_display = lsm_task_display(to);
> +
> + /*
> + * If the display is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has
> + * an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot.
> + *
> + * This is currently only required if the server has requested
> + * peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of
> + * the binder driver detail here.
> + */
> + if (from_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + from_display = 0;
> + if (to_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + to_display = 0;
> + if (from_display != to_display)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
> }
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information
when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++-
include/net/scm.h | 3 +-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++------
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++--
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++--
13 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index c76fc2abd091..e79c4948ab12 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3109,7 +3109,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fac5547dd89e..896b939f5d62 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "display" slot */
+#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the default "display" slot */
/**
* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -240,6 +242,8 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
return 0;
}
+const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -549,7 +553,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int display);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1354,7 +1359,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- struct lsmcontext *cp)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp, int display)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 4a6ad8caf423..8b5a4737e1b8 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index a534d71e689a..2e6dbf907ee3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 013a90dd2bd5..00a4fbecfdf7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &context);
+ &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2058,28 +2058,58 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
+ int i;
int error;
+ bool sep = false;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
+ struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
+ struct audit_context *context = NULL;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- if (error) {
- if (error != -EINVAL)
- goto error_path;
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * subject "context" it's necessary to put the subject data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
+ context = ab->ctx;
+ if (context)
+ lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
- security_release_secctx(&context);
- return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmdata, i);
+ if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ if (context) {
+ audit_log_format(lsmab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
+ sep ? " " : "",
+ security_lsm_slot_name(i),
+ lsmdata.context);
+ sep = true;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", lsmdata.context);
+
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
+ if (!context)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (context)
+ audit_log_end(lsmab);
-error_path:
- audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
- return error;
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b7275860ba5f..4df540c32581 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1225,7 +1225,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1377,7 +1378,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 27af7a6b8780..10b418029cdd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 2fa1e5bd781d..cd559fada596 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 383a4f44be63..9551e8be6ca4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index d07900c317fd..dc8902f8cea2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c14a485ff045..d816909866cc 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -552,7 +554,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b7c2ed1eee42..d3bf71d66724 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -480,7 +480,31 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
-static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * security_lsm_slot_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
+ * @slot: index into the "display" slot list.
+ *
+ * Provide the name of the security module associated with
+ * a display slot.
+ *
+ * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
+ * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
+ */
+const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot)
+{
+ if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = 0;
+ else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
+}
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2169,13 +2193,32 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int display)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int display = lsm_task_display(current);
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+ /*
+ * display either is the slot number use for formatting
+ * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
+ */
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
+ display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ else if (display == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ else if (display < 0) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true,
+ "LSM: %s unknown display\n", __func__);
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ } else if (display >= lsm_slot) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true,
+ "LSM: %s invalid display\n", __func__);
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ }
+
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
@@ -2186,7 +2229,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
&cp->context, &cp->len);
}
}
- return 0;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information
when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++-
include/net/scm.h | 3 +-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++------
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++--
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++--
13 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index c76fc2abd091..e79c4948ab12 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3109,7 +3109,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fac5547dd89e..896b939f5d62 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "display" slot */
+#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the default "display" slot */
/**
* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -240,6 +242,8 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
return 0;
}
+const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -549,7 +553,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int display);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1354,7 +1359,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- struct lsmcontext *cp)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp, int display)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 4a6ad8caf423..8b5a4737e1b8 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index a534d71e689a..2e6dbf907ee3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 013a90dd2bd5..00a4fbecfdf7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &context);
+ &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2058,28 +2058,58 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
+ int i;
int error;
+ bool sep = false;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
+ struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
+ struct audit_context *context = NULL;
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- if (error) {
- if (error != -EINVAL)
- goto error_path;
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * subject "context" it's necessary to put the subject data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
+ context = ab->ctx;
+ if (context)
+ lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
- security_release_secctx(&context);
- return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmdata, i);
+ if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ if (context) {
+ audit_log_format(lsmab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
+ sep ? " " : "",
+ security_lsm_slot_name(i),
+ lsmdata.context);
+ sep = true;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", lsmdata.context);
+
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
+ if (!context)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (context)
+ audit_log_end(lsmab);
-error_path:
- audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
- return error;
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b7275860ba5f..4df540c32581 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1225,7 +1225,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1377,7 +1378,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 27af7a6b8780..10b418029cdd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 2fa1e5bd781d..cd559fada596 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 383a4f44be63..9551e8be6ca4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index d07900c317fd..dc8902f8cea2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c14a485ff045..d816909866cc 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -552,7 +554,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b7c2ed1eee42..d3bf71d66724 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -480,7 +480,31 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
-static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * security_lsm_slot_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
+ * @slot: index into the "display" slot list.
+ *
+ * Provide the name of the security module associated with
+ * a display slot.
+ *
+ * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
+ * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
+ */
+const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot)
+{
+ if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = 0;
+ else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
+}
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2169,13 +2193,32 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int display)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int display = lsm_task_display(current);
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+ /*
+ * display either is the slot number use for formatting
+ * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
+ */
+ if (display == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
+ display = lsm_task_display(current);
+ else if (display == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ else if (display < 0) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true,
+ "LSM: %s unknown display\n", __func__);
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ } else if (display >= lsm_slot) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true,
+ "LSM: %s invalid display\n", __func__);
+ display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ }
+
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
@@ -2186,7 +2229,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
&cp->context, &cp->len);
}
}
- return 0;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:43 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:56PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information
> when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
> This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
> is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 9 +++-
> include/net/scm.h | 3 +-
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++------
> kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++--
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++--
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++--
> 13 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index c76fc2abd091..e79c4948ab12 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3109,7 +3109,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> size_t added_size;
>
> security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index fac5547dd89e..896b939f5d62 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
> #define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "display" slot */
> +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the default "display" slot */
>
> /**
> * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
> @@ -240,6 +242,8 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot);
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -549,7 +553,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size);
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
> + int display);
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1354,7 +1359,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
>
> static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> - struct lsmcontext *cp)
> + struct lsmcontext *cp, int display)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 4a6ad8caf423..8b5a4737e1b8 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index a534d71e689a..2e6dbf907ee3 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
> #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 013a90dd2bd5..00a4fbecfdf7 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
> if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> - &context);
> + &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> if (err)
> return err;
> }
> @@ -2058,28 +2058,58 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
>
> int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> + int i;
> int error;
> + bool sep = false;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext context;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
> + struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
> + struct audit_context *context = NULL;
>
> security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> - if (error) {
> - if (error != -EINVAL)
> - goto error_path;
> - return 0;
> + /*
> + * If there is more than one security module that has a
> + * subject "context" it's necessary to put the subject data
> + * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
> + */
> + if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
> + context = ab->ctx;
> + if (context)
> + lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
> + AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
> }
>
> - audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&context);
> - return 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> + if (blob.secid[i] == 0)
> + continue;
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmdata, i);
> + if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
> + return error;
> + }
> +
> + if (context) {
> + audit_log_format(lsmab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
> + sep ? " " : "",
> + security_lsm_slot_name(i),
> + lsmdata.context);
> + sep = true;
> + } else
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", lsmdata.context);
> +
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
> + if (!context)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (context)
> + audit_log_end(lsmab);
>
> -error_path:
> - audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
> - return error;
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index b7275860ba5f..4df540c32581 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> rc = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1225,7 +1225,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> *call_panic = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1377,7 +1378,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 27af7a6b8780..10b418029cdd 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 2fa1e5bd781d..cd559fada596 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
> struct lsmblob blob;
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index 383a4f44be63..9551e8be6ca4 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index d07900c317fd..dc8902f8cea2 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
> * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
> * module to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> }
>
> read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index c14a485ff045..d816909866cc 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> unlhsh_add_return:
> rcu_read_unlock();
> if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> if (dev != NULL)
> dev_put(dev);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -552,7 +554,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> if (dev != NULL)
> dev_put(dev);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
> }
>
> - ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
> + ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
> if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b7c2ed1eee42..d3bf71d66724 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -480,7 +480,31 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
> */
> static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> -static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> +/**
> + * security_lsm_slot_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
> + * @slot: index into the "display" slot list.
> + *
> + * Provide the name of the security module associated with
> + * a display slot.
> + *
> + * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
> + * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
> + *
> + * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
> + */
> +const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot)
> +{
> + if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + slot = 0;
> + else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
> + return NULL;
> + return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
> +}
>
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -2169,13 +2193,32 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
> + int display)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>
> memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
>
> + /*
> + * display either is the slot number use for formatting
> + * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
> + */
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
> + display = lsm_task_display(current);
> + else if (display == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
> + display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + else if (display < 0) {
> + WARN_ONCE(true,
> + "LSM: %s unknown display\n", __func__);
> + display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + } else if (display >= lsm_slot) {
> + WARN_ONCE(true,
> + "LSM: %s invalid display\n", __func__);
> + display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + }
> +
> +
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
> @@ -2186,7 +2229,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> &cp->context, &cp->len);
> }
> }
> - return 0;
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 20/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple subject LSM attributes
@ 2020-04-07 18:43 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:56PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information
> when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
> This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
> is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 9 +++-
> include/net/scm.h | 3 +-
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++------
> kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++--
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++--
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++--
> 13 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index c76fc2abd091..e79c4948ab12 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3109,7 +3109,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> size_t added_size;
>
> security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index fac5547dd89e..896b939f5d62 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
> #define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "display" slot */
> +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the default "display" slot */
>
> /**
> * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
> @@ -240,6 +242,8 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot);
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -549,7 +553,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size);
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
> + int display);
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1354,7 +1359,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
>
> static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> - struct lsmcontext *cp)
> + struct lsmcontext *cp, int display)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 4a6ad8caf423..8b5a4737e1b8 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index a534d71e689a..2e6dbf907ee3 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
> #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 013a90dd2bd5..00a4fbecfdf7 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
> if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> - &context);
> + &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> if (err)
> return err;
> }
> @@ -2058,28 +2058,58 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
>
> int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> + int i;
> int error;
> + bool sep = false;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext context;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
> + struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
> + struct audit_context *context = NULL;
>
> security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> - if (error) {
> - if (error != -EINVAL)
> - goto error_path;
> - return 0;
> + /*
> + * If there is more than one security module that has a
> + * subject "context" it's necessary to put the subject data
> + * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
> + */
> + if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
> + context = ab->ctx;
> + if (context)
> + lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
> + AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
> }
>
> - audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&context);
> - return 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> + if (blob.secid[i] == 0)
> + continue;
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmdata, i);
> + if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
> + return error;
> + }
> +
> + if (context) {
> + audit_log_format(lsmab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
> + sep ? " " : "",
> + security_lsm_slot_name(i),
> + lsmdata.context);
> + sep = true;
> + } else
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", lsmdata.context);
> +
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
> + if (!context)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (context)
> + audit_log_end(lsmab);
>
> -error_path:
> - audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
> - return error;
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index b7275860ba5f..4df540c32581 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> rc = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1225,7 +1225,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> *call_panic = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1377,7 +1378,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 27af7a6b8780..10b418029cdd 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 2fa1e5bd781d..cd559fada596 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
> struct lsmblob blob;
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index 383a4f44be63..9551e8be6ca4 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index d07900c317fd..dc8902f8cea2 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
> * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
> * module to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> }
>
> read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index c14a485ff045..d816909866cc 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> unlhsh_add_return:
> rcu_read_unlock();
> if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> if (dev != NULL)
> dev_put(dev);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -552,7 +554,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> if (dev != NULL)
> dev_put(dev);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
> }
>
> - ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
> + ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
> if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b7c2ed1eee42..d3bf71d66724 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -480,7 +480,31 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use.
> */
> static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> -static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> +/**
> + * security_lsm_slot_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
> + * @slot: index into the "display" slot list.
> + *
> + * Provide the name of the security module associated with
> + * a display slot.
> + *
> + * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
> + * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
> + *
> + * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
> + */
> +const char *security_lsm_slot_name(int slot)
> +{
> + if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + slot = 0;
> + else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
> + return NULL;
> + return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
> +}
>
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -2169,13 +2193,32 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
> + int display)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int display = lsm_task_display(current);
>
> memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
>
> + /*
> + * display either is the slot number use for formatting
> + * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
> + */
> + if (display == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
> + display = lsm_task_display(current);
> + else if (display == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
> + display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + else if (display < 0) {
> + WARN_ONCE(true,
> + "LSM: %s unknown display\n", __func__);
> + display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + } else if (display >= lsm_slot) {
> + WARN_ONCE(true,
> + "LSM: %s invalid display\n", __func__);
> + display = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + }
> +
> +
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
> @@ -2186,7 +2229,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> &cp->context, &cp->len);
> }
> }
> - return 0;
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Create a new audit record type to contain the object information
when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 4 +--
kernel/auditsc.c | 70 +++++---------------------------------
5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 8e1c759fd1ff..4c7c0ee867a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 2e6dbf907ee3..2269100ba0ca 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM object contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 00a4fbecfdf7..6a6146a34cc9 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2113,6 +2113,59 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+ int error;
+ bool sep = false;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
+ struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
+ struct audit_context *context = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+ context = ab->ctx;
+ if (context)
+ lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmdata, i);
+ if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ if (context) {
+ audit_log_format(lsmab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
+ sep ? " " : "",
+ security_lsm_slot_name(i),
+ lsmdata.context);
+ sep = true;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmdata.context);
+
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
+ if (!context)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (context)
+ audit_log_end(lsmab);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
+
void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index f65f516913c6..9a26ba213f6a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob oblob;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob oblob;
int has_perm;
uid_t perm_uid;
gid_t perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4df540c32581..f567f3776ca5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -659,14 +659,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
- * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
- * until name->osid is converted to a
- * lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
f->type,
@@ -674,7 +666,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
f->type,
@@ -688,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
- if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oblob,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules))
++result;
@@ -969,7 +959,6 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -979,15 +968,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
- rc = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ rc = audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1214,26 +1195,14 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
- u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+ struct lsmblob *oblob = &context->ipc.oblob;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
- if (osid) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
- *call_panic = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
- }
- }
+ if (audit_log_object_context(ab, oblob))
+ *call_panic = 1;
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
@@ -1373,20 +1342,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->oblob) && call_panic)
+ *call_panic = 2;
/* log the audit_names record type */
switch (n->type) {
@@ -1935,17 +1892,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
- name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->oblob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
@@ -2291,16 +2244,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
- /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
- * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
- * labels associated with the ipc object. */
- context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.oblob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Create a new audit record type to contain the object information
when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 4 +--
kernel/auditsc.c | 70 +++++---------------------------------
5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 8e1c759fd1ff..4c7c0ee867a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 2e6dbf907ee3..2269100ba0ca 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM object contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 00a4fbecfdf7..6a6146a34cc9 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2113,6 +2113,59 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+ int error;
+ bool sep = false;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
+ struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
+ struct audit_context *context = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+ context = ab->ctx;
+ if (context)
+ lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmdata, i);
+ if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ if (context) {
+ audit_log_format(lsmab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
+ sep ? " " : "",
+ security_lsm_slot_name(i),
+ lsmdata.context);
+ sep = true;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmdata.context);
+
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
+ if (!context)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (context)
+ audit_log_end(lsmab);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
+
void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index f65f516913c6..9a26ba213f6a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob oblob;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob oblob;
int has_perm;
uid_t perm_uid;
gid_t perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4df540c32581..f567f3776ca5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -659,14 +659,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
- * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
- * until name->osid is converted to a
- * lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
f->type,
@@ -674,7 +666,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
f->type,
@@ -688,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
- if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oblob,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rules))
++result;
@@ -969,7 +959,6 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -979,15 +968,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
- rc = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ rc = audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1214,26 +1195,14 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
- u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+ struct lsmblob *oblob = &context->ipc.oblob;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
- if (osid) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
- *call_panic = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
- }
- }
+ if (audit_log_object_context(ab, oblob))
+ *call_panic = 1;
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
@@ -1373,20 +1342,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->oblob) && call_panic)
+ *call_panic = 2;
/* log the audit_names record type */
switch (n->type) {
@@ -1935,17 +1892,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
- name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->oblob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
@@ -2291,16 +2244,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
- /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
- * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
- * labels associated with the ipc object. */
- context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.oblob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:43 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:57PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new audit record type to contain the object information
> when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
> This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
> is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/audit.h | 4 +--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 70 +++++---------------------------------
> 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 8e1c759fd1ff..4c7c0ee867a1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
> extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
>
> extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
> +extern int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
>
> extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 2e6dbf907ee3..2269100ba0ca 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM object contexts */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
> #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 00a4fbecfdf7..6a6146a34cc9 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2113,6 +2113,59 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
>
> +int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + int i;
> + int error;
> + bool sep = false;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
> + struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
> + struct audit_context *context = NULL;
> +
> + /*
> + * If there is more than one security module that has a
> + * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
> + * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
> + */
> + if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
> + context = ab->ctx;
> + if (context)
> + lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
> + AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> + if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
> + continue;
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmdata, i);
> + if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
> + return error;
> + }
> +
> + if (context) {
> + audit_log_format(lsmab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
> + sep ? " " : "",
> + security_lsm_slot_name(i),
> + lsmdata.context);
> + sep = true;
> + } else
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmdata.context);
> +
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
> + if (!context)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (context)
> + audit_log_end(lsmab);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
> +
> void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> struct mm_struct *mm)
> {
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index f65f516913c6..9a26ba213f6a 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> dev_t rdev;
> - u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob oblob;
> struct audit_cap_data fcap;
> unsigned int fcap_ver;
> unsigned char type; /* record type */
> @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> umode_t mode;
> - u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob oblob;
> int has_perm;
> uid_t perm_uid;
> gid_t perm_gid;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 4df540c32581..f567f3776ca5 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -659,14 +659,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> if (f->lsm_isset) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> - /*
> - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
> - * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
> - * until name->osid is converted to a
> - * lsmblob, which happens later in
> - * this patch set.
> - */
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> &blob,
> f->type,
> @@ -674,7 +666,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> &blob,
> f->type,
> @@ -688,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> /* Find ipc objects that match */
> if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
> break;
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> - if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> + if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oblob,
> f->type, f->op,
> f->lsm_rules))
> ++result;
> @@ -969,7 +959,6 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> int rc = 0;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> @@ -979,15 +968,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> - if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> - rc = 1;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> - }
> - }
> + rc = audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
> audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
> audit_log_end(ab);
> @@ -1214,26 +1195,14 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> context->socketcall.args[i]);
> break; }
> case AUDIT_IPC: {
> - u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
> + struct lsmblob *oblob = &context->ipc.oblob;
>
> audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
> context->ipc.mode);
> - if (osid) {
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
> - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> - *call_panic = 1;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> - }
> - }
> + if (audit_log_object_context(ab, oblob))
> + *call_panic = 1;
> if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
> audit_log_end(ab);
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
> @@ -1373,20 +1342,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> - if (n->osid != 0) {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> -
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> - if (call_panic)
> - *call_panic = 2;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> - }
> - }
> + if (audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->oblob) && call_panic)
> + *call_panic = 2;
>
> /* log the audit_names record type */
> switch (n->type) {
> @@ -1935,17 +1892,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
> const struct dentry *dentry,
> struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> name->ino = inode->i_ino;
> name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> name->mode = inode->i_mode;
> name->uid = inode->i_uid;
> name->gid = inode->i_gid;
> name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
> - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> - /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> - name->osid = blob.secid[0];
> + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->oblob);
> if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
> name->fcap_ver = -1;
> return;
> @@ -2291,16 +2244,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
> void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
> {
> struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
> context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
> context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
> context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> - security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> - /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
> - * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
> - * labels associated with the ipc object. */
> - context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
> + security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.oblob);
> context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
> }
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes
@ 2020-04-07 18:43 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:57PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new audit record type to contain the object information
> when there are multiple security modules that require such data.
> This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but
> is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/audit.h | 4 +--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 70 +++++---------------------------------
> 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 8e1c759fd1ff..4c7c0ee867a1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
> extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
>
> extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
> +extern int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
>
> extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 2e6dbf907ee3..2269100ba0ca 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM contexts */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM object contexts */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
> #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 00a4fbecfdf7..6a6146a34cc9 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2113,6 +2113,59 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
>
> +int audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + int i;
> + int error;
> + bool sep = false;
> + struct lsmcontext lsmdata;
> + struct audit_buffer *lsmab = NULL;
> + struct audit_context *context = NULL;
> +
> + /*
> + * If there is more than one security module that has a
> + * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
> + * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
> + */
> + if (security_lsm_slot_name(1) != NULL) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
> + context = ab->ctx;
> + if (context)
> + lsmab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
> + AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> + if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
> + continue;
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmdata, i);
> + if (error && error != -EINVAL) {
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
> + return error;
> + }
> +
> + if (context) {
> + audit_log_format(lsmab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
> + sep ? " " : "",
> + security_lsm_slot_name(i),
> + lsmdata.context);
> + sep = true;
> + } else
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmdata.context);
> +
> + security_release_secctx(&lsmdata);
> + if (!context)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (context)
> + audit_log_end(lsmab);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
> +
> void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> struct mm_struct *mm)
> {
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index f65f516913c6..9a26ba213f6a 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> dev_t rdev;
> - u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob oblob;
> struct audit_cap_data fcap;
> unsigned int fcap_ver;
> unsigned char type; /* record type */
> @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> umode_t mode;
> - u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob oblob;
> int has_perm;
> uid_t perm_uid;
> gid_t perm_gid;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 4df540c32581..f567f3776ca5 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -659,14 +659,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> if (f->lsm_isset) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> - /*
> - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
> - * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
> - * until name->osid is converted to a
> - * lsmblob, which happens later in
> - * this patch set.
> - */
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> &blob,
> f->type,
> @@ -674,7 +666,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> &blob,
> f->type,
> @@ -688,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> /* Find ipc objects that match */
> if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
> break;
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> - if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> + if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oblob,
> f->type, f->op,
> f->lsm_rules))
> ++result;
> @@ -969,7 +959,6 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> int rc = 0;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> @@ -979,15 +968,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> - if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> - rc = 1;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> - }
> - }
> + rc = audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
> audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
> audit_log_end(ab);
> @@ -1214,26 +1195,14 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> context->socketcall.args[i]);
> break; }
> case AUDIT_IPC: {
> - u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
> + struct lsmblob *oblob = &context->ipc.oblob;
>
> audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
> context->ipc.mode);
> - if (osid) {
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
> - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> - *call_panic = 1;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> - }
> - }
> + if (audit_log_object_context(ab, oblob))
> + *call_panic = 1;
> if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
> audit_log_end(ab);
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
> @@ -1373,20 +1342,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> - if (n->osid != 0) {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> -
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> - if (call_panic)
> - *call_panic = 2;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> - }
> - }
> + if (audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->oblob) && call_panic)
> + *call_panic = 2;
>
> /* log the audit_names record type */
> switch (n->type) {
> @@ -1935,17 +1892,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
> const struct dentry *dentry,
> struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> name->ino = inode->i_ino;
> name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> name->mode = inode->i_mode;
> name->uid = inode->i_uid;
> name->gid = inode->i_gid;
> name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
> - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> - /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> - name->osid = blob.secid[0];
> + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->oblob);
> if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
> name->fcap_ver = -1;
> return;
> @@ -2291,16 +2244,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
> void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
> {
> struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
> context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
> context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
> context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> - security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> - /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
> - * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
> - * labels associated with the ipc object. */
> - context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
> + security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.oblob);
> context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
> }
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
process security "context" in compound format:
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 +++++++++++++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +++++-----
security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index aadf47c808c0..304260778cab 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -199,3 +199,31 @@ capability-related fields:
- ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()`
- ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()`
+
+LSM External Interfaces
+=======================
+
+The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
+The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
+require.
+
+The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
+separated list of the active security modules.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/display`` contains the name of the security
+module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
+apply. This interface can be written to.
+
+The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
+case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
+This is provided in compound context format.
+
+- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
+
+The `lsm` and `value` fields are nul terminated bytestrings.
+Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
+The nul bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
+The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
+context of the identified process.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 505331ab7a14..4cc418ce9c3e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2744,6 +2744,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2bf82e1cf347..61977a33f2c3 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1321,6 +1321,12 @@
* @pages contains the number of pages.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * @getprocattr:
+ * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
+ * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
+ * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
+ * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
+ * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
* @ismaclabel:
* Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
* represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 16b992235c11..02f305ab2c69 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+ bool newline = true;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
@@ -600,11 +601,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
- else
+ else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
+ newline = false;
+ } else
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
- error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index c929bf4a3df1..be3b083d9b74 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
* @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
* @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
*
* Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure
*
@@ -30,20 +31,21 @@
*
* Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
*/
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
{
struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+ int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
int len;
if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return -EACCES;
}
+ if (newline)
+ flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
- len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
AA_BUG(len < 0);
*string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -52,19 +54,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
if (len < 0) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return len;
}
- (*string)[len] = '\n';
- (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
+ if (newline) {
+ (*string)[len] = '\n';
+ (*string)[++len] = 0;
+ }
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
- return len + 1;
+ return len;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d3bf71d66724..6643be07e778 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -754,6 +754,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
+ * @ctx: the existing compound context
+ * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
+ * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
+ * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
+ * @newlen: maximum size of @new
+ *
+ * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
+ * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
+ * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
+ */
+static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
+ int newlen)
+{
+ char *final;
+ int llen;
+
+ llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+ newlen = strnlen(new, newlen) + 1;
+
+ final = kzalloc(*ctxlen + llen + newlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (*ctxlen)
+ memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen);
+ kfree(*ctx);
+ *ctx = final;
+ *ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -2073,6 +2109,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *final = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int finallen = 0;
int display = lsm_task_display(current);
int slot = 0;
@@ -2100,6 +2140,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL)
+ continue;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
+ cp, rc);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *value = final;
+ return finallen;
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 75af88abb346..c5f2ff29645b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6257,7 +6257,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
goto bad;
}
- if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
sid = __tsec->osid;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5bee05bd7a42..453923eee950 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3479,7 +3479,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
char *cp;
int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
process security "context" in compound format:
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 +++++++++++++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +++++-----
security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index aadf47c808c0..304260778cab 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -199,3 +199,31 @@ capability-related fields:
- ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()`
- ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()`
+
+LSM External Interfaces
+=======================
+
+The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
+The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
+require.
+
+The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
+separated list of the active security modules.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/display`` contains the name of the security
+module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
+apply. This interface can be written to.
+
+The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
+case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
+This is provided in compound context format.
+
+- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
+
+The `lsm` and `value` fields are nul terminated bytestrings.
+Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
+The nul bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
+The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
+context of the identified process.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 505331ab7a14..4cc418ce9c3e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2744,6 +2744,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2bf82e1cf347..61977a33f2c3 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1321,6 +1321,12 @@
* @pages contains the number of pages.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * @getprocattr:
+ * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
+ * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
+ * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
+ * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
+ * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
* @ismaclabel:
* Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
* represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 16b992235c11..02f305ab2c69 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+ bool newline = true;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
@@ -600,11 +601,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
- else
+ else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
+ newline = false;
+ } else
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
- error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index c929bf4a3df1..be3b083d9b74 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
* @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
* @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
*
* Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure
*
@@ -30,20 +31,21 @@
*
* Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
*/
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
{
struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+ int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
int len;
if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return -EACCES;
}
+ if (newline)
+ flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
- len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
AA_BUG(len < 0);
*string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -52,19 +54,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
if (len < 0) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return len;
}
- (*string)[len] = '\n';
- (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
+ if (newline) {
+ (*string)[len] = '\n';
+ (*string)[++len] = 0;
+ }
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
- return len + 1;
+ return len;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d3bf71d66724..6643be07e778 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -754,6 +754,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
+ * @ctx: the existing compound context
+ * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
+ * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
+ * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
+ * @newlen: maximum size of @new
+ *
+ * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
+ * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
+ * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
+ */
+static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
+ int newlen)
+{
+ char *final;
+ int llen;
+
+ llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+ newlen = strnlen(new, newlen) + 1;
+
+ final = kzalloc(*ctxlen + llen + newlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (*ctxlen)
+ memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen);
+ kfree(*ctx);
+ *ctx = final;
+ *ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -2073,6 +2109,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *final = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int finallen = 0;
int display = lsm_task_display(current);
int slot = 0;
@@ -2100,6 +2140,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL)
+ continue;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
+ cp, rc);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *value = final;
+ return finallen;
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 75af88abb346..c5f2ff29645b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6257,7 +6257,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
goto bad;
}
- if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
sid = __tsec->osid;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5bee05bd7a42..453923eee950 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3479,7 +3479,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
char *cp;
int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 18:47 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:58PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
> process security "context" in compound format:
> lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
> This entry is not writable.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 +++++++++++++
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
> security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 +++-
> security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +++++-----
> security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
> 9 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> index aadf47c808c0..304260778cab 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> @@ -199,3 +199,31 @@ capability-related fields:
> - ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()`
>
> - ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()`
> +
> +LSM External Interfaces
> +=======================
> +
> +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
> +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
> +require.
> +
> +The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
> +separated list of the active security modules.
> +
> +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/display`` contains the name of the security
> +module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
> +apply. This interface can be written to.
> +
> +The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
> +case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
> +This is provided in compound context format.
> +
> +- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
> +
> +The `lsm` and `value` fields are nul terminated bytestrings.
> +Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
> +The nul bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
> +The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
> +
> +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
> +context of the identified process.
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 505331ab7a14..4cc418ce9c3e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2744,6 +2744,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
> + ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> DIR("smack", 0555,
> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 2bf82e1cf347..61977a33f2c3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1321,6 +1321,12 @@
> * @pages contains the number of pages.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> + * @getprocattr:
> + * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
> + * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
> + * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
> + * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
> + * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
> * @ismaclabel:
> * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
> * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
> #ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
> #define __AA_PROCATTR_H
>
> -int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
> +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
> int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
>
> #endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 16b992235c11..02f305ab2c69 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
> struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
> struct aa_label *label = NULL;
> + bool newline = true;
>
> if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
> label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
> @@ -600,11 +601,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
> else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
> label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
> - else
> + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
> + label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
> + newline = false;
> + } else
> error = -EINVAL;
>
> if (label)
> - error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
> + error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
>
> aa_put_label(label);
> put_cred(cred);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> index c929bf4a3df1..be3b083d9b74 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> * aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
> * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
> * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
> + * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
> *
> * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure
> *
> @@ -30,20 +31,21 @@
> *
> * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
> */
> -int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
> +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
> {
> struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
> struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
> + int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
> int len;
>
> if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> return -EACCES;
> }
> + if (newline)
> + flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
>
> - len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
> - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
> + len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
> AA_BUG(len < 0);
>
> *string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -52,19 +54,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> - len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
> - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
> + len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
> if (len < 0) {
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> return len;
> }
>
> - (*string)[len] = '\n';
> - (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
> + if (newline) {
> + (*string)[len] = '\n';
> + (*string)[++len] = 0;
> + }
>
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> - return len + 1;
> + return len;
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d3bf71d66724..6643be07e778 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -754,6 +754,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
> + * @ctx: the existing compound context
> + * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
> + * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
> + * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
> + * @newlen: maximum size of @new
> + *
> + * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
> + * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
> + * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
> + */
> +static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
> + int newlen)
> +{
> + char *final;
> + int llen;
> +
> + llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
> + newlen = strnlen(new, newlen) + 1;
> +
> + final = kzalloc(*ctxlen + llen + newlen, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (final == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + if (*ctxlen)
> + memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen);
> + kfree(*ctx);
> + *ctx = final;
> + *ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Hook list operation macros.
> *
> @@ -2073,6 +2109,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> char **value)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + char *final = NULL;
> + char *cp;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int finallen = 0;
> int display = lsm_task_display(current);
> int slot = 0;
>
> @@ -2100,6 +2140,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> + if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
> + list) {
> + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
> + if (rc == -EINVAL)
> + continue;
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + kfree(final);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
> + cp, rc);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + kfree(final);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + }
> + if (final == NULL)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *value = final;
> + return finallen;
> + }
> +
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 75af88abb346..c5f2ff29645b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6257,7 +6257,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
> goto bad;
> }
>
> - if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
> + if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
> sid = __tsec->sid;
> else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
> sid = __tsec->osid;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 5bee05bd7a42..453923eee950 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3479,7 +3479,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
> char *cp;
> int slen;
>
> - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
> + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v16 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
@ 2020-04-07 18:47 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-04-07 18:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:58PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
> process security "context" in compound format:
> lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
> This entry is not writable.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 +++++++++++++
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
> security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 +++-
> security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +++++-----
> security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
> 9 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> index aadf47c808c0..304260778cab 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> @@ -199,3 +199,31 @@ capability-related fields:
> - ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()`
>
> - ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()`
> +
> +LSM External Interfaces
> +=======================
> +
> +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
> +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
> +require.
> +
> +The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
> +separated list of the active security modules.
> +
> +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/display`` contains the name of the security
> +module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
> +apply. This interface can be written to.
> +
> +The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
> +case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
> +This is provided in compound context format.
> +
> +- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
> +
> +The `lsm` and `value` fields are nul terminated bytestrings.
> +Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
> +The nul bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
> +The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
> +
> +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
> +context of the identified process.
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 505331ab7a14..4cc418ce9c3e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2744,6 +2744,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
> + ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> DIR("smack", 0555,
> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 2bf82e1cf347..61977a33f2c3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1321,6 +1321,12 @@
> * @pages contains the number of pages.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> + * @getprocattr:
> + * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
> + * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
> + * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
> + * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
> + * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
> * @ismaclabel:
> * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
> * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
> #ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
> #define __AA_PROCATTR_H
>
> -int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
> +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
> int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
>
> #endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 16b992235c11..02f305ab2c69 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
> struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
> struct aa_label *label = NULL;
> + bool newline = true;
>
> if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
> label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
> @@ -600,11 +601,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
> else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
> label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
> - else
> + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
> + label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
> + newline = false;
> + } else
> error = -EINVAL;
>
> if (label)
> - error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
> + error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
>
> aa_put_label(label);
> put_cred(cred);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> index c929bf4a3df1..be3b083d9b74 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> * aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
> * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
> * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
> + * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
> *
> * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure
> *
> @@ -30,20 +31,21 @@
> *
> * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
> */
> -int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
> +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
> {
> struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
> struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
> + int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
> int len;
>
> if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> return -EACCES;
> }
> + if (newline)
> + flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
>
> - len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
> - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
> + len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
> AA_BUG(len < 0);
>
> *string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -52,19 +54,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> - len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
> - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
> + len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
> if (len < 0) {
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> return len;
> }
>
> - (*string)[len] = '\n';
> - (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
> + if (newline) {
> + (*string)[len] = '\n';
> + (*string)[++len] = 0;
> + }
>
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> - return len + 1;
> + return len;
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d3bf71d66724..6643be07e778 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -754,6 +754,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
> + * @ctx: the existing compound context
> + * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
> + * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
> + * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
> + * @newlen: maximum size of @new
> + *
> + * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
> + * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
> + * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
> + */
> +static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
> + int newlen)
> +{
> + char *final;
> + int llen;
> +
> + llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
> + newlen = strnlen(new, newlen) + 1;
> +
> + final = kzalloc(*ctxlen + llen + newlen, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (final == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + if (*ctxlen)
> + memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen);
> + kfree(*ctx);
> + *ctx = final;
> + *ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Hook list operation macros.
> *
> @@ -2073,6 +2109,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> char **value)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + char *final = NULL;
> + char *cp;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int finallen = 0;
> int display = lsm_task_display(current);
> int slot = 0;
>
> @@ -2100,6 +2140,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> + if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
> + list) {
> + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
> + if (rc == -EINVAL)
> + continue;
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + kfree(final);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
> + cp, rc);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + kfree(final);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + }
> + if (final == NULL)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *value = final;
> + return finallen;
> + }
> +
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 75af88abb346..c5f2ff29645b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6257,7 +6257,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
> goto bad;
> }
>
> - if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
> + if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
> sid = __tsec->sid;
> else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
> sid = __tsec->osid;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 5bee05bd7a42..453923eee950 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3479,7 +3479,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
> char *cp;
> int slen;
>
> - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
> + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v16 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-audit, sds
With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
interferes in the multiple LSM case.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 02f305ab2c69..07729c28275e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1124,22 +1124,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
@@ -1243,8 +1227,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1913,7 +1895,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
--
2.24.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH v16 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
@ 2020-04-07 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2020-04-07 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-audit
With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
interferes in the multiple LSM case.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 02f305ab2c69..07729c28275e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1124,22 +1124,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
@@ -1243,8 +1227,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1913,7 +1895,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
--
2.24.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread