From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, tiwai@suse.de, jeffm@suse.com,
bhe@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, labbott@redhat.com,
dyoung@redhat.com, AnDavis@suse.com, rpalethorpe@suse.de,
jikos@kernel.org, cai@lca.pw, bunk@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu,
jeyu@suse.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rdunlap@infradead.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
mcgrof@kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Date: Sat, 9 May 2020 11:59:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202005091159.A317BEFF@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200509135737.622299-1-aquini@redhat.com>
On Sat, May 09, 2020 at 09:57:37AM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
>
> This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>
> Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
> Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
dyoung@redhat.com, bhe@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
mcgrof@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, cai@lca.pw,
rdunlap@infradead.org, tytso@mit.edu, bunk@kernel.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
labbott@redhat.com, jeffm@suse.com, jikos@kernel.org,
jeyu@suse.de, tiwai@suse.de, AnDavis@suse.com,
rpalethorpe@suse.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Date: Sat, 9 May 2020 11:59:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202005091159.A317BEFF@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200509135737.622299-1-aquini@redhat.com>
On Sat, May 09, 2020 at 09:57:37AM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
>
> This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>
> Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
> Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-09 18:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-09 13:57 [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint Rafael Aquini
2020-05-09 13:57 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-09 18:59 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-05-09 18:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-10 2:59 ` Baoquan He
2020-05-10 2:59 ` Baoquan He
2020-05-10 4:10 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-10 4:10 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-10 5:16 ` Baoquan He
2020-05-10 5:16 ` Baoquan He
2020-05-10 18:22 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-10 18:22 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-11 1:11 ` Baoquan He
2020-05-11 1:11 ` Baoquan He
2020-05-11 18:24 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-11 18:24 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-11 20:03 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-11 20:03 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-11 21:05 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-11 21:05 ` Luis Chamberlain
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