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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@am.com>,
	Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] scs: Move scs_overflow_check() out of architecture code
Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 18:27:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200515172756.27185-5-will@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200515172756.27185-1-will@kernel.org>

There is nothing architecture-specific about scs_overflow_check() as
it's just a trivial wrapper around scs_corrupted().

For parity with task_stack_end_corrupted(), rename scs_corrupted() to
task_scs_end_corrupted() and call it from schedule_debug() when
CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK_is enabled. Finally, remove the unused
scs_overflow_check() function entirely.

This has absolutely no impact on architectures that do not support SCS
(currently arm64 only).

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h | 18 ------------------
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c  |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c      |  2 +-
 include/linux/scs.h          |  4 ++--
 kernel/sched/core.c          |  3 +++
 kernel/scs.c                 |  3 ++-
 6 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
index d46efdd2060a..eaa2cd92e4c1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
@@ -24,24 +24,6 @@
 	.endm
 #endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
 
-#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
-
-#include <linux/scs.h>
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
-
-static inline void scs_overflow_check(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	if (unlikely(scs_corrupted(tsk)))
-		panic("corrupted shadow stack detected inside scheduler\n");
-}
-
-#else /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
-
-static inline void scs_overflow_check(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
-
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY __ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_SCS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index a35d3318492c..56be4cbf771f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
-#include <asm/scs.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK)
@@ -516,7 +515,6 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
 	entry_task_switch(next);
 	uao_thread_switch(next);
 	ssbs_thread_switch(next);
-	scs_overflow_check(next);
 
 	/*
 	 * Complete any pending TLB or cache maintenance on this CPU in case
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
index adc97f826fab..955875dff9e1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <asm/scs.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
 
 /* Allocate a static per-CPU shadow stack */
 #define DEFINE_SCS(name)						\
diff --git a/include/linux/scs.h b/include/linux/scs.h
index 0eb2485ef832..2fd3df50e93e 100644
--- a/include/linux/scs.h
+++ b/include/linux/scs.h
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static inline unsigned long *__scs_magic(void *s)
 	return (unsigned long *)(s + SCS_SIZE) - 1;
 }
 
-static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	unsigned long *magic = __scs_magic(task_scs(tsk));
 	unsigned long sz = task_scs_sp(tsk) - task_scs(tsk);
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
 static inline void scs_init(void) {}
 static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
 static inline int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) { return 0; }
-static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
 static inline void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
+static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
 
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 934e03cfaec7..a1d815a11b90 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -3878,6 +3878,9 @@ static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev, bool preempt)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
 	if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
 		panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
+
+	if (task_scs_end_corrupted(prev))
+		panic("corrupted shadow stack detected inside scheduler\n");
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c
index aea841cd7586..faf0ecd7b893 100644
--- a/kernel/scs.c
+++ b/kernel/scs.c
@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	if (!s)
 		return;
 
-	WARN(scs_corrupted(tsk), "corrupted shadow stack detected when freeing task\n");
+	WARN(task_scs_end_corrupted(tsk),
+	     "corrupted shadow stack detected when freeing task\n");
 	scs_check_usage(tsk);
 	scs_free(s);
 }
-- 
2.26.2.761.g0e0b3e54be-goog


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@am.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	kernel-team@android.com
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] scs: Move scs_overflow_check() out of architecture code
Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 18:27:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200515172756.27185-5-will@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200515172756.27185-1-will@kernel.org>

There is nothing architecture-specific about scs_overflow_check() as
it's just a trivial wrapper around scs_corrupted().

For parity with task_stack_end_corrupted(), rename scs_corrupted() to
task_scs_end_corrupted() and call it from schedule_debug() when
CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK_is enabled. Finally, remove the unused
scs_overflow_check() function entirely.

This has absolutely no impact on architectures that do not support SCS
(currently arm64 only).

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h | 18 ------------------
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c  |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c      |  2 +-
 include/linux/scs.h          |  4 ++--
 kernel/sched/core.c          |  3 +++
 kernel/scs.c                 |  3 ++-
 6 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
index d46efdd2060a..eaa2cd92e4c1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
@@ -24,24 +24,6 @@
 	.endm
 #endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
 
-#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
-
-#include <linux/scs.h>
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
-
-static inline void scs_overflow_check(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	if (unlikely(scs_corrupted(tsk)))
-		panic("corrupted shadow stack detected inside scheduler\n");
-}
-
-#else /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
-
-static inline void scs_overflow_check(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
-
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY __ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_SCS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index a35d3318492c..56be4cbf771f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
-#include <asm/scs.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK)
@@ -516,7 +515,6 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
 	entry_task_switch(next);
 	uao_thread_switch(next);
 	ssbs_thread_switch(next);
-	scs_overflow_check(next);
 
 	/*
 	 * Complete any pending TLB or cache maintenance on this CPU in case
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
index adc97f826fab..955875dff9e1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <asm/scs.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
 
 /* Allocate a static per-CPU shadow stack */
 #define DEFINE_SCS(name)						\
diff --git a/include/linux/scs.h b/include/linux/scs.h
index 0eb2485ef832..2fd3df50e93e 100644
--- a/include/linux/scs.h
+++ b/include/linux/scs.h
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static inline unsigned long *__scs_magic(void *s)
 	return (unsigned long *)(s + SCS_SIZE) - 1;
 }
 
-static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	unsigned long *magic = __scs_magic(task_scs(tsk));
 	unsigned long sz = task_scs_sp(tsk) - task_scs(tsk);
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
 static inline void scs_init(void) {}
 static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
 static inline int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) { return 0; }
-static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
 static inline void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
+static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
 
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 934e03cfaec7..a1d815a11b90 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -3878,6 +3878,9 @@ static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev, bool preempt)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
 	if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
 		panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
+
+	if (task_scs_end_corrupted(prev))
+		panic("corrupted shadow stack detected inside scheduler\n");
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c
index aea841cd7586..faf0ecd7b893 100644
--- a/kernel/scs.c
+++ b/kernel/scs.c
@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	if (!s)
 		return;
 
-	WARN(scs_corrupted(tsk), "corrupted shadow stack detected when freeing task\n");
+	WARN(task_scs_end_corrupted(tsk),
+	     "corrupted shadow stack detected when freeing task\n");
 	scs_check_usage(tsk);
 	scs_free(s);
 }
-- 
2.26.2.761.g0e0b3e54be-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-15 17:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-15 17:27 [PATCH 0/6] Clean up Shadow Call Stack patches for 5.8 Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27 ` Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27 ` [PATCH 1/6] arm64: scs: Store absolute SCS stack pointer value in thread_info Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 11:37   ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 11:37     ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 13:37     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:37       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27 ` [PATCH 2/6] scs: Move accounting into alloc/free functions Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 11:38   ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 11:38     ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 13:39     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:39       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27 ` [PATCH 3/6] arm64: scs: Use 'scs_sp' register alias for x18 Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 11:55   ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 11:55     ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 13:03     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:03       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:13       ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 13:13         ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-15 17:27 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2020-05-15 17:27   ` [PATCH 4/6] scs: Move scs_overflow_check() out of architecture code Will Deacon
2020-05-18 12:12   ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 12:12     ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 13:23     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:23       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:32       ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 13:32         ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 15:31         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-18 15:31           ` Kees Cook
2020-05-18 16:44           ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 16:44             ` Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27 ` [PATCH 5/6] scs: Remove references to asm/scs.h from core code Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 12:15   ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 12:15     ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-15 17:27 ` [PATCH 6/6] scs: Move DEFINE_SCS macro into " Will Deacon
2020-05-15 17:27   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 12:14   ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 12:14     ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 13:26     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:26       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:37       ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-18 13:37         ` Mark Rutland
2020-05-15 20:42 ` [PATCH 0/6] Clean up Shadow Call Stack patches for 5.8 Sami Tolvanen
2020-05-15 20:42   ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-05-18 13:52   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 13:52     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 15:43     ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-05-18 15:43       ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-05-18 16:49       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 16:49         ` Will Deacon

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