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From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Ashwin H <ashwinh@vmware.com>
Cc: "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"srivatsa@csail.mit.edu" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>,
	"rostedt@goodmis.org" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <srostedt@vmware.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"stable@kernel.org" <stable@kernel.org>,
	Srivatsa Bhat <srivatsab@vmware.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4.19.x] make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 17:31:30 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200527153130.GA525531@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <MN2PR05MB63814CDAAF6828285929736ACDBF0@MN2PR05MB6381.namprd05.prod.outlook.com>

On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 05:08:19PM +0000, Ashwin H wrote:
> > Ok, but what does that mean for us?
> > 
> > You need to say why you are sending a patch, otherwise we will guess wrong.
> 
> In drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c, ioctl functions does user_access_begin() without doing access_ok(Checks if a user space pointer is valid)  first.
> A local attacker can craft a malicious ioctl function call to overwrite arbitrary kernel memory, resulting in a Denial of Service or privilege escalation (CVE-2018-20669)
> 
> This patch makes sure that user_access_begin always does access_ok. 
> user_access_begin has been modified to do access_ok internally.

I had this in the tree, but it broke the build on alpha, sh, and maybe a
few others :(

See:
	https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527140225.GA214763@roeck-us.net
for the details.

Can you dig out all of the needed follow-on patches as well, and send
them all as a patch series for 4.19.y so that I can queue them all up at
once?

thanks,

greg k-h
_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Ashwin H <ashwinh@vmware.com>
Cc: "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"srivatsa@csail.mit.edu" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>,
	"rostedt@goodmis.org" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <srostedt@vmware.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"stable@kernel.org" <stable@kernel.org>,
	Srivatsa Bhat <srivatsab@vmware.com>
Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4.19.x] make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 17:31:30 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200527153130.GA525531@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <MN2PR05MB63814CDAAF6828285929736ACDBF0@MN2PR05MB6381.namprd05.prod.outlook.com>

On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 05:08:19PM +0000, Ashwin H wrote:
> > Ok, but what does that mean for us?
> > 
> > You need to say why you are sending a patch, otherwise we will guess wrong.
> 
> In drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c, ioctl functions does user_access_begin() without doing access_ok(Checks if a user space pointer is valid)  first.
> A local attacker can craft a malicious ioctl function call to overwrite arbitrary kernel memory, resulting in a Denial of Service or privilege escalation (CVE-2018-20669)
> 
> This patch makes sure that user_access_begin always does access_ok. 
> user_access_begin has been modified to do access_ok internally.

I had this in the tree, but it broke the build on alpha, sh, and maybe a
few others :(

See:
	https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527140225.GA214763@roeck-us.net
for the details.

Can you dig out all of the needed follow-on patches as well, and send
them all as a patch series for 4.19.y so that I can queue them all up at
once?

thanks,

greg k-h
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Ashwin H <ashwinh@vmware.com>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"stable@kernel.org" <stable@kernel.org>,
	Srivatsa Bhat <srivatsab@vmware.com>,
	"srivatsa@csail.mit.edu" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>,
	"rostedt@goodmis.org" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <srostedt@vmware.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4.19.x] make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 17:31:30 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200527153130.GA525531@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <MN2PR05MB63814CDAAF6828285929736ACDBF0@MN2PR05MB6381.namprd05.prod.outlook.com>

On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 05:08:19PM +0000, Ashwin H wrote:
> > Ok, but what does that mean for us?
> > 
> > You need to say why you are sending a patch, otherwise we will guess wrong.
> 
> In drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c, ioctl functions does user_access_begin() without doing access_ok(Checks if a user space pointer is valid)  first.
> A local attacker can craft a malicious ioctl function call to overwrite arbitrary kernel memory, resulting in a Denial of Service or privilege escalation (CVE-2018-20669)
> 
> This patch makes sure that user_access_begin always does access_ok. 
> user_access_begin has been modified to do access_ok internally.

I had this in the tree, but it broke the build on alpha, sh, and maybe a
few others :(

See:
	https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527140225.GA214763@roeck-us.net
for the details.

Can you dig out all of the needed follow-on patches as well, and send
them all as a patch series for 4.19.y so that I can queue them all up at
once?

thanks,

greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-27 15:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-13  1:49 [PATCH v4.19.x] make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()' ashwin-h
2020-05-13  1:49 ` ashwin-h
2020-05-13  1:49 ` [Intel-gfx] " ashwin-h
2020-05-13  5:55 ` Greg KH
2020-05-13  5:55   ` Greg KH
2020-05-13  5:55   ` [Intel-gfx] " Greg KH
2020-05-13  6:13   ` Ashwin H
2020-05-13  6:13     ` Ashwin H
2020-05-13  6:13     ` [Intel-gfx] " Ashwin H
2020-05-13  6:34     ` Greg KH
2020-05-13  6:34       ` Greg KH
2020-05-13  6:34       ` [Intel-gfx] " Greg KH
2020-05-13 17:08       ` Ashwin H
2020-05-13 17:08         ` Ashwin H
2020-05-13 17:08         ` [Intel-gfx] " Ashwin H
2020-05-27 15:31         ` Greg KH [this message]
2020-05-27 15:31           ` Greg KH
2020-05-27 15:31           ` [Intel-gfx] " Greg KH
2020-05-28  7:30           ` Ashwin H
2020-05-28  7:30             ` Ashwin H
2020-05-28  7:30             ` [Intel-gfx] " Ashwin H
2020-05-28 11:20             ` Ashwin H
2020-05-28 11:20               ` Ashwin H
2020-05-28 11:20               ` [Intel-gfx] " Ashwin H
2020-05-13 15:29 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for " Patchwork

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