From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 1/9] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 17:26:36 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200825002645.3658-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200825002645.3658-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
oriented programming attacks. It is active when the kernel has this
feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
work, but without IBT protection.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
v10:
- Change build-time CET check to config depends on.
arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 6b6dad011763..b047e0a8d1c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1963,6 +1963,22 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
If unsure, say y.
+config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+ prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
+ def_bool n
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection)
+ select X86_INTEL_CET
+ help
+ Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
+ CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks. It is active when
+ the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
+ the application support it. When this feature is enabled,
+ legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
+ IBT protection.
+
+ If unsure, say y
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-25 0:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-25 0:26 [PATCH v11 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking, PTRACE Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-08-25 0:26 ` [PATCH v11 2/9] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:26 ` [PATCH v11 3/9] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:26 ` [PATCH v11 4/9] x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:26 ` [PATCH v11 5/9] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:26 ` [PATCH v11 6/9] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-02 20:03 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-02 22:13 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-02 23:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 2:53 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-03 4:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 14:26 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-03 14:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 16:09 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-03 16:11 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-03 16:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 16:25 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-03 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 16:42 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-03 17:59 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-03 16:21 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-03 16:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 0:33 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-03 2:53 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-25 0:26 ` [PATCH v11 7/9] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:26 ` [PATCH v11 8/9] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-25 16:13 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-25 0:26 ` [PATCH v11 9/9] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25 0:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-25 9:14 ` Florian Weimer
2020-08-25 15:08 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
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