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From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 6/9] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2020 19:53:22 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <46e42e5e-0bca-5f3f-efc9-5ab15827cc0b@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <A7775E11-8837-4727-921A-C88566FA01AF@amacapital.net>

On 9/2/2020 4:50 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Sep 2, 2020, at 3:13 PM, Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 9/2/2020 1:03 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Aug 25, 2020 at 2:30 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>>> Add REGSET_CET64/REGSET_CET32 to get/set CET MSRs:
>>>>
>>>>      IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings) and
>>>>      IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode Shadow Stack)
>>> [...]
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
>>> [...]
>>>> +int cetregs_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
>>>> +               struct membuf to)
>>>> +{
>>>> +       struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
>>>> +       struct cet_user_state *cetregs;
>>>> +
>>>> +       if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
>>>> +               return -ENODEV;
>>>> +
>>>> +       fpu__prepare_read(fpu);
>>>> +       cetregs = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
>>>> +       if (!cetregs)
>>>> +               return -EFAULT;
>>> Can this branch ever be hit without a kernel bug? If yes, I think
>>> -EFAULT is probably a weird error code to choose here. If no, this
>>> should probably use WARN_ON(). Same thing in cetregs_set().
>>
>> When a thread is not CET-enabled, its CET state does not exist.  I looked at EFAULT, and it means "Bad address".  Maybe this can be ENODEV, which means "No such device"?
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>>> @@ -1284,6 +1293,13 @@ static struct user_regset x86_32_regsets[] __ro_after_init = {
>>> [...]
>>>> +       [REGSET_CET32] = {
>>>> +               .core_note_type = NT_X86_CET,
>>>> +               .n = sizeof(struct cet_user_state) / sizeof(u64),
>>>> +               .size = sizeof(u64), .align = sizeof(u64),
>>>> +               .active = cetregs_active, .regset_get = cetregs_get,
>>>> +               .set = cetregs_set
>>>> +       },
>>>>   };
>>> Why are there different identifiers for 32-bit CET and 64-bit CET when
>>> they operate on the same structs and have the same handlers? If
>>> there's a good reason for that, the commit message should probably
>>> point that out.
>>
>> Yes, the reason for two regsets is that fill_note_info() does not expect any holes in a regsets.  I will put this in the commit log.
>>
>>
> 
> Perhaps we could fix that instead?
> 

As long as we understand the root cause, leaving it as-is may be OK.

I had a patch in the past, but did not follow up on it.

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180717162502.32274-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/

Yu-cheng

  reply	other threads:[~2020-09-03  2:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-25  0:26 [PATCH v11 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking, PTRACE Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 1/9] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 2/9] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 3/9] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 4/9] x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 5/9] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 6/9] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-02 20:03   ` Jann Horn
2020-09-02 22:13     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-02 23:50       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03  2:53         ` Yu, Yu-cheng [this message]
2020-09-03  4:35           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 14:26             ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-03 14:54               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 16:09               ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-03 16:11                 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-03 16:15                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 16:25                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-03 16:32                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03 16:42                         ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-03 17:59                           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-03 16:21                   ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-03 16:25                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-03  0:33       ` Jann Horn
2020-09-03  2:53         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 7/9] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 8/9] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-25 16:13     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-08-25  0:26 ` [PATCH v11 9/9] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled Yu-cheng Yu
2020-08-25  0:32   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-25  9:14     ` Florian Weimer
2020-08-25 15:08       ` Yu, Yu-cheng

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