From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
daniel.thompson@linaro.org, op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
corbet@lwn.net, jejb@linux.ibm.com, janne.karhunen@gmail.com,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
dhowells@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jens.wiklander@linaro.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 16:21:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200917162142.GB9750@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1600350398-4813-2-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org>
On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 07:16:35PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
>
> So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying
> implementations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
I would rephrase this a bit:
"Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend."
I remember asking about this approach that what if there was just a
header for trusted key functions and a compile time decision, which C
file to include instead of ops struct. I don't remember if these was a
conclusion on this or not.
E.g. lets say you have a device with TEE and TPM, should you be able
to be use both at run-time? I might play along how this works now but
somehow, in the commit message preferably, it should be conclude why
one alternative is chosen over another.
/Jarkko
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
jens.wiklander@linaro.org, corbet@lwn.net, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
janne.karhunen@gmail.com, daniel.thompson@linaro.org,
Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de, lhinds@redhat.com,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 19:21:42 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200917162142.GB9750@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1600350398-4813-2-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org>
On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 07:16:35PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
>
> So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying
> implementations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
I would rephrase this a bit:
"Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend."
I remember asking about this approach that what if there was just a
header for trusted key functions and a compile time decision, which C
file to include instead of ops struct. I don't remember if these was a
conclusion on this or not.
E.g. lets say you have a device with TEE and TPM, should you be able
to be use both at run-time? I might play along how this works now but
somehow, in the commit message preferably, it should be conclude why
one alternative is chosen over another.
/Jarkko
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 19:21:42 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200917162142.GB9750@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1600350398-4813-2-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1202 bytes --]
On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 07:16:35PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
>
> So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying
> implementations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
I would rephrase this a bit:
"Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend."
I remember asking about this approach that what if there was just a
header for trusted key functions and a compile time decision, which C
file to include instead of ops struct. I don't remember if these was a
conclusion on this or not.
E.g. lets say you have a device with TEE and TPM, should you be able
to be use both at run-time? I might play along how this works now but
somehow, in the commit message preferably, it should be conclude why
one alternative is chosen over another.
/Jarkko
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
daniel.thompson@linaro.org, op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
corbet@lwn.net, jejb@linux.ibm.com, janne.karhunen@gmail.com,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
dhowells@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jens.wiklander@linaro.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 19:21:42 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200917162142.GB9750@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1600350398-4813-2-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org>
On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 07:16:35PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
>
> So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying
> implementations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
I would rephrase this a bit:
"Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend."
I remember asking about this approach that what if there was just a
header for trusted key functions and a compile time decision, which C
file to include instead of ops struct. I don't remember if these was a
conclusion on this or not.
E.g. lets say you have a device with TEE and TPM, should you be able
to be use both at run-time? I might play along how this works now but
somehow, in the commit message preferably, it should be conclude why
one alternative is chosen over another.
/Jarkko
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linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-17 16:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-17 13:46 [PATCH v6 0/4] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` [PATCH v6 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 16:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2020-09-17 16:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-17 16:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-17 16:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-17 16:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-17 16:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-17 16:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-17 16:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-18 7:03 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-18 7:15 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-18 7:03 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-18 7:03 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` [PATCH v6 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` [PATCH v6 3/4] doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` [PATCH v6 4/4] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:58 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
2020-09-17 13:46 ` Sumit Garg
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