From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 07:28:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200925072829.GA170658@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200922022809.7105-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 07:28:07PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually
> recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
> hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this
> hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
> number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
> passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
> keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
> into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.
>
> so before
>
> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauthõ72d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle000001" @u
>
> after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
> directly supplied password:
>
> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle000001" @u
I'm still getting -EINVAL from both with a Geminilake NUC.
/Jarkko
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 10:28:29 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200925072829.GA170658@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200922022809.7105-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 07:28:07PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually
> recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
> hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this
> hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
> number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
> passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
> keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
> into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.
>
> so before
>
> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u
>
> after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
> directly supplied password:
>
> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u
I'm still getting -EINVAL from both with a Geminilake NUC.
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-25 7:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-22 2:28 [PATCH v13 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` [PATCH v13 1/5] lib: add ASN.1 encoder James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` [PATCH v13 2/5] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` [PATCH v13 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-25 7:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2020-09-25 7:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 17:39 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-25 17:39 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-27 23:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-27 23:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 11:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 11:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 2:28 ` [PATCH v13 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-26 11:33 ` kernel test robot
2020-09-26 11:33 ` kernel test robot
2020-09-26 11:33 ` kernel test robot
2020-09-30 11:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 11:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 14:49 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:49 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 15:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 2:28 ` [PATCH v13 5/5] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
2020-09-22 2:28 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 11:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 11:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 3:43 ` [PATCH v13 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 3:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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