From: elver@google.com
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/39] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 19:30:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201001173032.GD4162920@elver.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55887ae02bd083138050b1dfc1c599c13da8773d.1600987622.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 12:50AM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
> tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
>
> The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will still use the concept
> of memory granules. Each memory granule maps to a single metadata entry:
> 8 bytes per one shadow byte for generic mode, 16 bytes per one shadow byte
> for software tag-based mode, and 16 bytes per one allocation tag for
> hardware tag-based mode.
>
> Rename KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, and KASAN_SHADOW_MASK
> to KASAN_GRANULE_MASK.
>
> Also use MASK when used as a mask, otherwise use SIZE.
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> ---
> Change-Id: Iac733e2248aa9d29f6fc425d8946ba07cca73ecf
> ---
> Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 2 +-
> lib/test_kasan.c | 2 +-
> mm/kasan/common.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++---------------
> mm/kasan/generic.c | 14 +++++------
> mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 8 +++----
> mm/kasan/init.c | 8 +++----
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 4 ++--
> mm/kasan/report.c | 10 ++++----
> mm/kasan/tags_report.c | 2 +-
> 9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> index 38fd5681fade..a3030fc6afe5 100644
> --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
> page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
> therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
> use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
> -``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
> +``KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
>
> Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate
> a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index 53e953bb1d1d..ddd0b80f24a1 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>
> #include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h"
>
> -#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)
> +#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
>
> /*
> * We assign some test results to these globals to make sure the tests
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index a4b73fa0dd7e..f65c9f792f8f 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
>
> /*
> * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
> - * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
> + * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE.
> */
> void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
> {
> @@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
>
> kasan_poison_memory(address, size, tag);
>
> - if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
> + if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
> u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
> *shadow = tag;
> else
> - *shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
> + *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
> }
> }
>
> @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> {
> kasan_poison_memory(object,
> - round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
> + round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
> KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> }
>
> @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
> {
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
> return shadow_byte < 0 ||
> - shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
> /* else CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS: */
> if ((u8)shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
> @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> return true;
> }
>
> - rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
>
> if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
> @@ -440,9 +440,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
> return NULL;
>
> redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
> - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
> - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
> tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
> @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
>
> page = virt_to_page(ptr);
> redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
> - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
>
> kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
> @@ -584,8 +584,8 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
> shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
> shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size;
>
> - if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) ||
> - WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
> + if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) ||
> + WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
> return NOTIFY_BAD;
>
> switch (action) {
> @@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
> return;
>
> - size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> kasan_poison_memory(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
> }
>
> @@ -856,22 +856,22 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> unsigned long region_start, region_end;
> unsigned long size;
>
> - region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> - region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> + region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> free_region_start = ALIGN(free_region_start,
> - PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> if (start != region_start &&
> free_region_start < region_start)
> - region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
> free_region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(free_region_end,
> - PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> if (end != region_end &&
> free_region_end > region_end)
> - region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
> shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_start);
> shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_end);
> @@ -897,7 +897,8 @@ int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)
> unsigned long shadow_start;
>
> shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
> - scaled_size = (size + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
> + scaled_size = (size + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) >>
> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
> shadow_size = round_up(scaled_size, PAGE_SIZE);
>
> if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start)))
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> index 7006157c674b..ec4417156943 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(unsigned long addr)
> s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
>
> if (unlikely(shadow_value)) {
> - s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
> + s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
> return unlikely(last_accessible_byte >= shadow_value);
> }
>
> @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(unsigned long addr,
> * Access crosses 8(shadow size)-byte boundary. Such access maps
> * into 2 shadow bytes, so we need to check them both.
> */
> - if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) < size - 1))
> + if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) < size - 1))
> return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
>
> return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
> @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr)
> u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
>
> /* Unaligned 16-bytes access maps into 3 shadow bytes. */
> - if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)))
> + if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)))
> return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);
>
> return *shadow_addr;
> @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr,
> s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)last_byte);
>
> if (unlikely(ret != (unsigned long)last_shadow ||
> - ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
> + ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
> return true;
> }
> return false;
> @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache)
>
> static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
> {
> - size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> kasan_unpoison_memory(global->beg, global->size);
>
> @@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_handle_no_return);
> /* Emitted by compiler to poison alloca()ed objects. */
> void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
> {
> - size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> size_t padding_size = round_up(size, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE) -
> rounded_up_size;
> - size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> const void *left_redzone = (const void *)(addr -
> KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> index 6bb3f66992df..7d5b9e5c7cfe 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
> void *p = addr;
>
> while (p < addr + size && !(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p)))
> - p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> return p;
> }
>
> @@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
>
> /*
> - * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
> + * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) we can look
> * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
> */
> - if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
> + if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
> shadow_addr++;
>
> switch (*shadow_addr) {
> - case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
> + case 0 ... KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1:
> /*
> * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
> * due to a data race in the kernel code.
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c
> index 9ce8cc5b8621..dfddd6c39fe6 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/init.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/init.c
> @@ -442,8 +442,8 @@ void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
> end = addr + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
>
> if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start %
> - (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> - WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> + (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> + WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> return;
>
> for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
> @@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
> shadow_end = shadow_start + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
>
> if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start %
> - (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> - WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> + (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> + WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> ret = kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 03450d3b31f7..c31e2c739301 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
> #include <linux/kasan.h>
> #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
>
> -#define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
> -#define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
> +#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
> +#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
>
> #define KASAN_TAG_KERNEL 0xFF /* native kernel pointers tag */
> #define KASAN_TAG_INVALID 0xFE /* inaccessible memory tag */
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
> index c3031b4b4591..fc487ba83931 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
> @@ -312,24 +312,24 @@ static bool __must_check get_address_stack_frame_info(const void *addr,
> return false;
>
> aligned_addr = round_down((unsigned long)addr, sizeof(long));
> - mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> shadow_ptr = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)aligned_addr);
> shadow_bottom = kasan_mem_to_shadow(end_of_stack(current));
>
> while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr != KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
> shadow_ptr--;
> - mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> }
>
> while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr == KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
> shadow_ptr--;
> - mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> }
>
> if (shadow_ptr < shadow_bottom)
> return false;
>
> - frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> if (frame[0] != KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC) {
> pr_err("KASAN internal error: frame info validation failed; invalid marker: %lu\n",
> frame[0]);
> @@ -567,6 +567,6 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
> else
> bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access";
> pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
> - orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK);
> + orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1);
> }
> #endif
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> index 5f183501b871..c87d5a343b4e 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
> void *end = p + size;
>
> while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p))
> - p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> return p;
> }
>
> --
> 2.28.0.681.g6f77f65b4e-goog
>
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: elver@google.com
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/39] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 19:30:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201001173032.GD4162920@elver.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55887ae02bd083138050b1dfc1c599c13da8773d.1600987622.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 12:50AM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
> tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
>
> The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will still use the concept
> of memory granules. Each memory granule maps to a single metadata entry:
> 8 bytes per one shadow byte for generic mode, 16 bytes per one shadow byte
> for software tag-based mode, and 16 bytes per one allocation tag for
> hardware tag-based mode.
>
> Rename KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, and KASAN_SHADOW_MASK
> to KASAN_GRANULE_MASK.
>
> Also use MASK when used as a mask, otherwise use SIZE.
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> ---
> Change-Id: Iac733e2248aa9d29f6fc425d8946ba07cca73ecf
> ---
> Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 2 +-
> lib/test_kasan.c | 2 +-
> mm/kasan/common.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++---------------
> mm/kasan/generic.c | 14 +++++------
> mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 8 +++----
> mm/kasan/init.c | 8 +++----
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 4 ++--
> mm/kasan/report.c | 10 ++++----
> mm/kasan/tags_report.c | 2 +-
> 9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> index 38fd5681fade..a3030fc6afe5 100644
> --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
> page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
> therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
> use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
> -``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
> +``KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
>
> Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate
> a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index 53e953bb1d1d..ddd0b80f24a1 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>
> #include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h"
>
> -#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)
> +#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
>
> /*
> * We assign some test results to these globals to make sure the tests
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index a4b73fa0dd7e..f65c9f792f8f 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
>
> /*
> * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
> - * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
> + * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE.
> */
> void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
> {
> @@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
>
> kasan_poison_memory(address, size, tag);
>
> - if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
> + if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
> u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
> *shadow = tag;
> else
> - *shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
> + *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
> }
> }
>
> @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> {
> kasan_poison_memory(object,
> - round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
> + round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
> KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> }
>
> @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
> {
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
> return shadow_byte < 0 ||
> - shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
> /* else CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS: */
> if ((u8)shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
> @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> return true;
> }
>
> - rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
>
> if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
> @@ -440,9 +440,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
> return NULL;
>
> redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
> - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
> - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
> tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
> @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
>
> page = virt_to_page(ptr);
> redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
> - KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
>
> kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
> @@ -584,8 +584,8 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
> shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
> shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size;
>
> - if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) ||
> - WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
> + if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) ||
> + WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
> return NOTIFY_BAD;
>
> switch (action) {
> @@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
> return;
>
> - size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> kasan_poison_memory(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
> }
>
> @@ -856,22 +856,22 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> unsigned long region_start, region_end;
> unsigned long size;
>
> - region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> - region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> + region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> free_region_start = ALIGN(free_region_start,
> - PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> if (start != region_start &&
> free_region_start < region_start)
> - region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
> free_region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(free_region_end,
> - PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> if (end != region_end &&
> free_region_end > region_end)
> - region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
> shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_start);
> shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_end);
> @@ -897,7 +897,8 @@ int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)
> unsigned long shadow_start;
>
> shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
> - scaled_size = (size + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
> + scaled_size = (size + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) >>
> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
> shadow_size = round_up(scaled_size, PAGE_SIZE);
>
> if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start)))
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> index 7006157c674b..ec4417156943 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(unsigned long addr)
> s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
>
> if (unlikely(shadow_value)) {
> - s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
> + s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
> return unlikely(last_accessible_byte >= shadow_value);
> }
>
> @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(unsigned long addr,
> * Access crosses 8(shadow size)-byte boundary. Such access maps
> * into 2 shadow bytes, so we need to check them both.
> */
> - if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) < size - 1))
> + if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) < size - 1))
> return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
>
> return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
> @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr)
> u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
>
> /* Unaligned 16-bytes access maps into 3 shadow bytes. */
> - if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)))
> + if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)))
> return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);
>
> return *shadow_addr;
> @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr,
> s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)last_byte);
>
> if (unlikely(ret != (unsigned long)last_shadow ||
> - ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
> + ((long)(last_byte & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
> return true;
> }
> return false;
> @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache)
>
> static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
> {
> - size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> kasan_unpoison_memory(global->beg, global->size);
>
> @@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_handle_no_return);
> /* Emitted by compiler to poison alloca()ed objects. */
> void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
> {
> - size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> size_t padding_size = round_up(size, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE) -
> rounded_up_size;
> - size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> const void *left_redzone = (const void *)(addr -
> KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> index 6bb3f66992df..7d5b9e5c7cfe 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
> void *p = addr;
>
> while (p < addr + size && !(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p)))
> - p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> return p;
> }
>
> @@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
>
> /*
> - * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
> + * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) we can look
> * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
> */
> - if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
> + if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
> shadow_addr++;
>
> switch (*shadow_addr) {
> - case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
> + case 0 ... KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1:
> /*
> * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
> * due to a data race in the kernel code.
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c
> index 9ce8cc5b8621..dfddd6c39fe6 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/init.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/init.c
> @@ -442,8 +442,8 @@ void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
> end = addr + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
>
> if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start %
> - (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> - WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> + (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> + WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> return;
>
> for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
> @@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
> shadow_end = shadow_start + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
>
> if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start %
> - (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> - WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> + (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
> + WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> ret = kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 03450d3b31f7..c31e2c739301 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
> #include <linux/kasan.h>
> #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
>
> -#define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
> -#define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
> +#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
> +#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
>
> #define KASAN_TAG_KERNEL 0xFF /* native kernel pointers tag */
> #define KASAN_TAG_INVALID 0xFE /* inaccessible memory tag */
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
> index c3031b4b4591..fc487ba83931 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
> @@ -312,24 +312,24 @@ static bool __must_check get_address_stack_frame_info(const void *addr,
> return false;
>
> aligned_addr = round_down((unsigned long)addr, sizeof(long));
> - mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> shadow_ptr = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)aligned_addr);
> shadow_bottom = kasan_mem_to_shadow(end_of_stack(current));
>
> while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr != KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
> shadow_ptr--;
> - mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> }
>
> while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr == KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
> shadow_ptr--;
> - mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> }
>
> if (shadow_ptr < shadow_bottom)
> return false;
>
> - frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> if (frame[0] != KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC) {
> pr_err("KASAN internal error: frame info validation failed; invalid marker: %lu\n",
> frame[0]);
> @@ -567,6 +567,6 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
> else
> bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access";
> pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
> - orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK);
> + orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1);
> }
> #endif
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> index 5f183501b871..c87d5a343b4e 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
> void *end = p + size;
>
> while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p))
> - p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> + p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> return p;
> }
>
> --
> 2.28.0.681.g6f77f65b4e-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-01 17:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 176+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-24 22:50 [PATCH v3 00/39] kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64 Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 01/39] kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headers Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:18 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:18 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 02/39] kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:19 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:19 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 03/39] kasan: group vmalloc code Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:27 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:27 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 04/39] kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:29 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:29 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 05/39] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_memory Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:29 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:29 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 06/39] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_* Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:30 ` elver [this message]
2020-10-01 17:30 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 07/39] kasan: only build init.c for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:31 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:31 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 08/39] kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:32 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:32 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 09/39] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_PAGE Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:33 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:33 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 10/39] kasan: rename report and tags files Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:36 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:36 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 11/39] kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:39 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:39 ` elver
2020-10-01 21:54 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 21:54 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 12/39] kasan: hide invalid free check implementation Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:41 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:41 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 13/39] kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:43 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:43 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 14/39] kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 15/39] kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth " Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 16/39] kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:45 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:45 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 17/39] kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:45 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:45 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 18/39] kasan: kasan_non_canonical_hook only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:47 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:47 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 19/39] kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:48 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:48 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 20/39] kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:54 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:54 ` elver
2020-10-01 21:56 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 21:56 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 21/39] kasan: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:55 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:55 ` elver
2020-10-01 21:57 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 21:57 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 22/39] kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:57 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:57 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 23/39] arm64: Enable armv8.5-a asm-arch option Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 10:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 10:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 24/39] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 10:15 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 10:15 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:28 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-25 11:28 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-25 12:50 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 12:50 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 13:36 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-25 13:36 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 25/39] arm64: kasan: Add arch layer for memory tagging helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 26/39] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 10:49 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 10:49 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:26 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:26 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:47 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:47 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:52 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:52 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 12:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 12:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 12:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 12:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 27/39] arm64: kasan: Enable in-kernel MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:14 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:14 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 28/39] arm64: mte: Convert gcr_user into an exclude mask Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 29/39] arm64: mte: Switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:34 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:34 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:50 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-25 11:50 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-25 12:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 12:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 30/39] arm64: kasan: Enable TBI EL1 Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:37 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:37 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:47 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-25 11:47 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 31/39] arm64: kasan: Align allocations for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 32/39] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE " Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:58 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:58 ` elver
2020-10-01 21:59 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 21:59 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 33/39] kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:59 ` elver
2020-10-01 17:59 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 34/39] kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 35/39] kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 18:00 ` elver
2020-10-01 18:00 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 36/39] kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 37/39] kasan, slub: reset tags when accessing metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 18:03 ` elver
2020-10-01 18:03 ` elver
2020-10-01 22:00 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 22:00 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 38/39] kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 39/39] kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 18:03 ` elver
2020-10-01 18:03 ` elver
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20201001173032.GD4162920@elver.google.com \
--to=elver@google.com \
--cc=Branislav.Rankov@arm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=andreyknvl@google.com \
--cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=eugenis@google.com \
--cc=glider@google.com \
--cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=kevin.brodsky@arm.com \
--cc=lenaptr@google.com \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=vincenzo.frascino@arm.com \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.