From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>,
Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
libc-alpha@sourceware.org, systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: BTI interaction between seccomp filters in systemd and glibc mprotect calls, causing service failures
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 10:02:32 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201023090232.GA25736@gaia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202010221256.A4F95FD11@keescook>
On Thu, Oct 22, 2020 at 01:02:18PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Regardless, it makes sense to me to have the kernel load the executable
> itself with BTI enabled by default. I prefer gaining Catalin's suggested
> patch[2]. :)
[...]
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20201022093104.GB1229@gaia/
I think I first heard the idea at Mark R ;).
It still needs glibc changes to avoid the mprotect(), or at least ignore
the error. Since this is an ABI change and we don't know which kernels
would have it backported, maybe better to still issue the mprotect() but
ignore the failure.
--
Catalin
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
libc-alpha@sourceware.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: BTI interaction between seccomp filters in systemd and glibc mprotect calls, causing service failures
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 10:02:32 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201023090232.GA25736@gaia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202010221256.A4F95FD11@keescook>
On Thu, Oct 22, 2020 at 01:02:18PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Regardless, it makes sense to me to have the kernel load the executable
> itself with BTI enabled by default. I prefer gaining Catalin's suggested
> patch[2]. :)
[...]
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20201022093104.GB1229@gaia/
I think I first heard the idea at Mark R ;).
It still needs glibc changes to avoid the mprotect(), or at least ignore
the error. Since this is an ABI change and we don't know which kernels
would have it backported, maybe better to still issue the mprotect() but
ignore the failure.
--
Catalin
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-23 12:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <8584c14f-5c28-9d70-c054-7c78127d84ea@arm.com>
2020-10-22 7:18 ` [systemd-devel] BTI interaction between seccomp filters in systemd and glibc mprotect calls, causing service failures Lennart Poettering
2020-10-22 7:18 ` Lennart Poettering
2020-10-22 7:54 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-22 7:54 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-22 8:17 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 8:17 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 8:25 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-22 8:25 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-22 8:29 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-10-22 8:29 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-10-22 8:38 ` Lennart Poettering
2020-10-22 8:38 ` Lennart Poettering
2020-10-22 9:31 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-10-22 9:31 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-10-22 10:12 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 10:12 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 10:27 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-22 10:27 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-23 6:13 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-10-23 6:13 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-10-23 9:04 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-10-23 9:04 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-10-22 10:03 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 10:03 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 8:05 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-10-22 8:05 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-10-22 8:31 ` Lennart Poettering
2020-10-22 8:31 ` Lennart Poettering
[not found] ` <20201022075447.GO3819@arm.com>
2020-10-22 10:39 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 10:39 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-22 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-22 22:24 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-22 22:24 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-23 17:52 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2020-10-23 17:52 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2020-10-24 11:34 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-24 11:34 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-24 14:12 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2020-10-24 14:12 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2020-10-25 13:42 ` Jordan Glover
2020-10-25 13:42 ` Jordan Glover
2020-10-23 9:02 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2020-10-23 9:02 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-10-24 11:01 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-24 11:01 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-26 14:52 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-10-26 14:52 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-10-26 15:56 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-26 15:56 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-26 16:51 ` Mark Brown
2020-10-26 16:51 ` Mark Brown
2020-10-26 16:31 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-26 16:31 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-26 16:24 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-26 16:24 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-26 16:39 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-26 16:39 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-10-26 16:45 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-26 16:45 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-27 14:22 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-27 14:22 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-27 14:41 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-27 14:41 ` Florian Weimer
2020-10-26 16:57 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-10-26 16:57 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-10-26 17:52 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-26 17:52 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-26 22:39 ` Jeremy Linton
2020-10-26 22:39 ` Jeremy Linton
2020-10-27 14:15 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-27 14:15 ` Dave Martin
2020-10-29 11:02 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-10-29 11:02 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 12:18 ` Dave Martin
2020-11-04 12:18 ` Dave Martin
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