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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] mm, kasan: don't poison boot memory
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 10:46:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210218104626.GA12761@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8d79640cdab4608c454310881b6c771e856dbd2e.1613595522.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2021 at 09:59:24PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> During boot, all non-reserved memblock memory is exposed to the buddy
> allocator. Poisoning all that memory with KASAN lengthens boot time,
> especially on systems with large amount of RAM. This patch makes
> page_alloc to not call kasan_free_pages() on all new memory.
> 
> __free_pages_core() is used when exposing fresh memory during system
> boot and when onlining memory during hotplug. This patch adds a new
> FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON flag and passes it to __free_pages_ok() through
> free_pages_prepare() from __free_pages_core().
> 
> This has little impact on KASAN memory tracking.
> 
> Assuming that there are no references to newly exposed pages before they
> are ever allocated, there won't be any intended (but buggy) accesses to
> that memory that KASAN would normally detect.
> 
> However, with this patch, KASAN stops detecting wild and large
> out-of-bounds accesses that happen to land on a fresh memory page that
> was never allocated. This is taken as an acceptable trade-off.
> 
> All memory allocated normally when the boot is over keeps getting
> poisoned as usual.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>

The approach looks fine to me. If you don't like the trade-off, I think
you could still leave the kasan poisoning in if CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Just curious, have you noticed any issue booting a KASAN_SW_TAGS-enabled
kernel on a system with sufficiently large RAM? Is the boot slow-down
significant?

For MTE, we could look at optimising the poisoning code for page size to
use STGM or DC GZVA but I don't think we can make it unnoticeable for
large systems (especially with DC GZVA, that's like zeroing the whole
RAM at boot).

-- 
Catalin

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] mm, kasan: don't poison boot memory
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 10:46:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210218104626.GA12761@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8d79640cdab4608c454310881b6c771e856dbd2e.1613595522.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2021 at 09:59:24PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> During boot, all non-reserved memblock memory is exposed to the buddy
> allocator. Poisoning all that memory with KASAN lengthens boot time,
> especially on systems with large amount of RAM. This patch makes
> page_alloc to not call kasan_free_pages() on all new memory.
> 
> __free_pages_core() is used when exposing fresh memory during system
> boot and when onlining memory during hotplug. This patch adds a new
> FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON flag and passes it to __free_pages_ok() through
> free_pages_prepare() from __free_pages_core().
> 
> This has little impact on KASAN memory tracking.
> 
> Assuming that there are no references to newly exposed pages before they
> are ever allocated, there won't be any intended (but buggy) accesses to
> that memory that KASAN would normally detect.
> 
> However, with this patch, KASAN stops detecting wild and large
> out-of-bounds accesses that happen to land on a fresh memory page that
> was never allocated. This is taken as an acceptable trade-off.
> 
> All memory allocated normally when the boot is over keeps getting
> poisoned as usual.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>

The approach looks fine to me. If you don't like the trade-off, I think
you could still leave the kasan poisoning in if CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Just curious, have you noticed any issue booting a KASAN_SW_TAGS-enabled
kernel on a system with sufficiently large RAM? Is the boot slow-down
significant?

For MTE, we could look at optimising the poisoning code for page size to
use STGM or DC GZVA but I don't think we can make it unnoticeable for
large systems (especially with DC GZVA, that's like zeroing the whole
RAM at boot).

-- 
Catalin


  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-18 10:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-17 20:59 [PATCH RESEND] mm, kasan: don't poison boot memory Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-17 20:59 ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-18 10:46 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2021-02-18 10:46   ` Catalin Marinas
2021-02-18 20:24   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-18 20:24     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-19 16:35     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-02-19 16:35       ` Catalin Marinas

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