From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
To: x86@kernel.org, Hyunwook Baek <baekhw@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>, Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Mike Stunes <mstunes@vmware.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/8] x86/sev-es: Use __put_user()/__get_user() for data accesses
Date: Wed, 19 May 2021 15:52:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210519135251.30093-4-joro@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210519135251.30093-1-joro@8bytes.org>
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The put_user() and get_user() functions do checks on the address which is
passed to them. They check whether the address is actually a user-space
address and whether its fine to access it. They also call might_fault()
to indicate that they could fault and possibly sleep.
All of these checks are neither wanted nor needed in the #VC exception
handler, which can be invoked from almost any context and also for MMIO
instructions from kernel space on kernel memory. All the #VC handler
wants to know is whether a fault happened when the access was tried.
This is provided by __put_user()/__get_user(), which just do the access
no matter what. Also add comments explaining why __get_user() and
__put_user() are the best choice here and why it is safe to use them
in this context. Also explain why copy_to/from_user can't be used.
In addition, also revert commit
024f60d6552 x86/sev-es: ("Handle string port IO to kernel memory properly")
because using __get_user()/__put_user() fixes the same problem while
the above commit introduced several problems:
1) It uses access_ok() which is only allowed in task context.
2) It uses memcpy() which has no fault handling at all and is
thus unsafe to use here.
Fixes: f980f9c31a92 ("x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 1f428f401bed..651b81cd648e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -315,31 +315,44 @@ static enum es_result vc_write_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 d2;
u8 d1;
- /* If instruction ran in kernel mode and the I/O buffer is in kernel space */
- if (!user_mode(ctxt->regs) && !access_ok(target, size)) {
- memcpy(dst, buf, size);
- return ES_OK;
- }
-
+ /*
+ * This function uses __put_user() independent of whether kernel or user
+ * memory is accessed. This works fine because __put_user() does no
+ * sanity checks of the pointer being accessed. All that it does is
+ * to report when the access failed.
+ *
+ * Also, this function runs in atomic context, so __put_user() is not
+ * allowed to sleep. The page-fault handler detects that it is running
+ * in atomic context and will not try to take mmap_sem and handle the
+ * fault, so additional pagefault_enable()/disable() calls are not
+ * needed.
+ *
+ * The access can't be done via copy_to_user() here because
+ * vc_write_mem() must not use string instructions to access unsafe
+ * memory. The reason is that MOVS is emulated by the #VC handler by
+ * splitting the move up into a read and a write and taking a nested #VC
+ * exception on whatever of them is the MMIO access. Using string
+ * instructions here would cause infinite nesting.
+ */
switch (size) {
case 1:
memcpy(&d1, buf, 1);
- if (put_user(d1, target))
+ if (__put_user(d1, target))
goto fault;
break;
case 2:
memcpy(&d2, buf, 2);
- if (put_user(d2, target))
+ if (__put_user(d2, target))
goto fault;
break;
case 4:
memcpy(&d4, buf, 4);
- if (put_user(d4, target))
+ if (__put_user(d4, target))
goto fault;
break;
case 8:
memcpy(&d8, buf, 8);
- if (put_user(d8, target))
+ if (__put_user(d8, target))
goto fault;
break;
default:
@@ -370,30 +383,43 @@ static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 d2;
u8 d1;
- /* If instruction ran in kernel mode and the I/O buffer is in kernel space */
- if (!user_mode(ctxt->regs) && !access_ok(s, size)) {
- memcpy(buf, src, size);
- return ES_OK;
- }
-
+ /*
+ * This function uses __get_user() independent of whether kernel or user
+ * memory is accessed. This works fine because __get_user() does no
+ * sanity checks of the pointer being accessed. All that it does is
+ * to report when the access failed.
+ *
+ * Also, this function runs in atomic context, so __get_user() is not
+ * allowed to sleep. The page-fault handler detects that it is running
+ * in atomic context and will not try to take mmap_sem and handle the
+ * fault, so additional pagefault_enable()/disable() calls are not
+ * needed.
+ *
+ * The access can't be done via copy_from_user() here because
+ * vc_read_mem() must not use string instructions to access unsafe
+ * memory. The reason is that MOVS is emulated by the #VC handler by
+ * splitting the move up into a read and a write and taking a nested #VC
+ * exception on whatever of them is the MMIO access. Using string
+ * instructions here would cause infinite nesting.
+ */
switch (size) {
case 1:
- if (get_user(d1, s))
+ if (__get_user(d1, s))
goto fault;
memcpy(buf, &d1, 1);
break;
case 2:
- if (get_user(d2, s))
+ if (__get_user(d2, s))
goto fault;
memcpy(buf, &d2, 2);
break;
case 4:
- if (get_user(d4, s))
+ if (__get_user(d4, s))
goto fault;
memcpy(buf, &d4, 4);
break;
case 8:
- if (get_user(d8, s))
+ if (__get_user(d8, s))
goto fault;
memcpy(buf, &d8, 8);
break;
--
2.31.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
To: x86@kernel.org, Hyunwook Baek <baekhw@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
hpa@zytor.com, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Mike Stunes <mstunes@vmware.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/8] x86/sev-es: Use __put_user()/__get_user() for data accesses
Date: Wed, 19 May 2021 15:52:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210519135251.30093-4-joro@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210519135251.30093-1-joro@8bytes.org>
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
The put_user() and get_user() functions do checks on the address which is
passed to them. They check whether the address is actually a user-space
address and whether its fine to access it. They also call might_fault()
to indicate that they could fault and possibly sleep.
All of these checks are neither wanted nor needed in the #VC exception
handler, which can be invoked from almost any context and also for MMIO
instructions from kernel space on kernel memory. All the #VC handler
wants to know is whether a fault happened when the access was tried.
This is provided by __put_user()/__get_user(), which just do the access
no matter what. Also add comments explaining why __get_user() and
__put_user() are the best choice here and why it is safe to use them
in this context. Also explain why copy_to/from_user can't be used.
In addition, also revert commit
024f60d6552 x86/sev-es: ("Handle string port IO to kernel memory properly")
because using __get_user()/__put_user() fixes the same problem while
the above commit introduced several problems:
1) It uses access_ok() which is only allowed in task context.
2) It uses memcpy() which has no fault handling at all and is
thus unsafe to use here.
Fixes: f980f9c31a92 ("x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 1f428f401bed..651b81cd648e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -315,31 +315,44 @@ static enum es_result vc_write_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 d2;
u8 d1;
- /* If instruction ran in kernel mode and the I/O buffer is in kernel space */
- if (!user_mode(ctxt->regs) && !access_ok(target, size)) {
- memcpy(dst, buf, size);
- return ES_OK;
- }
-
+ /*
+ * This function uses __put_user() independent of whether kernel or user
+ * memory is accessed. This works fine because __put_user() does no
+ * sanity checks of the pointer being accessed. All that it does is
+ * to report when the access failed.
+ *
+ * Also, this function runs in atomic context, so __put_user() is not
+ * allowed to sleep. The page-fault handler detects that it is running
+ * in atomic context and will not try to take mmap_sem and handle the
+ * fault, so additional pagefault_enable()/disable() calls are not
+ * needed.
+ *
+ * The access can't be done via copy_to_user() here because
+ * vc_write_mem() must not use string instructions to access unsafe
+ * memory. The reason is that MOVS is emulated by the #VC handler by
+ * splitting the move up into a read and a write and taking a nested #VC
+ * exception on whatever of them is the MMIO access. Using string
+ * instructions here would cause infinite nesting.
+ */
switch (size) {
case 1:
memcpy(&d1, buf, 1);
- if (put_user(d1, target))
+ if (__put_user(d1, target))
goto fault;
break;
case 2:
memcpy(&d2, buf, 2);
- if (put_user(d2, target))
+ if (__put_user(d2, target))
goto fault;
break;
case 4:
memcpy(&d4, buf, 4);
- if (put_user(d4, target))
+ if (__put_user(d4, target))
goto fault;
break;
case 8:
memcpy(&d8, buf, 8);
- if (put_user(d8, target))
+ if (__put_user(d8, target))
goto fault;
break;
default:
@@ -370,30 +383,43 @@ static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 d2;
u8 d1;
- /* If instruction ran in kernel mode and the I/O buffer is in kernel space */
- if (!user_mode(ctxt->regs) && !access_ok(s, size)) {
- memcpy(buf, src, size);
- return ES_OK;
- }
-
+ /*
+ * This function uses __get_user() independent of whether kernel or user
+ * memory is accessed. This works fine because __get_user() does no
+ * sanity checks of the pointer being accessed. All that it does is
+ * to report when the access failed.
+ *
+ * Also, this function runs in atomic context, so __get_user() is not
+ * allowed to sleep. The page-fault handler detects that it is running
+ * in atomic context and will not try to take mmap_sem and handle the
+ * fault, so additional pagefault_enable()/disable() calls are not
+ * needed.
+ *
+ * The access can't be done via copy_from_user() here because
+ * vc_read_mem() must not use string instructions to access unsafe
+ * memory. The reason is that MOVS is emulated by the #VC handler by
+ * splitting the move up into a read and a write and taking a nested #VC
+ * exception on whatever of them is the MMIO access. Using string
+ * instructions here would cause infinite nesting.
+ */
switch (size) {
case 1:
- if (get_user(d1, s))
+ if (__get_user(d1, s))
goto fault;
memcpy(buf, &d1, 1);
break;
case 2:
- if (get_user(d2, s))
+ if (__get_user(d2, s))
goto fault;
memcpy(buf, &d2, 2);
break;
case 4:
- if (get_user(d4, s))
+ if (__get_user(d4, s))
goto fault;
memcpy(buf, &d4, 4);
break;
case 8:
- if (get_user(d8, s))
+ if (__get_user(d8, s))
goto fault;
memcpy(buf, &d8, 8);
break;
--
2.31.1
_______________________________________________
Virtualization mailing list
Virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-19 13:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-19 13:52 [PATCH v2 0/8] x86/sev-es: Fixes for SEV-ES Guest Support Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] x86/sev-es: Don't return NULL from sev_es_get_ghcb() Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-20 10:22 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] x86/sev-es: Forward page-faults which happen during emulation Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-20 10:22 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel [this message]
2021-05-19 13:52 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] x86/sev-es: Use __put_user()/__get_user() for data accesses Joerg Roedel
2021-05-20 10:22 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] x86/sev-es: Fix error message in runtime #VC handler Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] x86/sev-es: Leave NMI-mode before sending signals Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 17:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-05-19 17:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-05-19 19:13 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 19:13 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 19:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-05-19 19:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-05-19 13:52 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] x86/insn-eval: Make 0 a valid RIP for insn_get_effective_ip() Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] x86/insn: Extend error reporting from insn_fetch_from_user[_inatomic]() Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-05-21 14:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-21 14:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-19 13:52 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] x86/sev-es: Propagate #GP if getting linear instruction address failed Joerg Roedel
2021-05-19 13:52 ` Joerg Roedel
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