[PULL 0/6 for-6.2] AMD SEV patches

[PULL 0/6 for-6.2] AMD SEV patches

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

The following changes since commit 0055ecca84cb948c935224b4f7ca1ceb26209790:

  Merge tag 'vfio-fixes-20211117.0' of git://github.com/awilliam/qemu-vfio into staging (2021-11-18 09:39:47 +0100)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://gitlab.com/berrange/qemu tags/sev-hashes-pull-request

for you to fetch changes up to 58603ba2680fa35eade630e4b040e96953a11021:

  target/i386/sev: Replace qemu_map_ram_ptr with address_space_map (2021-11-18 13:28:32 +0000)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Add property for requesting AMD SEV measured kernel launch

 - The 'sev-guest' object gains a boolean 'kernel-hashes' property
   which must be enabled to request a measured kernel launch.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Dov Murik (6):
  qapi/qom,target/i386: sev-guest: Introduce kernel-hashes=on|off option
  target/i386/sev: Add kernel hashes only if sev-guest.kernel-hashes=on
  target/i386/sev: Rephrase error message when no hashes table in guest
    firmware
  target/i386/sev: Fail when invalid hashes table area detected
  target/i386/sev: Perform padding calculations at compile-time
  target/i386/sev: Replace qemu_map_ram_ptr with address_space_map

 qapi/qom.json     |  7 ++++-
 qemu-options.hx   |  6 +++-
 target/i386/sev.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 0/6 for-6.2] AMD SEV patches

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

The following changes since commit 0055ecca84cb948c935224b4f7ca1ceb26209790:

  Merge tag 'vfio-fixes-20211117.0' of git://github.com/awilliam/qemu-vfio into staging (2021-11-18 09:39:47 +0100)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://gitlab.com/berrange/qemu tags/sev-hashes-pull-request

for you to fetch changes up to 58603ba2680fa35eade630e4b040e96953a11021:

  target/i386/sev: Replace qemu_map_ram_ptr with address_space_map (2021-11-18 13:28:32 +0000)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Add property for requesting AMD SEV measured kernel launch

 - The 'sev-guest' object gains a boolean 'kernel-hashes' property
   which must be enabled to request a measured kernel launch.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Dov Murik (6):
  qapi/qom,target/i386: sev-guest: Introduce kernel-hashes=on|off option
  target/i386/sev: Add kernel hashes only if sev-guest.kernel-hashes=on
  target/i386/sev: Rephrase error message when no hashes table in guest
    firmware
  target/i386/sev: Fail when invalid hashes table area detected
  target/i386/sev: Perform padding calculations at compile-time
  target/i386/sev: Replace qemu_map_ram_ptr with address_space_map

 qapi/qom.json     |  7 ++++-
 qemu-options.hx   |  6 +++-
 target/i386/sev.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 1/6] qapi/qom,target/i386: sev-guest: Introduce kernel-hashes=on|off option

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Introduce new boolean 'kernel-hashes' option on the sev-guest object.
It will be used to to decide whether to add the hashes of
kernel/initrd/cmdline to SEV guest memory when booting with -kernel.
The default value is 'off'.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 qapi/qom.json     |  7 ++++++-
 qemu-options.hx   |  6 +++++-
 target/i386/sev.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/qapi/qom.json b/qapi/qom.json
index ccd1167808..eeb5395ff3 100644
--- a/qapi/qom.json
+++ b/qapi/qom.json
@@ -769,6 +769,10 @@
 # @reduced-phys-bits: number of bits in physical addresses that become
 #                     unavailable when SEV is enabled
 #
+# @kernel-hashes: if true, add hashes of kernel/initrd/cmdline to a
+#                 designated guest firmware page for measured boot
+#                 with -kernel (default: false) (since 6.2)
+#
 # Since: 2.12
 ##
 { 'struct': 'SevGuestProperties',
@@ -778,7 +782,8 @@
             '*policy': 'uint32',
             '*handle': 'uint32',
             '*cbitpos': 'uint32',
-            'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32' } }
+            'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32',
+            '*kernel-hashes': 'bool' } }
 
 ##
 # @ObjectType:
diff --git a/qemu-options.hx b/qemu-options.hx
index 7749f59300..ae2c6dbbfc 100644
--- a/qemu-options.hx
+++ b/qemu-options.hx
@@ -5189,7 +5189,7 @@ SRST
                  -object secret,id=sec0,keyid=secmaster0,format=base64,\\
                      data=$SECRET,iv=$(<iv.b64)
 
-    ``-object sev-guest,id=id,cbitpos=cbitpos,reduced-phys-bits=val,[sev-device=string,policy=policy,handle=handle,dh-cert-file=file,session-file=file]``
+    ``-object sev-guest,id=id,cbitpos=cbitpos,reduced-phys-bits=val,[sev-device=string,policy=policy,handle=handle,dh-cert-file=file,session-file=file,kernel-hashes=on|off]``
         Create a Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest object,
         which can be used to provide the guest memory encryption support
         on AMD processors.
@@ -5229,6 +5229,10 @@ SRST
         session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used for
         attestation. The file must be encoded in base64.
 
+        The ``kernel-hashes`` adds the hashes of given kernel/initrd/
+        cmdline to a designated guest firmware page for measured Linux
+        boot with -kernel. The default is off. (Since 6.2)
+
         e.g to launch a SEV guest
 
         .. parsed-literal::
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index eede07f11d..cad32812f5 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct SevGuestState {
     char *session_file;
     uint32_t cbitpos;
     uint32_t reduced_phys_bits;
+    bool kernel_hashes;
 
     /* runtime state */
     uint32_t handle;
@@ -327,6 +328,20 @@ sev_guest_set_sev_device(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
     sev->sev_device = g_strdup(value);
 }
 
+static bool sev_guest_get_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, Error **errp)
+{
+    SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(obj);
+
+    return sev->kernel_hashes;
+}
+
+static void sev_guest_set_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
+{
+    SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(obj);
+
+    sev->kernel_hashes = value;
+}
+
 static void
 sev_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
 {
@@ -345,6 +360,11 @@ sev_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
                                   sev_guest_set_session_file);
     object_class_property_set_description(oc, "session-file",
             "guest owners session parameters (encoded with base64)");
+    object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "kernel-hashes",
+                                   sev_guest_get_kernel_hashes,
+                                   sev_guest_set_kernel_hashes);
+    object_class_property_set_description(oc, "kernel-hashes",
+            "add kernel hashes to guest firmware for measured Linux boot");
 }
 
 static void
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 1/6] qapi/qom, target/i386: sev-guest: Introduce kernel-hashes=on|off option

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Introduce new boolean 'kernel-hashes' option on the sev-guest object.
It will be used to to decide whether to add the hashes of
kernel/initrd/cmdline to SEV guest memory when booting with -kernel.
The default value is 'off'.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 qapi/qom.json     |  7 ++++++-
 qemu-options.hx   |  6 +++++-
 target/i386/sev.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/qapi/qom.json b/qapi/qom.json
index ccd1167808..eeb5395ff3 100644
--- a/qapi/qom.json
+++ b/qapi/qom.json
@@ -769,6 +769,10 @@
 # @reduced-phys-bits: number of bits in physical addresses that become
 #                     unavailable when SEV is enabled
 #
+# @kernel-hashes: if true, add hashes of kernel/initrd/cmdline to a
+#                 designated guest firmware page for measured boot
+#                 with -kernel (default: false) (since 6.2)
+#
 # Since: 2.12
 ##
 { 'struct': 'SevGuestProperties',
@@ -778,7 +782,8 @@
             '*policy': 'uint32',
             '*handle': 'uint32',
             '*cbitpos': 'uint32',
-            'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32' } }
+            'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32',
+            '*kernel-hashes': 'bool' } }
 
 ##
 # @ObjectType:
diff --git a/qemu-options.hx b/qemu-options.hx
index 7749f59300..ae2c6dbbfc 100644
--- a/qemu-options.hx
+++ b/qemu-options.hx
@@ -5189,7 +5189,7 @@ SRST
                  -object secret,id=sec0,keyid=secmaster0,format=base64,\\
                      data=$SECRET,iv=$(<iv.b64)
 
-    ``-object sev-guest,id=id,cbitpos=cbitpos,reduced-phys-bits=val,[sev-device=string,policy=policy,handle=handle,dh-cert-file=file,session-file=file]``
+    ``-object sev-guest,id=id,cbitpos=cbitpos,reduced-phys-bits=val,[sev-device=string,policy=policy,handle=handle,dh-cert-file=file,session-file=file,kernel-hashes=on|off]``
         Create a Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest object,
         which can be used to provide the guest memory encryption support
         on AMD processors.
@@ -5229,6 +5229,10 @@ SRST
         session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used for
         attestation. The file must be encoded in base64.
 
+        The ``kernel-hashes`` adds the hashes of given kernel/initrd/
+        cmdline to a designated guest firmware page for measured Linux
+        boot with -kernel. The default is off. (Since 6.2)
+
         e.g to launch a SEV guest
 
         .. parsed-literal::
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index eede07f11d..cad32812f5 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct SevGuestState {
     char *session_file;
     uint32_t cbitpos;
     uint32_t reduced_phys_bits;
+    bool kernel_hashes;
 
     /* runtime state */
     uint32_t handle;
@@ -327,6 +328,20 @@ sev_guest_set_sev_device(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
     sev->sev_device = g_strdup(value);
 }
 
+static bool sev_guest_get_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, Error **errp)
+{
+    SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(obj);
+
+    return sev->kernel_hashes;
+}
+
+static void sev_guest_set_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
+{
+    SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(obj);
+
+    sev->kernel_hashes = value;
+}
+
 static void
 sev_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
 {
@@ -345,6 +360,11 @@ sev_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
                                   sev_guest_set_session_file);
     object_class_property_set_description(oc, "session-file",
             "guest owners session parameters (encoded with base64)");
+    object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "kernel-hashes",
+                                   sev_guest_get_kernel_hashes,
+                                   sev_guest_set_kernel_hashes);
+    object_class_property_set_description(oc, "kernel-hashes",
+            "add kernel hashes to guest firmware for measured Linux boot");
 }
 
 static void
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 2/6] target/i386/sev: Add kernel hashes only if sev-guest.kernel-hashes=on

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Commit cff03145ed3c ("sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes
for measured linux boot", 2021-09-30) introduced measured direct boot
with -kernel, using an OVMF-designated hashes table which QEMU fills.

However, if OVMF doesn't designate such an area, QEMU would completely
abort the VM launch.  This breaks launching with -kernel using older
OVMF images which don't publish the SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID.

Fix that so QEMU will only look for the hashes table if the sev-guest
kernel-hashes option is set to on.  Otherwise, QEMU won't look for the
designated area in OVMF and won't fill that area.

To enable addition of kernel hashes, launch the guest with:

    -object sev-guest,...,kernel-hashes=on

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index cad32812f5..e3abbeef68 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -1223,6 +1223,14 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
     int aligned_len;
 
+    /*
+     * Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
+     * stated kernel-hashes=on.
+     */
+    if (!sev_guest->kernel_hashes) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
     if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
         error_setg(errp, "SEV: kernel specified but OVMF has no hash table guid");
         return false;
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 2/6] target/i386/sev: Add kernel hashes only if sev-guest.kernel-hashes=on

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Commit cff03145ed3c ("sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes
for measured linux boot", 2021-09-30) introduced measured direct boot
with -kernel, using an OVMF-designated hashes table which QEMU fills.

However, if OVMF doesn't designate such an area, QEMU would completely
abort the VM launch.  This breaks launching with -kernel using older
OVMF images which don't publish the SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID.

Fix that so QEMU will only look for the hashes table if the sev-guest
kernel-hashes option is set to on.  Otherwise, QEMU won't look for the
designated area in OVMF and won't fill that area.

To enable addition of kernel hashes, launch the guest with:

    -object sev-guest,...,kernel-hashes=on

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index cad32812f5..e3abbeef68 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -1223,6 +1223,14 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
     int aligned_len;
 
+    /*
+     * Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
+     * stated kernel-hashes=on.
+     */
+    if (!sev_guest->kernel_hashes) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
     if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
         error_setg(errp, "SEV: kernel specified but OVMF has no hash table guid");
         return false;
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 3/6] target/i386/sev: Rephrase error message when no hashes table in guest firmware

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index e3abbeef68..6ff196f7ad 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -1232,7 +1232,8 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     }
 
     if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "SEV: kernel specified but OVMF has no hash table guid");
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: kernel specified but guest firmware "
+                         "has no hashes table GUID");
         return false;
     }
     area = (SevHashTableDescriptor *)data;
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 3/6] target/i386/sev: Rephrase error message when no hashes table in guest firmware

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index e3abbeef68..6ff196f7ad 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -1232,7 +1232,8 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     }
 
     if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
-        error_setg(errp, "SEV: kernel specified but OVMF has no hash table guid");
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: kernel specified but guest firmware "
+                         "has no hashes table GUID");
         return false;
     }
     area = (SevHashTableDescriptor *)data;
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 4/6] target/i386/sev: Fail when invalid hashes table area detected

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Commit cff03145ed3c ("sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes
for measured linux boot", 2021-09-30) introduced measured direct boot
with -kernel, using an OVMF-designated hashes table which QEMU fills.

However, no checks are performed on the validity of the hashes area
designated by OVMF.  Specifically, if OVMF publishes the
SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID entry but it is filled with zeroes, this will
cause QEMU to write the hashes entries over the first page of the
guest's memory (GPA 0).

Add validity checks to the published area.  If the hashes table area's
base address is zero, or its size is too small to fit the aligned hashes
table, display an error and stop the guest launch.  In such case, the
following error will be displayed:

    qemu-system-x86_64: SEV: guest firmware hashes table area is invalid (base=0x0 size=0x0)

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 6ff196f7ad..d11b512361 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     uint8_t kernel_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t *hashp;
     size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
-    int aligned_len;
+    int aligned_len = ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16);
 
     /*
      * Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
@@ -1237,6 +1237,11 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
         return false;
     }
     area = (SevHashTableDescriptor *)data;
+    if (!area->base || area->size < aligned_len) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: guest firmware hashes table area is invalid "
+                         "(base=0x%x size=0x%x)", area->base, area->size);
+        return false;
+    }
 
     /*
      * Calculate hash of kernel command-line with the terminating null byte. If
@@ -1295,7 +1300,6 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     memcpy(ht->kernel.hash, kernel_hash, sizeof(ht->kernel.hash));
 
     /* When calling sev_encrypt_flash, the length has to be 16 byte aligned */
-    aligned_len = ROUND_UP(ht->len, 16);
     if (aligned_len != ht->len) {
         /* zero the excess data so the measurement can be reliably calculated */
         memset(ht->padding, 0, aligned_len - ht->len);
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 4/6] target/i386/sev: Fail when invalid hashes table area detected

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Commit cff03145ed3c ("sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes
for measured linux boot", 2021-09-30) introduced measured direct boot
with -kernel, using an OVMF-designated hashes table which QEMU fills.

However, no checks are performed on the validity of the hashes area
designated by OVMF.  Specifically, if OVMF publishes the
SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID entry but it is filled with zeroes, this will
cause QEMU to write the hashes entries over the first page of the
guest's memory (GPA 0).

Add validity checks to the published area.  If the hashes table area's
base address is zero, or its size is too small to fit the aligned hashes
table, display an error and stop the guest launch.  In such case, the
following error will be displayed:

    qemu-system-x86_64: SEV: guest firmware hashes table area is invalid (base=0x0 size=0x0)

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 6ff196f7ad..d11b512361 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     uint8_t kernel_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t *hashp;
     size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
-    int aligned_len;
+    int aligned_len = ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16);
 
     /*
      * Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
@@ -1237,6 +1237,11 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
         return false;
     }
     area = (SevHashTableDescriptor *)data;
+    if (!area->base || area->size < aligned_len) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: guest firmware hashes table area is invalid "
+                         "(base=0x%x size=0x%x)", area->base, area->size);
+        return false;
+    }
 
     /*
      * Calculate hash of kernel command-line with the terminating null byte. If
@@ -1295,7 +1300,6 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     memcpy(ht->kernel.hash, kernel_hash, sizeof(ht->kernel.hash));
 
     /* When calling sev_encrypt_flash, the length has to be 16 byte aligned */
-    aligned_len = ROUND_UP(ht->len, 16);
     if (aligned_len != ht->len) {
         /* zero the excess data so the measurement can be reliably calculated */
         memset(ht->padding, 0, aligned_len - ht->len);
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 5/6] target/i386/sev: Perform padding calculations at compile-time

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

In sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes, the sizes of structs are known at
compile-time, so calculate needed padding at compile-time.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index d11b512361..4fd258a570 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -110,9 +110,19 @@ typedef struct QEMU_PACKED SevHashTable {
     SevHashTableEntry cmdline;
     SevHashTableEntry initrd;
     SevHashTableEntry kernel;
-    uint8_t padding[];
 } SevHashTable;
 
+/*
+ * Data encrypted by sev_encrypt_flash() must be padded to a multiple of
+ * 16 bytes.
+ */
+typedef struct QEMU_PACKED PaddedSevHashTable {
+    SevHashTable ht;
+    uint8_t padding[ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16) - sizeof(SevHashTable)];
+} PaddedSevHashTable;
+
+QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(PaddedSevHashTable) % 16 != 0);
+
 static SevGuestState *sev_guest;
 static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
 
@@ -1216,12 +1226,12 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     uint8_t *data;
     SevHashTableDescriptor *area;
     SevHashTable *ht;
+    PaddedSevHashTable *padded_ht;
     uint8_t cmdline_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t initrd_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t kernel_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t *hashp;
     size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
-    int aligned_len = ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16);
 
     /*
      * Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
@@ -1237,7 +1247,7 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
         return false;
     }
     area = (SevHashTableDescriptor *)data;
-    if (!area->base || area->size < aligned_len) {
+    if (!area->base || area->size < sizeof(PaddedSevHashTable)) {
         error_setg(errp, "SEV: guest firmware hashes table area is invalid "
                          "(base=0x%x size=0x%x)", area->base, area->size);
         return false;
@@ -1282,7 +1292,8 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
      * Populate the hashes table in the guest's memory at the OVMF-designated
      * area for the SEV hashes table
      */
-    ht = qemu_map_ram_ptr(NULL, area->base);
+    padded_ht = qemu_map_ram_ptr(NULL, area->base);
+    ht = &padded_ht->ht;
 
     ht->guid = sev_hash_table_header_guid;
     ht->len = sizeof(*ht);
@@ -1299,13 +1310,10 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     ht->kernel.len = sizeof(ht->kernel);
     memcpy(ht->kernel.hash, kernel_hash, sizeof(ht->kernel.hash));
 
-    /* When calling sev_encrypt_flash, the length has to be 16 byte aligned */
-    if (aligned_len != ht->len) {
-        /* zero the excess data so the measurement can be reliably calculated */
-        memset(ht->padding, 0, aligned_len - ht->len);
-    }
+    /* zero the excess data so the measurement can be reliably calculated */
+    memset(padded_ht->padding, 0, sizeof(padded_ht->padding));
 
-    if (sev_encrypt_flash((uint8_t *)ht, aligned_len, errp) < 0) {
+    if (sev_encrypt_flash((uint8_t *)padded_ht, sizeof(*padded_ht), errp) < 0) {
         return false;
     }
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 5/6] target/i386/sev: Perform padding calculations at compile-time

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

In sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes, the sizes of structs are known at
compile-time, so calculate needed padding at compile-time.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index d11b512361..4fd258a570 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -110,9 +110,19 @@ typedef struct QEMU_PACKED SevHashTable {
     SevHashTableEntry cmdline;
     SevHashTableEntry initrd;
     SevHashTableEntry kernel;
-    uint8_t padding[];
 } SevHashTable;
 
+/*
+ * Data encrypted by sev_encrypt_flash() must be padded to a multiple of
+ * 16 bytes.
+ */
+typedef struct QEMU_PACKED PaddedSevHashTable {
+    SevHashTable ht;
+    uint8_t padding[ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16) - sizeof(SevHashTable)];
+} PaddedSevHashTable;
+
+QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(PaddedSevHashTable) % 16 != 0);
+
 static SevGuestState *sev_guest;
 static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
 
@@ -1216,12 +1226,12 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     uint8_t *data;
     SevHashTableDescriptor *area;
     SevHashTable *ht;
+    PaddedSevHashTable *padded_ht;
     uint8_t cmdline_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t initrd_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t kernel_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t *hashp;
     size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
-    int aligned_len = ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16);
 
     /*
      * Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
@@ -1237,7 +1247,7 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
         return false;
     }
     area = (SevHashTableDescriptor *)data;
-    if (!area->base || area->size < aligned_len) {
+    if (!area->base || area->size < sizeof(PaddedSevHashTable)) {
         error_setg(errp, "SEV: guest firmware hashes table area is invalid "
                          "(base=0x%x size=0x%x)", area->base, area->size);
         return false;
@@ -1282,7 +1292,8 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
      * Populate the hashes table in the guest's memory at the OVMF-designated
      * area for the SEV hashes table
      */
-    ht = qemu_map_ram_ptr(NULL, area->base);
+    padded_ht = qemu_map_ram_ptr(NULL, area->base);
+    ht = &padded_ht->ht;
 
     ht->guid = sev_hash_table_header_guid;
     ht->len = sizeof(*ht);
@@ -1299,13 +1310,10 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     ht->kernel.len = sizeof(ht->kernel);
     memcpy(ht->kernel.hash, kernel_hash, sizeof(ht->kernel.hash));
 
-    /* When calling sev_encrypt_flash, the length has to be 16 byte aligned */
-    if (aligned_len != ht->len) {
-        /* zero the excess data so the measurement can be reliably calculated */
-        memset(ht->padding, 0, aligned_len - ht->len);
-    }
+    /* zero the excess data so the measurement can be reliably calculated */
+    memset(padded_ht->padding, 0, sizeof(padded_ht->padding));
 
-    if (sev_encrypt_flash((uint8_t *)ht, aligned_len, errp) < 0) {
+    if (sev_encrypt_flash((uint8_t *)padded_ht, sizeof(*padded_ht), errp) < 0) {
         return false;
     }
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 6/6] target/i386/sev: Replace qemu_map_ram_ptr with address_space_map

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Use address_space_map/unmap and check for errors.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
[Two lines wrapped for length - Daniel]
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 4fd258a570..025ff7a6f8 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "qapi/qmp/qerror.h"
 #include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h"
 #include "hw/i386/pc.h"
+#include "exec/address-spaces.h"
 
 #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest"
 OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST)
@@ -1232,6 +1233,9 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     uint8_t kernel_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t *hashp;
     size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
+    hwaddr mapped_len = sizeof(*padded_ht);
+    MemTxAttrs attrs = { 0 };
+    bool ret = true;
 
     /*
      * Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
@@ -1292,7 +1296,12 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
      * Populate the hashes table in the guest's memory at the OVMF-designated
      * area for the SEV hashes table
      */
-    padded_ht = qemu_map_ram_ptr(NULL, area->base);
+    padded_ht = address_space_map(&address_space_memory, area->base,
+                                  &mapped_len, true, attrs);
+    if (!padded_ht || mapped_len != sizeof(*padded_ht)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: cannot map hashes table guest memory area");
+        return false;
+    }
     ht = &padded_ht->ht;
 
     ht->guid = sev_hash_table_header_guid;
@@ -1314,10 +1323,13 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     memset(padded_ht->padding, 0, sizeof(padded_ht->padding));
 
     if (sev_encrypt_flash((uint8_t *)padded_ht, sizeof(*padded_ht), errp) < 0) {
-        return false;
+        ret = false;
     }
 
-    return true;
+    address_space_unmap(&address_space_memory, padded_ht,
+                        mapped_len, true, mapped_len);
+
+    return ret;
 }
 
 static void
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 6/6] target/i386/sev: Replace qemu_map_ram_ptr with address_space_map

[Daniel P. Berrangé]

From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

Use address_space_map/unmap and check for errors.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
[Two lines wrapped for length - Daniel]
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 4fd258a570..025ff7a6f8 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "qapi/qmp/qerror.h"
 #include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h"
 #include "hw/i386/pc.h"
+#include "exec/address-spaces.h"
 
 #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest"
 OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST)
@@ -1232,6 +1233,9 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     uint8_t kernel_hash[HASH_SIZE];
     uint8_t *hashp;
     size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
+    hwaddr mapped_len = sizeof(*padded_ht);
+    MemTxAttrs attrs = { 0 };
+    bool ret = true;
 
     /*
      * Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
@@ -1292,7 +1296,12 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
      * Populate the hashes table in the guest's memory at the OVMF-designated
      * area for the SEV hashes table
      */
-    padded_ht = qemu_map_ram_ptr(NULL, area->base);
+    padded_ht = address_space_map(&address_space_memory, area->base,
+                                  &mapped_len, true, attrs);
+    if (!padded_ht || mapped_len != sizeof(*padded_ht)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: cannot map hashes table guest memory area");
+        return false;
+    }
     ht = &padded_ht->ht;
 
     ht->guid = sev_hash_table_header_guid;
@@ -1314,10 +1323,13 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
     memset(padded_ht->padding, 0, sizeof(padded_ht->padding));
 
     if (sev_encrypt_flash((uint8_t *)padded_ht, sizeof(*padded_ht), errp) < 0) {
-        return false;
+        ret = false;
     }
 
-    return true;
+    address_space_unmap(&address_space_memory, padded_ht,
+                        mapped_len, true, mapped_len);
+
+    return ret;
 }
 
 static void
-- 
2.31.1

Re: [PULL 0/6 for-6.2] AMD SEV patches

[Richard Henderson]

On 11/18/21 2:35 PM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> The following changes since commit 0055ecca84cb948c935224b4f7ca1ceb26209790:
> 
>    Merge tag 'vfio-fixes-20211117.0' of git://github.com/awilliam/qemu-vfio into staging (2021-11-18 09:39:47 +0100)
> 
> are available in the Git repository at:
> 
>    https://gitlab.com/berrange/qemu tags/sev-hashes-pull-request
> 
> for you to fetch changes up to 58603ba2680fa35eade630e4b040e96953a11021:
> 
>    target/i386/sev: Replace qemu_map_ram_ptr with address_space_map (2021-11-18 13:28:32 +0000)
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Add property for requesting AMD SEV measured kernel launch
> 
>   - The 'sev-guest' object gains a boolean 'kernel-hashes' property
>     which must be enabled to request a measured kernel launch.
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Dov Murik (6):
>    qapi/qom,target/i386: sev-guest: Introduce kernel-hashes=on|off option
>    target/i386/sev: Add kernel hashes only if sev-guest.kernel-hashes=on
>    target/i386/sev: Rephrase error message when no hashes table in guest
>      firmware
>    target/i386/sev: Fail when invalid hashes table area detected
>    target/i386/sev: Perform padding calculations at compile-time
>    target/i386/sev: Replace qemu_map_ram_ptr with address_space_map
> 
>   qapi/qom.json     |  7 ++++-
>   qemu-options.hx   |  6 +++-
>   target/i386/sev.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>   3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

Applied, thanks.


r~