From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/7] x86/altcall: Optimise away endbr64 instruction where possible
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 12:56:28 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214125632.24563-4-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214125632.24563-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
With altcall, we convert indirect branches into direct ones. With that
complete, none of the potential targets need an endbr64 instruction.
Furthermore, removing the endbr64 instructions is a security defence-in-depth
improvement, because it limits the options available to an attacker who has
managed to hijack a function pointer.
Introduce new .init.{ro,}data.cf_clobber sections. Have _apply_alternatives()
walk over this, looking for any pointers into .text, and clobber an endbr64
instruction if found. This is some minor structure (ab)use but it works
alarmingly well.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
It would be nice for the printk() to say "optimised away %u of %u", but the
latter number can only feasibly come from post-processing of xen-syms during
the build.
v2:
* Drop hard tabs
* Add __initconst_cf_clobber too
* Change types to reduce casting
---
xen/arch/x86/alternative.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 6 ++++++
xen/include/xen/init.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
index 65537fe1f0bd..dd4609070001 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
@@ -173,6 +173,9 @@ text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
return memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
}
+extern void *const __initdata_cf_clobber_start[];
+extern void *const __initdata_cf_clobber_end[];
+
/*
* Replace instructions with better alternatives for this CPU type.
* This runs before SMP is initialized to avoid SMP problems with
@@ -330,6 +333,41 @@ static void init_or_livepatch _apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
add_nops(buf + a->repl_len, total_len - a->repl_len);
text_poke(orig, buf, total_len);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Clobber endbr64 instructions now that altcall has finished optimising
+ * all indirect branches to direct ones.
+ */
+ if ( force && cpu_has_xen_ibt )
+ {
+ void *const *val;
+ unsigned int clobbered = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * This is some minor structure (ab)use. We walk the entire contents
+ * of .init.{ro,}data.cf_clobber as if it were an array of pointers.
+ *
+ * If the pointer points into .text, and at an endbr64 instruction,
+ * nop out the endbr64. This causes the pointer to no longer be a
+ * legal indirect branch target under CET-IBT. This is a
+ * defence-in-depth measure, to reduce the options available to an
+ * adversary who has managed to hijack a function pointer.
+ */
+ for ( val = __initdata_cf_clobber_start;
+ val < __initdata_cf_clobber_end;
+ val++ )
+ {
+ void *ptr = *val;
+
+ if ( !is_kernel_text(ptr) || !is_endbr64(ptr) )
+ continue;
+
+ add_nops(ptr, 4);
+ clobbered++;
+ }
+
+ printk("altcall: Optimised away %u endbr64 instructions\n", clobbered);
+ }
}
void init_or_livepatch apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
index ca22e984f807..c399178ac123 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
@@ -221,6 +221,12 @@ SECTIONS
*(.initcall1.init)
__initcall_end = .;
+ . = ALIGN(POINTER_ALIGN);
+ __initdata_cf_clobber_start = .;
+ *(.init.data.cf_clobber)
+ *(.init.rodata.cf_clobber)
+ __initdata_cf_clobber_end = .;
+
*(.init.data)
*(.init.data.rel)
*(.init.data.rel.*)
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/init.h b/xen/include/xen/init.h
index bfe789e93f6b..0af0e234ec80 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/init.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/init.h
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
#define __init_call(lvl) __used_section(".initcall" lvl ".init")
#define __exit_call __used_section(".exitcall.exit")
+#define __initdata_cf_clobber __section(".init.data.cf_clobber")
+#define __initconst_cf_clobber __section(".init.rodata.cf_clobber")
+
/* These macros are used to mark some functions or
* initialized data (doesn't apply to uninitialized data)
* as `initialization' functions. The kernel can take this
--
2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-14 12:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-14 12:56 [PATCH v2 0/7] x86: Further harden function pointers Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:56 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] xen/altcall: Use __ro_after_init now that it exists Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:59 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:56 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] x86/altcall: Check and optimise altcall targets Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:56 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-02-14 13:06 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] x86/altcall: Optimise away endbr64 instruction where possible Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:51 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 16:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:16 ` Jan Beulich
2022-03-01 11:59 ` Jan Beulich
2022-03-01 14:51 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-03-01 14:58 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:56 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] xsm: Use __initconst_cf_clobber for xsm_ops Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:56 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] x86/hvm: Use __initdata_cf_clobber for hvm_funcs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:10 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:35 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:39 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:45 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:56 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] x86/ucode: Use altcall, and __initconst_cf_clobber Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:13 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:56 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] x86/vpmu: Harden indirect branches Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:14 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-21 18:03 ` [PATCH v2.1 8/7] x86/IOMMU: Use altcall, and __initconst_cf_clobber Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22 9:29 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-22 10:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22 11:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22 11:06 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-22 11:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22 11:04 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-22 11:47 ` [PATCH v2.2 " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22 12:10 ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-25 8:24 ` Jan Beulich
2022-03-01 14:58 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-03-02 8:10 ` Jan Beulich
2022-03-02 10:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-03-02 10:34 ` Jan Beulich
2022-03-02 13:39 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-03-02 19:57 ` Andrew Cooper
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220214125632.24563-4-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--to=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
--cc=roger.pau@citrix.com \
--cc=wl@xen.org \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.