All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	dianders@chromium.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	mka@chromium.org, sarthakkukreti@chromium.org, agk@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [dm-devel] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 09:13:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202209080912.00880AD6@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YxoJcG5MN4OdaulL@redhat.com>

On Thu, Sep 08, 2022 at 11:25:36AM -0400, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07 2022 at  6:34P -0400,
> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 7 Sep 2022 13:30:58 -0700, Matthias Kaehlcke wrote:
> > > Verity targets can be configured to ignore corrupted data blocks.
> > > LoadPin must only trust verity targets that are configured to
> > > perform some kind of enforcement when data corruption is detected,
> > > like returning an error, restarting the system or triggering a
> > > panic.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > [...]
> > 
> > Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
> > 
> > [1/1] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
> >       https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/2e1875c05267
> 
> Does this mean you're intending to send this upstream?  I prefer to
> take all DM changes unless there is an external dependency.

Oh! Yeah, I added it to my tree since you'd asked me to take the
original verity-loadpin series and this was a fix. I'm happy either
way. Shall I drop this change from my tree?

-- 
Kees Cook

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Cc: agk@redhat.com, mka@chromium.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	dianders@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	sarthakkukreti@chromium.org
Subject: Re: dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 09:13:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202209080912.00880AD6@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YxoJcG5MN4OdaulL@redhat.com>

On Thu, Sep 08, 2022 at 11:25:36AM -0400, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07 2022 at  6:34P -0400,
> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 7 Sep 2022 13:30:58 -0700, Matthias Kaehlcke wrote:
> > > Verity targets can be configured to ignore corrupted data blocks.
> > > LoadPin must only trust verity targets that are configured to
> > > perform some kind of enforcement when data corruption is detected,
> > > like returning an error, restarting the system or triggering a
> > > panic.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > [...]
> > 
> > Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
> > 
> > [1/1] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
> >       https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/2e1875c05267
> 
> Does this mean you're intending to send this upstream?  I prefer to
> take all DM changes unless there is an external dependency.

Oh! Yeah, I added it to my tree since you'd asked me to take the
original verity-loadpin series and this was a fix. I'm happy either
way. Shall I drop this change from my tree?

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2022-09-08 16:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-07 20:30 [dm-devel] [PATCH] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement Matthias Kaehlcke
2022-09-07 20:30 ` Matthias Kaehlcke
2022-09-07 20:45 ` [dm-devel] " Sarthak Kukreti
2022-09-07 20:45   ` Sarthak Kukreti
2022-09-07 22:34 ` [dm-devel] " Kees Cook
2022-09-07 22:34   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-08 15:25   ` [dm-devel] " Mike Snitzer
2022-09-08 15:25     ` Mike Snitzer
2022-09-08 16:13     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-09-08 16:13       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-08 16:31       ` [dm-devel] " Mike Snitzer
2022-09-08 16:31         ` Mike Snitzer

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=202209080912.00880AD6@keescook \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=agk@redhat.com \
    --cc=dianders@chromium.org \
    --cc=dm-devel@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mka@chromium.org \
    --cc=sarthakkukreti@chromium.org \
    --cc=snitzer@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.