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From: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
To: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <surajjs@amazon.com>, <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com>,
	<cascardo@canonical.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 11/34] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 13:54:51 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221027205452.17271-3-surajjs@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221027205452.17271-1-surajjs@amazon.com>

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit caa0ff24d5d0e02abce5e65c3d2b7f20a6617be5 upstream.

Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can
differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value
reflecting the current task's MSR content.

  [jpoimboe: rename]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c            |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 8a618fbf569f..6bc5a324dd65 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val);
 
 /*
  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 9249831fc3bb..b0768341afbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -47,11 +47,29 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
 
-/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
+/*
+ * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
+ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
+ */
+void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val)
+{
+	if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
+		return;
+
+	this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+}
+
 /*
  * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
  * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
@@ -1173,7 +1191,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 	}
 
 	switch (mode) {
@@ -1228,7 +1246,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
 {
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 }
 
 /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
@@ -1471,7 +1489,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 		} else {
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+			write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1676,7 +1694,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index a07b09f68e7e..6e000c6ec6be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
 	}
 
 	if (updmsr)
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(msr);
 }
 
 static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-10-27 21:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-27 20:48 [PATCH 4.14 00/34] Retbleed & PBRSB Mitigations Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/34] Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id" Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 02/34] x86/cpufeature: Add facility to check for min microcode revisions Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 03/34] x86/cpufeature: Fix various quality problems in the <asm/cpu_device_hd.h> header Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 04/34] x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/34] x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 06/34] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 07/34] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 08/34] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/34] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 10/34] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` Suraj Jitindar Singh [this message]
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 12/34] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/34] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 14/34] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 15/34] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 16/34] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/34] entel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 18/34] x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 19/34] x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 20/34] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/34] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 22/34] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 23/34] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 24/34] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/34] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 26/34] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 27/34] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 28/34] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/34] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 30/34] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 31/34] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 32/34] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:56 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/34] x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:56   ` [PATCH 4.14 34/34] x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-31  7:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/34] Retbleed & PBRSB Mitigations Greg KH
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-10-31  7:02 [PATCH 4.14 00/34] 4.14.297-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-31  7:02 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/34] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman

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