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From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, sjitindarsingh@gmail.com,
	cascardo@canonical.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	jpoimboe@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.14 00/34] Retbleed & PBRSB Mitigations
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 08:00:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y19ymueuSZ1MRrmm@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221027204801.13146-1-surajjs@amazon.com>

On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 01:48:01PM -0700, Suraj Jitindar Singh wrote:
> This backport adds support for Retbleed and PBRSB mitigations for Intel parts.
> 
> Some AMD parts are added to simplify context however support for IBPB or UNRET
> is not included in this series. The reporting of whether a cpu is affected
> should be correct however.
> 
> Most patches applied cleanly or required only context changes, the major
> difference between this series and upstream is the fact that the kvm entry
> path is in inline asm in the 4.14 tree and so this had to be accommodated
> in patches:
>  - x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
>  - x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections
> 
> This series is unsurprisingly very similar to that for the 5.4 backport [1].
> 
> Boot tested on a variety of Intel and AMD systems.
> 
> Tested correct reporting of vulnerabilities and mitigation selection on Skylake,
> Cascade Lake, Ice Lake and Zen3 parts.
> 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20221003131038.12645-1-cascardo@canonical.com/

Note, you forgot to sign off on a lot of these patches.  Whenever you
submit a patch, you need to also do that as the patch came through you.

I've queued these up now, and will go do a 4.14.y-rc release with just
these in it to get some testing separate from other changes.

thanks,

greg k-h

      parent reply	other threads:[~2022-10-31  7:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-27 20:48 [PATCH 4.14 00/34] Retbleed & PBRSB Mitigations Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/34] Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id" Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 02/34] x86/cpufeature: Add facility to check for min microcode revisions Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 03/34] x86/cpufeature: Fix various quality problems in the <asm/cpu_device_hd.h> header Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 04/34] x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/34] x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 06/34] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 07/34] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 08/34] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/34] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 10/34] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 11/34] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54   ` [PATCH 4.14 12/34] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:54 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/34] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 14/34] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 15/34] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 16/34] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/34] entel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 18/34] x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 19/34] x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 20/34] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/34] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 22/34] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 23/34] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 24/34] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/34] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 26/34] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 27/34] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 28/34] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/34] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 30/34] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 31/34] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:55   ` [PATCH 4.14 32/34] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:56 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/34] x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-27 20:56   ` [PATCH 4.14 34/34] x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections Suraj Jitindar Singh
2022-10-31  7:00 ` Greg KH [this message]

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