From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, rjw@rjwysocki.net,
gwendal@chromium.org, apronin@chromium.org,
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dlunev@google.com,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Ben Boeckel <me@benboeckel.net>,
jarkko@kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Ben Boeckel <linux@me.benboeckel.net>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 11:34:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202211041134.927C258@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221103105558.v4.5.I32591db064b6cdc91850d777f363c9d05c985b39@changeid>
On Thu, Nov 03, 2022 at 11:01:13AM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
>
> When TPMs generate keys, they can also generate some information
> describing the state of the PCRs at creation time. This data can then
> later be certified by the TPM, allowing verification of the PCR values.
> This allows us to determine the state of the system at the time a key
> was generated. Add an additional argument to the trusted key creation
> options, allowing the user to provide the set of PCRs that should have
> their values incorporated into the creation data.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210220013255.1083202-6-matthewgarrett@google.com/
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-04 18:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-03 18:01 [PATCH v4 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] tpm: Export and rename tpm2_find_and_validate_cc() Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 11:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:27 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 11:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-07 18:15 ` Evan Green
2022-11-11 20:04 ` Evan Green
2022-11-23 23:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 20:11 ` Evan Green
2022-11-10 0:29 ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:34 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:35 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:38 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10 0:29 ` Evan Green
2022-11-07 11:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:41 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:54 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10 0:30 ` Evan Green
2022-11-10 16:17 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10 18:32 ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-11-04 19:00 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10 0:30 ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green
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