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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, rjw@rjwysocki.net,
	gwendal@chromium.org, apronin@chromium.org,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dlunev@google.com,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Ben Boeckel <me@benboeckel.net>,
	jarkko@kernel.org, Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 11:41:49 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202211041139.15A90C4EED@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221103105558.v4.8.Ibd067e73916b9fae268a5824c2dd037416426af8@changeid>

On Thu, Nov 03, 2022 at 11:01:16AM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> When using encrypted hibernate images, have the TPM create a key for us
> and seal it. By handing back a sealed blob instead of the raw key, we
> prevent usermode from being able to decrypt and tamper with the
> hibernate image on a different machine.
> 
> We'll also go through the motions of having PCR23 set to a known value at
> the time of key creation and unsealing. Currently there's nothing that
> enforces the contents of PCR23 as a condition to unseal the key blob,
> that will come in a later change.
> 
> Sourced-from: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>

I'd say Suggested-by. "Source-from:" is not a tag that has ever been
used before. :)

Otherwise, looks good.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-04 18:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-03 18:01 [PATCH v4 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] tpm: Export and rename tpm2_find_and_validate_cc() Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:25   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 11:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:27   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 11:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-07 18:15     ` Evan Green
2022-11-11 20:04       ` Evan Green
2022-11-23 23:03       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:33   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 20:11     ` Evan Green
2022-11-10  0:29       ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:34   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:35   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:38   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10  0:29     ` Evan Green
2022-11-07 11:42   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:41   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:54   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10  0:30     ` Evan Green
2022-11-10 16:17       ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10 18:32         ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-11-04 19:00   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10  0:30     ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green

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