Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] Harden a few virtio bits

["Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>]

On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 03:57:15PM +0200, Alexander Shishkin wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> Here are 6 patches that harden console, net and 9p drivers against
> various malicious host input as well as close a bounds check bypass
> in the split virtio ring.

Hardening against buggy devices is one thing,
Hardening against malicious devices is another.
Which is this?
If really malicious, aren't there any spectre considerations here?
I am for example surprised not to find anything addressing
spectre v1 nor any uses of array_index_nospec here.


> Changes since previous version:
>  * Added Christian's R-B to 3/6
>  * Added a speculation fix per Michael's comment on the cover letter
>  * CC'ing lkml
> 
> Alexander Shishkin (3):
>   virtio console: Harden control message handling
>   virtio_net: Guard against buffer length overflow in
>     xdp_linearize_page()
>   virtio_ring: Prevent bounds check bypass on descriptor index
> 
> Andi Kleen (3):
>   virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input
>   virtio console: Harden port adding
>   virtio 9p: Fix an overflow
> 
>  drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
>  drivers/net/virtio_net.c      |  4 +++-
>  drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c  |  3 +++
>  net/9p/trans_virtio.c         |  2 +-
>  4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> -- 
> 2.39.0

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