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From: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com, yuan.yao@linux.intel.com,
	jingqi.liu@intel.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com,
	chao.gao@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: x86: Untag LAM bits when applicable
Date: Thu,  9 Feb 2023 10:40:18 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230209024022.3371768-6-robert.hu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230209024022.3371768-1-robert.hu@linux.intel.com>

Define kvm_untagged_addr() per LAM feature spec: Address high bits are sign
extended, from highest effective address bit.
Note that LAM_U48 and LA57 has some effective bits overlap. This patch
gives a WARN() on that case.

Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h     | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 66edd091f145..e4f14d1bdd2f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2163,6 +2163,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
 		     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
 			return 1;
+
+		data = kvm_untagged_addr(data, vcpu);
+
 		if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
 		    (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
 			return 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 312aea1854ae..1bdc8c0c80c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1809,6 +1809,10 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
 	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
 	case MSR_CSTAR:
 	case MSR_LSTAR:
+		/*
+		 * The strict canonical checking still applies to MSR
+		 * writing even LAM is enabled.
+		 */
 		if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
 			return 1;
 		break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 8ec5cc983062..7228895d4a6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -201,6 +201,38 @@ static inline bool is_noncanonical_address(u64 la, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return !__is_canonical_address(la, vcpu_virt_addr_bits(vcpu));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/* untag addr for guest, according to vCPU CR3 and CR4 settings */
+static inline u64 kvm_untagged_addr(u64 addr, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (addr >> 63 == 0) {
+		/* User pointers */
+		if (kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_LAM_U57)
+			addr = __canonical_address(addr, 57);
+		else if (kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_LAM_U48) {
+			/*
+			 * If guest enabled 5-level paging and LAM_U48,
+			 * bit 47 should be 0, bit 48:56 contains meta data
+			 * although bit 47:56 are valid 5-level address
+			 * bits.
+			 * If LAM_U48 and 4-level paging, bit47 is 0.
+			 */
+			WARN_ON(addr & _BITUL(47));
+			addr = __canonical_address(addr, 48);
+		}
+	} else if (kvm_read_cr4(vcpu) & X86_CR4_LAM_SUP) { /* Supervisor pointers */
+		if (kvm_read_cr4(vcpu) & X86_CR4_LA57)
+			addr = __canonical_address(addr, 57);
+		else
+			addr = __canonical_address(addr, 48);
+	}
+
+	return addr;
+}
+#else
+#define kvm_untagged_addr(addr, vcpu)	(addr)
+#endif
+
 static inline void vcpu_cache_mmio_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 					gva_t gva, gfn_t gfn, unsigned access)
 {
-- 
2.31.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-02-09  2:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-09  2:40 [PATCH v4 0/9] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] KVM: x86: Intercept CR4.LAM_SUP when LAM feature is enabled in guest Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  9:21   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09 12:48     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:29   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-02-10  5:02     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 16:30       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-14  1:27   ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-14  6:11     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  9:00       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-14 12:24         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14 12:36           ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  5:31           ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-16  5:54             ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Clear CR3 LAM bits when allocate shadow root Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  9:55   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09 13:02     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  2:55       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-15  1:17         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  2:14         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:38   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-02-11  3:12     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Commets update Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  6:59   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-10  7:55     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 16:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Integrate LAM bits when build guest CR3 Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 14:04   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-11  6:24     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-11  6:29       ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` Robert Hoo [this message]
2023-02-10 15:04   ` [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: x86: Untag LAM bits when applicable Chao Gao
2023-02-11  5:57     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  6:37       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] KVM: x86: When KVM judges CR3 valid or not, consider LAM bits Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  2:01   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-13 13:25     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  6:18       ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  7:00         ` Chao Gao
2023-02-18  5:44         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] KVM: x86: When guest set CR3, handle LAM bits semantics Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  3:31   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  5:28     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  6:48       ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] KVM: x86: emulation: Apply LAM when emulating data access Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  3:53   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  5:38     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] KVM: x86: LAM: Expose LAM CPUID to user space VMM Robert Hoo
2023-02-21  5:47   ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21  7:26     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-21  8:26       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 11:13         ` Yu Zhang
2023-02-21 13:18           ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 14:36             ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  6:15 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Chao Gao
2023-02-09 12:25   ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 17:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10  2:07       ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:17         ` Chao Gao
2023-02-10  8:41           ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  8:39         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  9:22           ` Chao Gao
2023-02-13  9:02 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-13 13:16   ` Robert Hoo

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