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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>, <yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>,
	<jingqi.liu@intel.com>, <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	<isaku.yamahata@intel.com>, <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/9] KVM: x86: Intercept CR4.LAM_SUP when LAM feature is enabled in guest
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 17:21:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y+S7ErkCpUADAn1x@gao-cwp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230209024022.3371768-2-robert.hu@linux.intel.com>

The subject doesn't match what the patch does; intercepting 
CR4.LAM_SUP isn't done by this patch. How about:

	Virtualize CR4.LAM_SUP

and in the changelog, explain a bit why CR4.LAM_SUP isn't
pass-thru'd and why no change to kvm/vmx_set_cr4() is needed.

On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 10:40:14AM +0800, Robert Hoo wrote:
>Remove CR4.LAM_SUP (bit 28) from default CR4_RESERVED_BITS, while reserve

s/(bit 28)//

>it in __cr4_reserved_bits() by feature testing.
>
>Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
>Reviewed-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-09  9:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-09  2:40 [PATCH v4 0/9] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] KVM: x86: Intercept CR4.LAM_SUP when LAM feature is enabled in guest Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  9:21   ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-02-09 12:48     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:29   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-02-10  5:02     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 16:30       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-14  1:27   ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-14  6:11     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  9:00       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-14 12:24         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14 12:36           ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  5:31           ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-16  5:54             ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Clear CR3 LAM bits when allocate shadow root Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  9:55   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09 13:02     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  2:55       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-15  1:17         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  2:14         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:38   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-02-11  3:12     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Commets update Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  6:59   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-10  7:55     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 16:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Integrate LAM bits when build guest CR3 Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 14:04   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-11  6:24     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-11  6:29       ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: x86: Untag LAM bits when applicable Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 15:04   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-11  5:57     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  6:37       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] KVM: x86: When KVM judges CR3 valid or not, consider LAM bits Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  2:01   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-13 13:25     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  6:18       ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  7:00         ` Chao Gao
2023-02-18  5:44         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] KVM: x86: When guest set CR3, handle LAM bits semantics Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  3:31   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  5:28     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  6:48       ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] KVM: x86: emulation: Apply LAM when emulating data access Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  3:53   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  5:38     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] KVM: x86: LAM: Expose LAM CPUID to user space VMM Robert Hoo
2023-02-21  5:47   ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21  7:26     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-21  8:26       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 11:13         ` Yu Zhang
2023-02-21 13:18           ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 14:36             ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  6:15 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Chao Gao
2023-02-09 12:25   ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 17:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10  2:07       ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:17         ` Chao Gao
2023-02-10  8:41           ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  8:39         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  9:22           ` Chao Gao
2023-02-13  9:02 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-13 13:16   ` Robert Hoo

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