Re: [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3

[Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>]

On Tue, 14 Feb 2023 12:17:37 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> Changes in v2
> use reverse xmas tree ordering in tls_set_sw_offload and
> do_tls_setsockopt_conf
> turn the alt_crypto_info into an else if
> selftests: add rekey_fail test
> 
> Vadim suggested simplifying tls_set_sw_offload by copying the new
> crypto_info in the context in do_tls_setsockopt_conf, and then
> detecting the rekey in tls_set_sw_offload based on whether the iv was
> already set, but I don't think we can have a common error path
> (otherwise we'd free the aead etc on rekey failure). I decided instead
> to reorganize tls_set_sw_offload so that the context is unmodified
> until we know the rekey cannot fail. Some fields will be touched
> during the rekey, but they will be set to the same value they had
> before the rekey (prot->rec_seq_size, etc).
> 
> Apoorv suggested to name the struct tls_crypto_info_keys "tls13"
> rather than "tls12". Since we're using the same crypto_info data for
> TLS1.3 as for 1.2, even if the tests only run for TLS1.3, I'd rather
> keep the "tls12" name, in case we end up adding a
> "tls13_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128" type in the future.
> 
> Kuniyuki and Apoorv also suggested preventing rekeys on RX when we
> haven't received a matching KeyUpdate message, but I'd rather let
> userspace handle this and have a symmetric API between TX and RX on
> the kernel side. It's a bit of a foot-gun, but we can't really stop a
> broken userspace from rolling back the rec_seq on an existing
> crypto_info either, and that seems like a worse possible breakage.

And how will we handle re-keying in offload?

>  include/net/tls.h                 |   4 +
>  net/tls/tls.h                     |   3 +-
>  net/tls/tls_device.c              |   2 +-
>  net/tls/tls_main.c                |  37 +++-
>  net/tls/tls_sw.c                  | 189 +++++++++++++----
>  tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 336 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-

Documentation please.