From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>,
"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Tsahee Zidenberg" <tsahee@annapurnalabs.com>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de>,
"Mahé Tardy" <mahe.tardy@isovalent.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 4/8] maccess: clarify kerneldoc comments
Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 22:33:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230522203352.738576-5-jolsa@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230522203352.738576-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
commit 4f6de12b375c37ba51f9412be7ed6ab44a7f71d8 upstream.
Add proper kerneldoc comments for probe_kernel_read_strict and
probe_kernel_read strncpy_from_unsafe_strict and explain the different
versus the non-strict version.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-5-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/maccess.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/maccess.c b/mm/maccess.c
index 3ca8d97e5010..d263c7b5e4eb 100644
--- a/mm/maccess.c
+++ b/mm/maccess.c
@@ -31,29 +31,36 @@ probe_write_common(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
}
/**
- * probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from a kernel-space location
+ * probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from any location
* @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
* @src: address to read from
* @size: size of the data chunk
*
- * Safely read from address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel fault
- * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
+ * Same as probe_kernel_read_strict() except that for architectures with
+ * not fully separated user and kernel address spaces this function also works
+ * for user address tanges.
+ *
+ * DO NOT USE THIS FUNCTION - it is broken on architectures with entirely
+ * separate kernel and user address spaces, and also a bad idea otherwise.
+ */
+long __weak probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
+ __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
+
+/**
+ * probe_kernel_read_strict(): safely attempt to read from kernel-space
+ * @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
+ * @src: address to read from
+ * @size: size of the data chunk
+ *
+ * Safely read from kernel address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel
+ * fault happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
*
* We ensure that the copy_from_user is executed in atomic context so that
* do_page_fault() doesn't attempt to take mmap_sem. This makes
* probe_kernel_read() suitable for use within regions where the caller
* already holds mmap_sem, or other locks which nest inside mmap_sem.
- *
- * probe_kernel_read_strict() is the same as probe_kernel_read() except for
- * the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address
- * ranges: probe_kernel_read_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for
- * probing memory on a user address range where probe_user_read() is supposed
- * to be used instead.
*/
-long __weak probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
- __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
-
long __weak probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
__attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
@@ -167,16 +174,35 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_user_write);
* If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes,
* sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count.
*
- * strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() is the same as strncpy_from_unsafe() except
- * for the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address
- * ranges: strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for
- * probing memory on a user address range where strncpy_from_unsafe_user() is
- * supposed to be used instead.
+ * Same as strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() except that for architectures with
+ * not fully separated user and kernel address spaces this function also works
+ * for user address tanges.
+ *
+ * DO NOT USE THIS FUNCTION - it is broken on architectures with entirely
+ * separate kernel and user address spaces, and also a bad idea otherwise.
*/
long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
__attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe")));
+/**
+ * strncpy_from_unsafe_strict: - Copy a NUL terminated string from unsafe
+ * address.
+ * @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at
+ * least @count bytes long.
+ * @unsafe_addr: Unsafe address.
+ * @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from unsafe address to kernel buffer.
+ *
+ * On success, returns the length of the string INCLUDING the trailing NUL.
+ *
+ * If access fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been copied
+ * and the trailing NUL added).
+ *
+ * If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes,
+ * sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count.
+ */
long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr,
long count)
__attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe")));
--
2.40.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>,
"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Tsahee Zidenberg" <tsahee@annapurnalabs.com>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de>,
"Mahé Tardy" <mahe.tardy@isovalent.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 4/8] maccess: clarify kerneldoc comments
Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 22:33:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230522203352.738576-5-jolsa@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230522203352.738576-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
commit 4f6de12b375c37ba51f9412be7ed6ab44a7f71d8 upstream.
Add proper kerneldoc comments for probe_kernel_read_strict and
probe_kernel_read strncpy_from_unsafe_strict and explain the different
versus the non-strict version.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-5-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/maccess.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/maccess.c b/mm/maccess.c
index 3ca8d97e5010..d263c7b5e4eb 100644
--- a/mm/maccess.c
+++ b/mm/maccess.c
@@ -31,29 +31,36 @@ probe_write_common(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
}
/**
- * probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from a kernel-space location
+ * probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from any location
* @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
* @src: address to read from
* @size: size of the data chunk
*
- * Safely read from address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel fault
- * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
+ * Same as probe_kernel_read_strict() except that for architectures with
+ * not fully separated user and kernel address spaces this function also works
+ * for user address tanges.
+ *
+ * DO NOT USE THIS FUNCTION - it is broken on architectures with entirely
+ * separate kernel and user address spaces, and also a bad idea otherwise.
+ */
+long __weak probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
+ __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
+
+/**
+ * probe_kernel_read_strict(): safely attempt to read from kernel-space
+ * @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
+ * @src: address to read from
+ * @size: size of the data chunk
+ *
+ * Safely read from kernel address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel
+ * fault happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
*
* We ensure that the copy_from_user is executed in atomic context so that
* do_page_fault() doesn't attempt to take mmap_sem. This makes
* probe_kernel_read() suitable for use within regions where the caller
* already holds mmap_sem, or other locks which nest inside mmap_sem.
- *
- * probe_kernel_read_strict() is the same as probe_kernel_read() except for
- * the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address
- * ranges: probe_kernel_read_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for
- * probing memory on a user address range where probe_user_read() is supposed
- * to be used instead.
*/
-long __weak probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
- __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
-
long __weak probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
__attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
@@ -167,16 +174,35 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_user_write);
* If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes,
* sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count.
*
- * strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() is the same as strncpy_from_unsafe() except
- * for the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address
- * ranges: strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for
- * probing memory on a user address range where strncpy_from_unsafe_user() is
- * supposed to be used instead.
+ * Same as strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() except that for architectures with
+ * not fully separated user and kernel address spaces this function also works
+ * for user address tanges.
+ *
+ * DO NOT USE THIS FUNCTION - it is broken on architectures with entirely
+ * separate kernel and user address spaces, and also a bad idea otherwise.
*/
long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
__attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe")));
+/**
+ * strncpy_from_unsafe_strict: - Copy a NUL terminated string from unsafe
+ * address.
+ * @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at
+ * least @count bytes long.
+ * @unsafe_addr: Unsafe address.
+ * @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from unsafe address to kernel buffer.
+ *
+ * On success, returns the length of the string INCLUDING the trailing NUL.
+ *
+ * If access fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been copied
+ * and the trailing NUL added).
+ *
+ * If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes,
+ * sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count.
+ */
long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr,
long count)
__attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe")));
--
2.40.1
_______________________________________________
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linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-22 20:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-22 20:33 [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 0/8] bpf: Fix bpf_probe_read/bpf_probe_read_str helpers Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 1/8] uaccess: Add strict non-pagefault kernel-space read function Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 2/8] bpf: Add probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 3/8] bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only to archs where they work Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa [this message]
2023-05-22 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 4/8] maccess: clarify kerneldoc comments Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 5/8] maccess: rename strncpy_from_unsafe_user to strncpy_from_user_nofault Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 6/8] maccess: rename strncpy_from_unsafe_strict to strncpy_from_kernel_nofault Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 7/8] bpf: rework the compat kernel probe handling Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 8/8] bpf: bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has to return amount of data read on success Jiri Olsa
2023-05-22 20:33 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-26 18:54 ` [RFC PATCH stable 5.4 0/8] bpf: Fix bpf_probe_read/bpf_probe_read_str helpers Greg KH
2023-05-26 18:54 ` Greg KH
2023-05-28 20:02 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-28 20:02 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-29 8:37 ` Greg KH
2023-05-29 8:37 ` Greg KH
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