From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: Ishizaki Kou <kou.ishizaki@toshiba.co.jp>,
Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH][next] net: spider_net: Use size_add() in call to struct_size()
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 12:53:20 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202309151253.844C8BFCA3@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZQSvsLmJrDsKtLCa@work>
On Fri, Sep 15, 2023 at 01:25:36PM -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> If, for any reason, the open-coded arithmetic causes a wraparound,
> the protection that `struct_size()` adds against potential integer
> overflows is defeated. Fix this by hardening call to `struct_size()`
> with `size_add()`.
>
> Fixes: 3f1071ec39f7 ("net: spider_net: Use struct_size() helper")
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH][next] net: spider_net: Use size_add() in call to struct_size()
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 12:53:20 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202309151253.844C8BFCA3@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZQSvsLmJrDsKtLCa@work>
On Fri, Sep 15, 2023 at 01:25:36PM -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> If, for any reason, the open-coded arithmetic causes a wraparound,
> the protection that `struct_size()` adds against potential integer
> overflows is defeated. Fix this by hardening call to `struct_size()`
> with `size_add()`.
>
> Fixes: 3f1071ec39f7 ("net: spider_net: Use struct_size() helper")
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-15 19:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-15 19:25 [PATCH][next] net: spider_net: Use size_add() in call to struct_size() Gustavo A. R. Silva
2023-09-15 19:25 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2023-09-15 19:53 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-09-15 19:53 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-16 0:21 ` Geoff Levand
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