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From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, paul@paul-moore.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
	daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org,
	renauld@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2023 00:13:06 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202309302332.1mxVwb0U-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230928202410.3765062-4-kpsingh@kernel.org>

Hi KP,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on bpf-next/master]
[also build test ERROR on bpf/master pcmoore-selinux/next linus/master v6.6-rc3 next-20230929]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/KP-Singh/kernel-Add-helper-macros-for-loop-unrolling/20230929-042610
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230928202410.3765062-4-kpsingh%40kernel.org
patch subject: [PATCH v5 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
config: i386-randconfig-001-20230930 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230930/202309302332.1mxVwb0U-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230930/202309302332.1mxVwb0U-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202309302332.1mxVwb0U-lkp@intel.com/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> security/security.c:139:1: error: Only string constants are supported as initializers for randomized structures with flexible arrays
     139 | };
         | ^


vim +139 security/security.c

   118	
   119	/*
   120	 * Initialise a table of static calls for each LSM hook.
   121	 * DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL invocation above generates a key (STATIC_CALL_KEY)
   122	 * and a trampoline (STATIC_CALL_TRAMP) which are used to call
   123	 * __static_call_update when updating the static call.
   124	 */
   125	struct lsm_static_calls_table static_calls_table __ro_after_init = {
   126	#define INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME)					\
   127		(struct lsm_static_call) {					\
   128			.key = &STATIC_CALL_KEY(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM)),	\
   129			.trampoline = LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM),		\
   130			.active = &SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM),		\
   131		},
   132	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...)				\
   133		.NAME = {							\
   134			LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL, NAME)		\
   135		},
   136	#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
   137	#undef LSM_HOOK
   138	#undef INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL
 > 139	};
   140	

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-30 16:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-28 20:24 [PATCH v5 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-09-29  0:37   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-30 16:13   ` kernel test robot [this message]
2023-09-30 20:40     ` Kees Cook
2023-10-04  0:09       ` KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-10-05  8:09   ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-05 13:26     ` KP Singh
2023-10-05 13:27       ` KP Singh
2023-10-05 13:52         ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-05 16:07           ` KP Singh
2023-10-06  7:27             ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-06  9:05               ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-06 10:57                 ` KP Singh
2023-10-06 18:32                   ` KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-09-29  0:38   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-29  0:41 ` [PATCH v5 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls Kees Cook
2023-10-02 11:06 ` Paolo Abeni
2023-10-02 11:09   ` KP Singh
2023-10-02 13:27     ` Paolo Abeni

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