From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2023 00:28:28 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231005212828.veeekxqc7rwvrbig@box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8d0e4e71-0614-618a-0f84-55eeb6d27a6d@amd.com>
On Thu, Oct 05, 2023 at 01:41:38PM -0500, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
> > +static void unshare_all_memory(bool unmap)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long addr, end;
> > + long found = 0, shared;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private,
> > + */
> > +
> > + addr = PAGE_OFFSET;
> > + end = PAGE_OFFSET + get_max_mapped();
> > +
> > + while (addr < end) {
> > + unsigned long size;
> > + unsigned int level;
> > + pte_t *pte;
> > +
> > + pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
>
> IIRC, you were earlier walking the direct mapping using
> walk_page_range_novma(), any particular reason to use lookup_address()
> instead ?
walk_page_range_novma() wants mmap lock to be taken, but it is tricky as
we run here from atomic context in case of crash.
I considered using trylock to bypass the limitation, but it is a hack.
>
> > + size = page_level_size(level);
> > +
> > + if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte)) {
>
> Additionally need to add check for pte_none() here to handle physical memory
> holes in direct mapping.
lookup_address() returns NULL for none entries.
> > + int pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Touching memory with shared bit set triggers implicit
> > + * conversion to shared.
> > + *
> > + * Make sure nobody touches the shared range from
> > + * now on.
> > + *
> > + * Bypass unmapping for crash scenario. Unmapping
> > + * requires sleepable context, but in crash case kernel
> > + * hits the code path with interrupts disabled.
>
> In case of SNP we will need to temporarily enable interrupts during this
> unsharing as we invoke set_memory_encrypted() which then hits a BUG_ON() in
> cpa_flush() if interrupts are disabled.
Do you really need full set_memory_encrypted()? Can't you do something
ligher?
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2023 00:28:28 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231005212828.veeekxqc7rwvrbig@box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8d0e4e71-0614-618a-0f84-55eeb6d27a6d@amd.com>
On Thu, Oct 05, 2023 at 01:41:38PM -0500, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
> > +static void unshare_all_memory(bool unmap)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long addr, end;
> > + long found = 0, shared;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private,
> > + */
> > +
> > + addr = PAGE_OFFSET;
> > + end = PAGE_OFFSET + get_max_mapped();
> > +
> > + while (addr < end) {
> > + unsigned long size;
> > + unsigned int level;
> > + pte_t *pte;
> > +
> > + pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
>
> IIRC, you were earlier walking the direct mapping using
> walk_page_range_novma(), any particular reason to use lookup_address()
> instead ?
walk_page_range_novma() wants mmap lock to be taken, but it is tricky as
we run here from atomic context in case of crash.
I considered using trylock to bypass the limitation, but it is a hack.
>
> > + size = page_level_size(level);
> > +
> > + if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte)) {
>
> Additionally need to add check for pte_none() here to handle physical memory
> holes in direct mapping.
lookup_address() returns NULL for none entries.
> > + int pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Touching memory with shared bit set triggers implicit
> > + * conversion to shared.
> > + *
> > + * Make sure nobody touches the shared range from
> > + * now on.
> > + *
> > + * Bypass unmapping for crash scenario. Unmapping
> > + * requires sleepable context, but in crash case kernel
> > + * hits the code path with interrupts disabled.
>
> In case of SNP we will need to temporarily enable interrupts during this
> unsharing as we invoke set_memory_encrypted() which then hits a BUG_ON() in
> cpa_flush() if interrupts are disabled.
Do you really need full set_memory_encrypted()? Can't you do something
ligher?
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-05 21:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-05 13:13 [PATCH 00/13] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-06 10:22 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-06 10:22 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-06 11:59 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-06 11:59 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-06 18:33 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-06 18:33 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-09 13:32 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-09 13:32 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 02/13] kernel/cpu: Add support for declaring CPU hotplug not supported Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-10 13:35 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-10 13:35 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-11 13:07 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-11 13:07 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-11 13:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-11 13:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 03/13] cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU hotplug for ACPI MADT wakeup Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-10 10:24 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-10 10:24 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 11:58 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 11:58 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 12:42 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-20 12:42 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-10 13:39 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-10 13:39 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-11 13:09 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-11 13:09 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86/kvm: Do not try to disable kvmclock if it was not enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-06 14:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-06 14:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-06 14:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-06 14:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-10 13:53 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-10 13:53 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-11 13:11 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-11 13:11 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-09 12:30 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-09 12:30 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-09 13:32 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-09 13:32 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 08/13] KVM: x86: Add config option to gate emergency virt callback support Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86/tdx: Account shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-10 10:05 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-10 10:05 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-11 13:14 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-11 13:14 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-05 13:13 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 18:41 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-05 18:41 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-05 21:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2023-10-05 21:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 22:01 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-05 22:01 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-05 22:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 22:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-06 19:24 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-06 19:24 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-20 9:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-20 9:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-20 9:39 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-20 9:39 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-06 14:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-06 14:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-06 15:11 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-06 15:11 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-06 22:15 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-06 22:15 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-08 8:35 ` Baoquan He
2023-10-08 8:35 ` Baoquan He
2023-10-09 13:35 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-09 13:35 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:14 ` [PATCH 11/13] x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:14 ` [PATCH 12/13] x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-05 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-20 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 9:29 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-20 9:29 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-05 13:14 ` [PATCH 13/13] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-20 9:49 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 9:49 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 10:42 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-20 10:42 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-20 11:21 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 11:21 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-20 12:34 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-20 12:34 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-10-08 23:49 ` [PATCH 00/13] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Baoquan He
2023-10-08 23:49 ` Baoquan He
2023-10-09 13:36 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-09 13:36 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-10-09 14:13 ` Baoquan He
2023-10-09 14:13 ` Baoquan He
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