From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org,
decui@microsoft.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
ravi.v.shankar@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v1 10/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 10:29:50 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231108183003.5981-11-xin3.li@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231108183003.5981-1-xin3.li@intel.com>
Handle host initiated FRED MSR access requests to allow FRED context
to be set/get from user level.
During VM save/restore and live migration, FRED context needs to be
saved/restored, which requires FRED MSRs to be accessed from a user
level application, e.g., Qemu.
Note, handling of MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0, i.e., MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, is not
added yet, which needs to be aligned with KVM CET patch set.
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 23 ++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 95 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index d00ab9d4c93e..58d01e845804 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1429,6 +1429,24 @@ static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
preempt_enable();
vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
}
+
+static u64 vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ preempt_disable();
+ if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+ vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 = read_msr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0);
+ preempt_enable();
+ return vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
+{
+ preempt_disable();
+ if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, data);
+ preempt_enable();
+ vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 = data;
+}
#endif
void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
@@ -2028,6 +2046,33 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0:
+ msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(vmx);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
+ msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG);
+ break;
#endif
case MSR_EFER:
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
@@ -2233,6 +2278,33 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
}
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0:
+ vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(vmx, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1:
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2:
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3:
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS:
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1:
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2:
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3:
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3, data);
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, data);
+ break;
#endif
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 2c924075f6f1..c5a55810647f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1451,6 +1451,9 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_base[] = {
MSR_STAR,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
MSR_CSTAR, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR,
+ MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2,
+ MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3, MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1,
+ MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3, MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG,
#endif
MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA,
MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX,
@@ -1890,6 +1893,16 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
data = (u32)data;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
+ if (host_initiated || guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Inject #GP upon FRED MSRs accesses from a non-FRED guest to
+ * make sure no malicious guest can write to FRED MSRs thus to
+ * corrupt host FRED MSRs.
+ */
+ return 1;
}
msr.data = data;
@@ -1933,6 +1946,16 @@ int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data,
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
return 1;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
+ if (host_initiated || guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Inject #GP upon FRED MSRs accesses from a non-FRED guest to
+ * make sure no malicious guest can write to FRED MSRs thus to
+ * corrupt host FRED MSRs.
+ */
+ return 1;
}
msr.index = index;
--
2.42.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-08 19:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-08 18:29 [PATCH v1 00/23] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 01/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 02/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 03/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 04/23] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 05/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2023-11-09 8:53 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 15:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-10 0:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10 15:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14 4:05 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-13 17:18 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15 2:39 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 06/23] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2023-11-09 9:15 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 23:50 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10 0:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14 2:50 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-15 21:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 07/23] KVM: VMX: Disable intercepting FRED MSRs Xin Li
2023-11-09 9:21 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 08/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2023-11-13 3:04 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 6:02 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 6:51 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 09/23] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2023-11-13 3:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 5:17 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 7:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 3:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` Xin Li [this message]
2023-11-13 5:24 ` [PATCH v1 10/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:48 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 11/23] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2023-11-13 7:35 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:42 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 8:16 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 18:57 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20 9:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 12/23] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2023-11-13 10:14 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:34 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 8:58 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 2:52 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-16 2:39 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-20 8:16 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 13/23] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Xin Li
2023-11-14 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 3:03 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-06 8:37 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-07 8:42 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-07 10:09 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-08 1:56 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-08 23:48 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 14/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2023-11-14 14:36 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15 2:41 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 15/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-09 8:21 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-10 0:12 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20 15:52 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-11-20 17:42 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 16/23] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 17/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 18/23] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 19/23] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 20/23] KVM: selftests: Add FRED VMCS fields to evmcs Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 21/23] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 22/23] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 23/23] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li
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