From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: elena.reshetova@intel.com, virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org,
virtualization@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [virtio-dev] Re: Using packed virtqueues in Confidential VMs
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 17:26:42 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231116172507-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231116200245.GA336841@fedora>
On Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 03:02:45PM -0500, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> Hi Elena,
> You raised concerns about using packed virtqueues with untrusted devices at
> Linux Plumbers Conference. I reviewed the specification and did not find
> fundamental issues that would preclude the use of packed virtqueues in
> untrusted devices. Do you have more information about issues with packed
> virtqueues?
>
> I also reviewed Linux's virtio_ring.c to look for implementation issues. One
> thing I noticed was that detach_buf_packed -> vring_unmap_desc_packed trusts
> the fields of indirect descriptors that have been mapped to the device:
>
> flags = le16_to_cpu(desc->flags);
>
> dma_unmap_page(vring_dma_dev(vq),
> le64_to_cpu(desc->addr),
> le32_to_cpu(desc->len),
> (flags & VRING_DESC_F_WRITE) ?
> DMA_FROM_DEVICE : DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>
> This could be problematic if the device is able to modify indirect descriptors.
> However, the indirect descriptor table is mapped with DMA_TO_DEVICE:
>
> addr = vring_map_single(vq, desc,
> total_sg * sizeof(struct vring_packed_desc),
> DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>
> There is no problem when there is an enforcing IOMMU that maps the page with
> read-only permissions but that's not always the case. Software devices (QEMU,
> vhost kernel, or vhost-user) usually have full access to guest RAM.
Not with encrypted memory.
> They can
> cause dma_unmap_page() to be invoked with arguments of their choice (except for
> the first argument) by modifying indirect descriptors.
> I am not sure if this poses a danger since software devices already have access
> to guest RAM, but I think this code is risky. It would be safer for the driver
> to stash away the arguments needed for dma_unmap_page() in memory that is not
> mapped to the device.
>
> Other than that, I didn't find any issues with the packed virtqueue
> implementation.
>
> Stefan
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: elena.reshetova@intel.com, virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org,
virtualization@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: Using packed virtqueues in Confidential VMs
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 17:26:42 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231116172507-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231116200245.GA336841@fedora>
On Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 03:02:45PM -0500, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> Hi Elena,
> You raised concerns about using packed virtqueues with untrusted devices at
> Linux Plumbers Conference. I reviewed the specification and did not find
> fundamental issues that would preclude the use of packed virtqueues in
> untrusted devices. Do you have more information about issues with packed
> virtqueues?
>
> I also reviewed Linux's virtio_ring.c to look for implementation issues. One
> thing I noticed was that detach_buf_packed -> vring_unmap_desc_packed trusts
> the fields of indirect descriptors that have been mapped to the device:
>
> flags = le16_to_cpu(desc->flags);
>
> dma_unmap_page(vring_dma_dev(vq),
> le64_to_cpu(desc->addr),
> le32_to_cpu(desc->len),
> (flags & VRING_DESC_F_WRITE) ?
> DMA_FROM_DEVICE : DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>
> This could be problematic if the device is able to modify indirect descriptors.
> However, the indirect descriptor table is mapped with DMA_TO_DEVICE:
>
> addr = vring_map_single(vq, desc,
> total_sg * sizeof(struct vring_packed_desc),
> DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>
> There is no problem when there is an enforcing IOMMU that maps the page with
> read-only permissions but that's not always the case. Software devices (QEMU,
> vhost kernel, or vhost-user) usually have full access to guest RAM.
Not with encrypted memory.
> They can
> cause dma_unmap_page() to be invoked with arguments of their choice (except for
> the first argument) by modifying indirect descriptors.
> I am not sure if this poses a danger since software devices already have access
> to guest RAM, but I think this code is risky. It would be safer for the driver
> to stash away the arguments needed for dma_unmap_page() in memory that is not
> mapped to the device.
>
> Other than that, I didn't find any issues with the packed virtqueue
> implementation.
>
> Stefan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-16 22:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-16 20:02 [virtio-dev] Using packed virtqueues in Confidential VMs Stefan Hajnoczi
2023-11-16 20:02 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2023-11-16 22:26 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2023-11-16 22:26 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-11-20 10:13 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-11-20 11:02 ` [virtio-dev] " Stefan Hajnoczi
2023-11-20 11:02 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2023-11-20 12:29 ` [virtio-dev] " Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-11-20 12:29 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-11-21 11:02 ` Reshetova, Elena
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